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Abstract 
Financing environmental sustainability for small 
landholders in Guatemala: Exploring the potential  
of the Carbon Banking Approach  
 
by 
Giovanni Fernando Garcia-Barrios 
 
Carbon sequestration through forestry or agro-forestry is an option for reducing carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere.  Carbon markets have been identified as potentially being an important 
contributor to slowing deforestation and forest degradation by providing payments to small 
landholders to sequester carbon.  This is also the case in Guatemala, where 43.4% of land is 
held by small landholders, much of which is forested or could be forested.  However, small 
landholders face limitations to tap into carbon markets. One limitation relates to market 
exclusion because of landholding size, as carbon markets require large scale forestry projects 
to provide stable carbon stocks over time. Small landholders might be exposed to release of 
carbon through intentional disturbances such as landholders’ decisions about land use, and 
unintentional disturbances such as drought, floods, forest fire, pests and landslides. There are 
also institutional limitations in the structure of carbon markets. For instance, international 
carbon markets require a single upfront payment.  Also, costs tend to be high for carbon projects 
when small landholders are involved.  Carbon banking, which is based on an annual carbon 
rental market, may potentially overcome these limitations faced by small forest owners.  This 
approach uses a financial institution that aggregates deposits of forest carbon from small 
landholders (depositors) in exchange for annual rental payments, and then rents out forest 
carbon to those who have carbon liabilities (renters). This research investigates the stability of 
carbon pools formed by small landholders and the ability of a bank to structure payments to 
small landholders in a lease arrangement, after accounting for forest fires, forest pests and 
landholders’ decisions about land use, administrative costs and international carbon prices.  
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To investigate the carbon bank approach, a mathematical model was designed to model 
variables associated with the risk small landholders’ forest carbon is exposed to and how the 
bank should structure payments to small landholders considering risks of fire, pest, landholders’ 
preferences on land use (socioeconomic), and changes in international carbon prices and 
administrative costs.  For forest fires, this study uses data on area burnt annually in three regions 
in Guatemala (Dry, Wet and Moist, and Montane) to estimate the risk of loss of forest area due 
to fire.  This information was used in a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the 95th percentile 
annual proportion of area burnt by fire in each region.  To estimate the combined effect of forest 
fire, pest and socioeconomic risks the Montane region was chosen to assess the carbon bank 
approach.  The results for fires in the Montane region showed that 98.87% of forest carbon 
under contract from small landholders can be made available for renting out in the carbon rental 
market.  For pests 99.95% of carbon is available to lease.  Further, landholders’ decisions about 
land use were modelled using a double hurdle model.  Model output showed that 99.8% of 
carbon is available to the bank for renting out.  After combining these risks using joint 
probability theory, the bank is able to rent out 97% of forest carbon deposited.  
Taking into account the effect of biophysical (forest fire and pests) and socioeconomic (land 
use change) risks, administrative costs and international carbon prices, a carbon banking 
viability analysis was undertaken.  The main assumptions for this analysis are: a constant 
interest rate (λ) of 4.9%, the total area of forest in the Montane region (Ar), the proportion of 
sequestered carbon deposited in the bank by small holdings (Wir), and density of carbon 
sequestered by a landholder (Dir).  Complementary variables for the carbon banking analysis 
from this research are: carbon deposited is 1.494 M tCO2e if the whole forested areas is banked, 
risk-adjusted carbon available to rent out is 1.449 M tCO2e, total cost estimates from this study 
($743,272), total cost estimates from related work ($265,670), and carbon prices in international 
markets (Pc $5/tCO2e and $20/tCO2e).  The effect of total costs and carbon prices on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 was 
assessed using sensitivity analysis.  Results showed that using high total cost estimates from 
this study and the current international carbon prices ($5/tCO2e), the π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 of $-390,000.  
Assuming low carbon prices and low total cost estimates, π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 is $90,000.  In addition, the 
payment analysis encompasses two variables; total cost estimates and carbon prices.  
Considering the total cost estimates from this study and the current carbon prices in 
international markets ($5/tCO2e), the bank cannot afford to pay to small landholders to protect 
their forest.  Also, small landholders’ willingness to maintain their forest based on what they 
would require per year was analysed.  Due to the question was not properly understood by 
landholders, and data reported wide variations, results were not included in the carbon banking 
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model.  Finally, this study has identified some potential areas for further research, has included 
policy implications, and has also contributed to the carbon banking knowledge. 
 
Keywords: small landholders, carbon banking model, carbon markets, forest carbon, climate 
change, environmental disturbances, decision about land use.  
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Tropical forest and carbon markets  
Tropical forests are threatened by the distinctly different processes of deforestation and forest 
degradation.  Deforestation occurs when forests are converted into another type of land use such 
as extensive livestock farms, residential areas, and agriculture (e.g. corn, oil palm, rubber 
plantations) (Pfaff et al., 2013).  Degradation results when forests have lost some of their 
abilities to provide environmental goods and services (Nasi, Putz, Pacheco, Wunder, & Anta, 
2011; Smith & Applegate, 2004).  In economic terms, deforestation is a permanent loss of forest 
benefits and it tends to be associated with land use investment projects, mainly agriculture, 
whereas degradation is linked to short-term extraction of forest rents or loss of environmental 
services benefits caused by environmental hazards such as wildfires, hurricanes, frost and wind 
throws.  Forest degradation translates into losses of biodiversity, enhanced likelihood of 
subsequent deforestation, and reduced resilience and adaptation potential to climate change 
(Nasi et al., 2011). 
 
The significance of tropical forests to climate change in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) source 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, as well as in terms of the mitigation 
potential of forested areas, has been addressed by several authors (Chenost et al., 2010; IPCC, 
2000; Jindal, Swallow, & Kerr, 2008; Matyssek et al., 2012; Newell & Vos, 2012; Skole, 
Thongmanivong, Butthep, & Xuan Lan, 2009; Smith & Applegate, 2004).  Forest ecosystems 
have a great significance for dealing with climate change as they help to sequester carbon 
dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and hence, to regulate the climate on the earth (Chenost et 
al., 2010; Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010).  Therefore, carbon sequestration through forestry or agro-
forestry activities has been promoted as an alternative for removing CO2.  CO2 by itself is now 
a commodity traded on a number of regulatory and voluntary international markets.  Thus, 
forestry has the potential to both mitigate climate change and provide an income stream to 
farmers beyond income generated from traditional timber and non-timber products (Skole et 
al., 2009). 
 
Reducing carbon emissions through forested areas started with the Kyoto Protocol, creating 
three main international trading mechanisms 1) Joint Implementation, 2) Clean Development 
Mechanism, and 3) Cap-and-trade (UNFCCC, 1998).  All of these trading mechanisms are 
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grounded in establishing quantitative and enforceable limits on the emissions of greenhouse 
gases to the atmosphere (IPPC, 2007; Marland, Fruit, & Sedjo, 2001).  The three carbon trading 
mechanisms are legally binding amongst Kyoto Protocol Parties.  The carbon trading market 
also has a voluntary market which operates separately of mandatory emission reduction targets 
through which Parties1 and Non-Protocol2 parties can trade their carbon credits (Chenost et al., 
2009; van Kooten, 2009).  Recently, the majority of finance flowing into forestry-based 
mitigation projects is through the voluntary market (Peters-Stanley, Thongmanivong, Butthep, 
& Xuan Lan, 2012). 
 
Carbon trading options, either legally binding or independent of compulsory emission 
reduction, have been identified as potentially being a relevant contributor to slowing 
deforestation and forest degradation by making payments to forested countries which provide 
environmental services, such as carbon sequestration (IPCC, 2007; Tavoni, Sohngen, & Bosetti, 
2007).  Carbon markets have been designed for keeping and selling permanent quantities of 
CO2; therefore, forest owners are required to undertake long-term commitment to maintaining 
a forest.  An optimal forest owner for participation in carbon markets is either a large forest 
owner with a forest management system that allows annual harvest, or an owner who will not 
harvest forest (Bigsby, 2009a; Esuola & Weersink 2006).  Both categories of forest owners may 
dominate the current carbon market as they are able to provide large and stable amounts of 
carbon credits in the market.  This still leaves a significant part of the carbon reservoirs outside 
of the market.  There are many forests where the landholding is too small to ever approximate 
individually the scale for the current carbon trading market.  Thus, the carbon banking rental 
approach is a proposed mechanism for pooling small landholders into an annual rental carbon 
market (Bigsby, 2009a). 
 
Although the literature has been focused on carbon trading and the benefits of forestry systems 
for carbon sequestration, there has not been applied a carbon banking approach on-the-ground 
to help small landholders and their forests to tap into carbon markets through a carbon rental 
mechanism.  This research, by exploring a carbon rental mechanism for small landholders’ 
forestry systems fills a gap in the literature for both small landholder carbon markets and the 
carbon banking rental approach, especially by analysing whether carbon markets can be 
contributors to environmental sustainability.  This analysis uses a Guatemalan case study. 
 
                                                 
1 Protocol signatory countries 
2 Protocol non-signatory countries 
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The following subsections describe the importance of small landholders in mitigating climate 
change and opportunities they have to tap into carbon markets.  
1.2 Small landholders and climate change mitigation  
 
Mitigation strategies to support small landholders have been widely analysed (Cacho, Marshall 
& Milne, 2003; Charnley, Diaz & Gosnell, 2010; De Pinto, Magalhaes & Ringler, 2010; Lipper 
et al., 2011; Montagnini & Nair, 2004; Peskett, Luttrell & Brown, 2006; Rahman, 2008; 
Roshetko, Lasco & De Los Angeles, 2006;  Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010; Skole et al., 2009; 
Wollenberg, Higman, Seeberg-Elverfeldt, Neely, Tapio-Biström, & Neufeldt,  2012). Small 
landholdings are tree- and species-rich systems and most are agroforestry- and forestry-based. 
They produce wood and non-wood products for both market sale and home use.  Owing to their 
high level of biomass, these systems can sequester a large amount of carbon. Whilst the systems 
of individual landholders are small by definition, in total, land managed by small landholders 
stores a significant amount of carbon, equal to the amount of carbon stored in secondary forests 
of the same age (Roshetko et al., 2006). 
The size of small landholdings differs from country to country and there is a lack of consensus 
in the forestry community regarding the definition of a small scale forestry (Butterfield, Hansen, 
Fletcher, & Nikinma, 2005).  Small scale forest owners in the USA, with an average of 22 
hectares, tend to be non-industrial private forest land owners, woodland owners, or family forest 
land owners (Butler, 2008; Butterfield et al., 2005).  In the European Union (EU) the average 
small forest is 13 hectares, which in total spans roughly 75 million hectares (Pelli et al., 2009).  
In Guatemala, where this study was undertaken, small private and communal forests are up to 
15 hectares each, and 43.4% of the land is held by small landholders (INAB, 2011).   
Small landholders’ ecosystems have been analysed by spatial methods which indicate that their 
land and natural resources have the potential to generate a broad range of ecosystem services 
such as soil conservation, water supply, timber and non-timber products, as well as carbon 
dioxide sequestration.  Hence, their land has a high degree of eligibility to tap into these 
ecosystem services (Nelson & Chomitz, 2007; Pagiola, Zhang, & Colom, 2008; Sunderlin, 
Dewi & Puntodewo, 2007).  Particularly, carbon markets have significant potential to benefit 
small landholders (Milder, Scherr & Bracer, 2010).  By 2030 between 25 and 35 million small 
landholders from various countries could trade their carbon in international carbon markets 
(Milder et al., 2010).  This participation could be more beneficial if carbon sequestration can 
be attained by implementing sustainable practices such as agro-forestry and conservation 
agriculture, which can improve natural resource-based livelihoods and increase small 
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landholders’ resilience to drought, climate change, and economic instability (De Pinto et al., 
2010; Grieg-Gran, Porras & Wunder, 2005; Milder et al., 2010). 
In order to meet high stocks of quantifiable sequestered carbon, small landholders should either 
keep maintaining their high biomass forestry and agro-forestry land use systems, or convert 
low-biomass land use systems into systems that will store high levels of carbon above and 
below ground over time (Roshetko et al., 2006).  Small landholders tend to plant multiple 
species and species types (timber, vegetables, fruits, etc.).  Considerations on carbon 
sequestration are likely to be balanced with livelihood and market opportunities (Roshetko et 
al., 2006; Smith & Scherr, 2003).  Considering these high biomass systems and their high levels 
of carbon stocks, small landholders in developing countries can have an attractive economic 
alternative by trading their carbon (De Pinto et al., 2010; Takimoto, Nair, & Nair, 2008).  Some 
examples of the capacity of agro-forestry systems in sequestering carbon are: Woomer, Karanja, 
and Murage (2001) estimated that 66 Mg of CO2 ha-1 year-1 could be captured in east African 
small landholders’ agro-forestry systems over a 20-year period.  In India Maikhuri, Semwal, 
Rao, Singh, and Saxena (2000) found that above ground accumulation in a mixed plantation at 
an abandoned agricultural land site was 3.9 Mg of CO2 ha-1 year-1.  In the West African Sahel 
(WAS) agroforestry systems can capture between 28.7 – 87.3 Mg of CO2 ha-1 year-1(Takimoto 
et al, 2008).  In northeast Thailand small landholders’ teak plantations can sequester carbon at 
a conservative annual rate of 10.62 Mg of CO2 ha-1 year-1 (Kumar et al., 2011).  The volume of 
sequestered carbon varies according to tree species, climate conditions and carbon measuring 
methods.  However, Montagnini and Nair (2004) point out that in the tropics agro-forestry 
systems can store carbon in a range from 1.5 to 3.5 Mg of CO2 ha -1 year -1. 
 
As well as the potential for carbon sequestration, an important role agro-forestry and forest 
plantations may play is to offset destruction of pristine forest by providing the necessary wood 
products from land which has already been cleared (Montagnini & Nair, 2004).  Carbon storage 
can become an additional output that small landholders might consider in their management 
decisions, potentially changing the dynamics of agricultural practices in terms of the rotation 
age of trees, crop-tree mixture and silviculture, amongst others.  Hence, with the introduction 
of carbon payments forestry and agro-forestry systems that are otherwise less profitable could 
become more attractive, or vice versa (Montagnini & Nair, 2004). 
 
As stated previously, small landholders’ forests have the potential of being involved in carbon 
sequestration initiatives, as well as opportunities to participate in carbon markets to sell or rent 
their carbon. 
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1.2.1 Opportunities for small landholders in trading carbon credits  
Despite market volatility in 2011 the voluntary carbon market demonstrated its resilience, as 
buyers in Europe upped their offset sales volume, even in the middle of financial troubles, 
although at a lower price.  Suppliers in 2011 reported transacting the second-largest total market 
volumes (95 MtCO2e) and the highest over-the-counter transactions of USD $574 million 
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2012).  Prices in the voluntary market have remaind resilient over time. 
Average prices for voluntary emission reduction (VERs) increased slightly from USD $6/tCO2e 
in 2010 to USD $6.2/tCO2e in 2011 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2012). However, as of 2011 prices 
have had a downward trend, averaging USD $5.9/tCO2e in 2012, and USD $4.8/tCO2e in 2013 
(Peters-Stanley & Gonzalez 2014). 
 
According to the State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2011 report, in 2010, 101 projects reported 
committed buyers, with 53 projects signing contracts for the first time.  Also, some progress in 
tenure and ownership issues has occurred over the last two years in order to facilitate 
landholders, even without property rights, to be included in carbon markets (Kossoy & Guigon, 
2012).  Finally, looking beyond 2012 several initiatives will demand carbon credits despite 
international policy uncertainties.  For instance, it is expected that countries such as Australia, 
Japan, North America, New Zealand, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and 
European Union with its 27 states will demand 2,706 MtCO2e  beyond 2012 (Kossoy & Guigon, 
2012). 
 
Forestry projects developed to help small landholders also offer a marketing advantage that 
could promote demand and explore new market niches, especially on the voluntary market 
where offset carbon credits of high quality may be able to generate higher prices than on the 
regulatory market (Hamilton, Sjardin, Marcelle, &  Xu, 2008).  This marketability is being seen 
as a co-benefit where environmental and social aspects could be combined to increase carbon 
credit value on the voluntary market, as consumers become educated about what constitutes a 
quality carbon offset (Charnley et al., 2010; Diaz, Hamilton, & Johnson, 2011; Hamilton et al., 
2008; Peters-Stanley et al., 2012).  
 
Carbon offset standards set out all of the procedures that need to be followed to establish and 
implement a carbon offset project.  For example, Plan Vivo meets the validity criteria3 with 
regards to verification, additionality, leakage, and impermanence in carbon projects (Plan Vivo, 
                                                 
3 Plan Vivo standards to validate carbon projects can be found in http://www.planvivo.org/governance-of-the-
standard/  
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2013).  These criteria also specify how other processes should be handled, such as how 
governments should approve projects and how wider social and environmental concerns should 
be taken into account.  Because Plan Vivo has experience with small landholders, it represents 
an opportunity for them to approach carbon projects standards and commercialise their carbon.  
Currently there are a number of other existing carbon mitigation projects involving small 
landholders’ agro-forestry systems in developing countries such as Mexico (2,437 small 
landholders, 9,645 ha, and 470,103 tCO2), Uganda (1,492 small landholders, 1,904 ha, and 
481,814 tCO2), Mozambique (2,799 small landholders, 11,744 ha, and 342,423 tCO2), 
Nicaragua (81 small landholders, 155 ha, and 112,233 tCO2), Bolivia (907 small landholders, 
1,829 ha, and 34,766 tCO2).  Tanzania, Malawi, Sri Lanka, Cameroon, India, Kenya, Nepal, 
Ethiopia Senegal, and Burkina Faso also have small landholders involved in carbon projects 
(Plan Vivo, 2013).  
 
Carbon markets also represent a wide spectrum of project types such as afforestation, 
reforestation, forest conservation, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD+), and improved forest management.  Therefore, small landholders may be able to 
choose the carbon sequestration projects that are most compatible with their environmental 
conditions, land use, and forest management goals (Charnley et al., 2010). 
 
Opportunities for carbon-oriented forest management projects led by small landholders will 
provide a chance to obtain a new source of income, social and environmental co-benefits, and 
improve livelihoods.  The fact that small landholders may have opportunities when trading their 
forest carbon does not mean that they will not face problems when trading in international 
carbon markets.  Bearing this in mind, the following section frames the research problem. 
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1.3 Problem statement 
With the increasing awareness of the impacts of deforestation and forest degradation in 
Guatemala (Aronsen & Lindhjem, 2011; Espinosa, Cabrera & Dunning, 2011; MARN, 2012), 
there is mounting pressure from social groups on governmental institutions to implement 
sustainable forestry activities in order to maintain forest coverage and to provide streams of 
revenue to forest holders.  The current carbon trading scheme, whilst facilitating the 
development of selling and buying carbon credits arising from forest carbon for some forest 
owners, still leaves aside a great part of other owners’ forests (Bigsby, 2009a).  This is the case 
for small landholders’ forests.  As a result, small landholders in Guatemala have already been 
supported by the government through an economic incentive programme4 which seeks to 
promote, manage and improve their forestry initiatives (Espinosa et al., 2011; INAB, 2011).  
Guatemala, with this economic incentive programme to support small landholders, plus 43.4% 
of its national territory being held under a smallholding scheme (INAB, 2011), has the potential 
to explore new and innovative ways to diversify small landholders’ revenue.  One way to do 
this is the inclusion of their forest carbon into the carbon markets.  Some authors have written 
theoretical approaches on how to make carbon markets work for small landholders by applying 
what they call ‘carbon banking’ (Bigsby, 2009a; Bigsby, 2009b; Esuola & Weersink, 2006), 
but there have also been on-the-ground initiatives to help small landholders in trading forest 
carbon (Boyd, Gutierrez & Chang, 2007; Plan Vivo, 2013).    
 
Despite small landholders having the potential to be involved in carbon markets through their 
forestry, and agro-forestry systems, there are problems that may limit their participation in such 
markets.  Firstly, market exclusion may occur due to landholding size or fragmentation failing 
to meet the scale of land cover and hence the minimum amount of sequestered carbon required 
for carbon trading schemes (Beddoe, 2010; Esuola & Weersink, 2006; Milder et al., 2010).  
Secondly, carbon credit prices which are affected by energy prices, institutional decisions, 
weather events and financial market shocks are volatile (Chevallier, 2011).  The instability of 
prices may affect the small landholders’ motivation to be involved in a carbon project as they 
will not be able to visualise a medium- and long-term stable revenue from looking after their 
forests.  Thirdly, transaction costs of carbon projects for small landholders5 tend to be high 
(Beddoe, 2010; Cacho, Marshall & Milne, 2005a; De Pinto et al., 2010; Galik, Baker & 
                                                 
4 Addressed to small landholders to deliver economic subsidies to promote reforestation, management, 
agroforestry activities, and conservation programmes.(INAB, 2010) 
5 Such as negotiation, establishing carbon base line, verification, approval, monitoring costs, to name a few.  
 19 
Grinnell, 2009; Pfaff et al., 2007; Skutsch, 2005).  Also, small landholder’s forest might be 
threatened due to the temporary nature of sequestered carbon (Chomitz & Lecocq, 2003; Feng, 
Zhao & Kling, 2002; Skutsch & Trines, 2010).  This carbon storage  might be influenced by  
the risk of releasing it into the atmosphere due to environmental disturbances such as floods, 
droughts, forest fire, forest pests, landslides, frost and the like (MARN, URL-IARNA & 
PNUMA, 2009).  Owing to small landholders’ tendency to look for short return periods on 
capital invested, their preferences on land use may change over time.  That is, forest plantations 
can be at risk of being reduced or replaced by another land use alternative (Roncoli et al., 2007; 
URL-IARNA, 2009a). 
One way of overcoming these problems is the Carbon Banking Approach (Bigsby, 2009a; 
Bigsby, 2009b).  This approach uses an intermediary financial institution (bank) to aggregate 
carbon credits from small landholders’ forests and package them for large buyers who are 
unwilling to accept the additional risks and costs currently associated with sourcing carbon 
credits from small landholders individually (Milder et al., 2010).  The financial institution can 
receive deposits of carbon from small landholders in exchange for annual rental payments and 
rent packages of carbon to companies which have carbon emissions liabilities (Bigsby, 2009a).  
As a result, small landholders may receive some benefits in terms of enhancing sustainable 
livelihoods by harnessing natural resources sustainably (Roshetko et al., 2006), and introducing 
new agricultural and forestry techniques to increase revenue and improve natural resources’ 
resilience against climate change impacts (e.g. forest fires, floods, storms, wind throws, and 
droughts) (Rahman, 2008; Skutsch & Trines, 2010). 
After framing the research problem, this study investigates the stability of small landholders’ 
carbon pools and the ability of a bank to structure payments to small landholders in a lease 
arrangement after accounting for fire, pest, landholders’ decision risks, as well as carbon prices 
and administrative costs. To address this problem the following section lays out the research 
questions this study is based on. 
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1.4 Research questions  
 
1. What is the effect of biophysical risks from forest fires and forest pests on the effective 
carbon pool provided by small landholders? 
 
2. What is the effect of changes in land use on the effective carbon pool provided by small 
landowners? 
 
3. How should the bank structure payments to small landholders considering risks of fire, 
pests and landholder’s decisions about land use, carbon prices and administrative 
costs? 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
This research thesis comprises eight chapters: Chapter One contains an introduction and 
outlines the problem and research questions.  
 
Chapter Two provides an analysis of relevant literature that addresses the research questions.  
An overview of carbon markets is followed by a discussion on the permanence of carbon credits 
and different approaches to deal with it.  The carbon banking approach and its main variables 
are developed. In addition, the effects of biophysical and land use risks on carbon storage are 
discussed.  Finally, the chapter includes a section related to carbon bank costs.  
 
Chapter Three outlines the carbon bank model including a mathematical model with the 
following components: a) the risks of forest loss, b) land use risks, c) the combined effect of 
risks on the carbon pool, and d) the carbon rental and leasing payments.  The chapter also 
provides the methods used to estimate each of the components and ends with a summary table 
showing the variables used in the mathematical model.  
 
Chapter Four provides details about the data used in the carbon model (Chapter Three) such as 
describing the research site, the research approach used, and the data collection process.  The 
latter includes the type of data used in this study such as data associated with carbon stocks, 
data associated with environmental disturbances, landholders’ decisions about land use, and 
carbon banking costs.  
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Chapter Five presents an analysis of the biophysical risks on the forest carbon provided by small 
landholders. The risk of forest fire and pest are modelled using Monte Carlo simulation.  The 
chapter discusses the effect of both risks on the effective carbon in the Montane region. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the modelling results from small landholders’ decisions about land use 
and its risk.  The extent of forest land reduced was modelled with a double hurdle model. 
 
Chapter Seven presents the carbon banking analysis. This includes an analysis of the combined 
effect of biophysical and socioeconomic risks.  It also discusses the effect of these risks, 
administrative costs, and carbon prices on bank profit when PL=0 and on the maximum annual 
carbon rental price payable to depositors. A comparison between what the bank can afford to 
pay to landholders and what landholders are willing to receive to sequester carbon is discussed.  
 
Chapter Eight summarises the research findings, draws conclusions from the findings, describes 
the main contributions to existing knowledge and policy implications, discusses limitations, 
and finally, suggests opportunities for further research. 
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    Chapter 2 
Literature review  
2.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the limitations that small landholders have when tapping into 
international carbon markets and suggested that the Carbon Banking Approach overcomes such 
limitations.  Despite the risk of forest fires, pests and small landholders’ decisions about land 
use, this study investigates whether carbon stocks provided by small landholders are stable 
enough and cost-effective for the bank to provide payments to small landholders to keep their 
forest.  In order to explore the usefulness of this approach, this chapter begins by describing 
and assessing carbon markets at the global level, followed by discussing the permanence of 
carbon credits.  This provides an insight into the importance of thinking about different ways 
carbon credits may be treated, especially when the permanence of carbon on the ground 
represents a challenge to project developers.  This leads into the consideration of incorporating 
innovative approaches to motivate the participation of forest owners in carbon markets.  After 
a general discussion about permanence of carbon credits, the carbon banking approach to deal 
with carbon permanence is introduced.  Its structure, deposits and withdrawals, payment 
system, and advantages and disadvantages are analysed to identify the opportunities it possesses 
in contributing to matching landholders’ forest needs with carbon markets’ demands. 
A review of environmental disturbances, landholders’ preferences about land use and their 
effects on the effective carbon pool provided by landholders is carried out with the aim of 
identifying the potential significance of these risks and how they might affect the amount of 
carbon traded.  Finally, the theory of how the bank can incorporate these risks into the 
mathematical calculations is also addressed, followed by a description of carbon banking 
transaction costs. 
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2.2 An overview of carbon markets  
Climate change in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) usage refers to any 
change in climate over time, whether due to anthropogenic activity or as a result of natural 
variability (IPCC, 2001).  This change in climate is attributed largely to the increased levels of 
atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHG) (IPCC, 2007).  The six major greenhouse gases (GHG) 
are: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs), 
per fluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).  Mitigation strategies by sector have 
been proposed by the IPCC (2001).  Some of the sectors are: the energy supply sector which 
attempts to boost advanced renewable energy (e.g. solar, wind, hydropower, geothermal and 
bioenergy) and advanced nuclear energy to reduce CO2 emissions.  The transport sector 
attempts to promote more fuel-efficient vehicles, hybrid vehicles, cleaner diesel vehicles, and 
biofuels.  The agriculture sector aims to enhance crop and grazing land management to increase 
soil carbon storage, improve rice cultivation techniques, and livestock and manure management 
to reduce CH4 emissions, and improve nitrogen fertiliser application techniques to reduce N2O 
emissions.  The waste sector aims to improve waste management by promoting composting of 
organic waste, controlling wastewater treatment, recycling, optimisation of CH4 with biocovers 
and biofilters, and incinerating waste with energy recovery.  Finally, the forestry sector 
promotes afforestation, reforestation, forest management, reduced deforestation, use of forestry 
products for bioenergy to replace fossil fuel use, all with the purpose of increased carbon 
sequestration6 in forests. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 and created a market-based mechanism for 
reducing GHGs in the atmosphere, as well as to deal with climate change effects throughout 
the world (IPCC, 2007).  Since carbon dioxide is one of the largest constituents of GHG 
emissions, a carbon market has been evolving under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol 
(IPCC, 2001, 2007).  Figure 2-1 shows that carbon market systems are composed of two main 
actors: those who need carbon (end users or carbon emitters) who have to be matched with 
those who have carbon stocks (carbon suppliers).  Before carbon emitters pay for carbon offsets, 
there are actors who facilitate primary emission reductions.  They are brokers, traders, and 
private sector financial companies, to name a few.  Their role is to match specific sequestration 
                                                 
6 It means that carbon dioxide is absorbed from the atmosphere during photosynthesis and during the process of 
growing the CO2 is transformed into solid carbon that makes up branches, twigs, leaves, bark, fruits and roots 
(Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010; Virgilio et al., 2010).  
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requirements of buyers with the owners of corresponding carbon reservoirs.  Brokers are paid 
for facilitating the trading of carbon but do not take ownership of the carbon in any sense.  All 
these actors are guided by an international and national legal framework which encompasses 
laws, policies and regulatory bodies regarding carbon trading (IPCC, 2007; Kossoy, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
•  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two types of carbon market exist: regulatory compliance and voluntary markets.  The 
regulatory market is used by companies and governments that by law have to account for their 
GHG emissions.  Three market-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol are important for 
the regulatory market: a) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), b) Joint Implementation (JI), 
and c) Emission trading (cap-and-trade).  They are implemented by countries which have 
ratified the Protocol and have committed to reduce their emissions levels to specific national 
targets (Mol, 2012; UNFCCC, 1998).  The second market is the trade of carbon on a voluntary 
basis; hence, there is not a legal binding mechanism (IPCC, 2007; Mol, 2012; Seeberg-
Elverfeldt, 2010).  In voluntary markets, demand is driven by individuals and companies that 
take responsibility for offsetting their own emissions.  The volume of carbon credits traded 
voluntarily in 2011 was less than 0.1% of the global carbon markets (Peters-Stanley et al., 
2012). 
 
Under the regulatory compliance market, regional and national initiatives have been 
undertaken.  For instance, emission trading schemes (ETS) under implementation around the 
world (Perdan & Azapagic, 2011) include The European Union Emissions Trading Systems 
(EC ETS, 2011), the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ Ministry for the 
Regulation frame 
Legal frameworks: e.g. UNFCCC at international scale, ETS at national scale 
Regulatory bodies: e.g UNFCCC Secretariat, CDM executive board, National agencies 
Quality control: Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), NGOs 
 
Suppliers 
Forest owners 
Banks 
Carbon funds 
Consultants 
(NGOs, 
methodology 
developers) 
Intermediaries 
Brokers 
Traders 
Financial companies 
Large compliance buyers 
 
End users 
Compliance buyers 
Voluntary buyers 
 
Primary Emission Reductions 
Figure 2-1. Types of actors and transactions in the carbon markets (Adapted from Kossoy & Guigon, 
2012) 
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Environment, 2007) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Trading Scheme (Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government, 2010).  Other national initiatives associated with emission reduction have been 
developed, even though countries have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  This is the case for the 
United States of America, where some legally binding state GHG reduction schemes have been 
set (IPPC, 2007; Marland et al., 2001).  This includes for example, the US Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) which involves 10 states from the East Coast (RGGI, 2011), and others 
recently enacted such as California’s Cap-and-Trade Programme (ARB, 2011). 
 
These markets have made carbon a tradable economic commodity (Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010).  
At the same time, the markets have set a system where buyers and sellers need to be aware of 
certain trading characteristics.  These include carbon ownership, amount of carbon to be 
delivered which has to be verified and certified by an accredited third party, the commitment 
of having a stable and large carbon pool over time, and calculating and tracking changes in the 
amount of carbon that is being sequestered (Bigsby, 2009b; Chenost et al., 2010).  Another 
important issue is carbon payments.  These may vary based on the negotiation between the 
carbon supplier and companies with carbon liabilities.  Sometimes, the price paid to the forest 
owners can be a single upfront payment for permanent ownership of the carbon (Bigsby, 2009a; 
Hepburn, 2007; Perdan & Azapagic, 2011), or payments can be a set payment to be made in 
different periods (e.g. every 3, 5 or 10 years).  Another important issue is permanent and 
temporary carbon sequestration.  Permanent carbon sequestration is associated with the stability 
of the carbon pool on-the-ground (Marland & Marland, 2009), whereas temporary carbon 
sequestration reflects the recognition that carbon has a finite life or where there is uncertainty 
about the permanence of carbon sequestration.  
 
It is also noteworthy to mention that carbon markets developed under the Kyoto protocol 
present limitations and their implementation has been criticised.  For instance, Kollnus, 
Schneider and Zhezherin (2015) have criticised the effectiveness of Joint Implementation 
programmes in the European Union.  They indicate that at about three quarters of Emission 
Reduction Units (ERU) are unlikely to represent additional carbon emission reductions, and 
about 95% of the total ERUs were from countries with significant assigned amount units (AAU) 
provided by their governments.  Thereby, Joint Implementation scheme may have enabled GHG 
emission to be about 600 million tCO2e higher than they would have otherwise been.  Sovacool 
(2011) also has criticism of carbon markets, especially the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.  He points out four problems: 1) homogeneity, 2) justice, 3) 
gaming, and 3) information. Homogeneity refers to the assumption that the relationship 
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between emissions and climate change is linear, that a one-to-one tradeoff is present between 
emissions and offsets, and that a tonne of carbon emitted is equally valuable regardless of when 
and where carbon was emitted.  These assumptions have been largely debated by Solomon et. 
al. (2009) who found that carbon emissions are irreversible and may remain in the atmosphere 
for about one thousand years.  Sovacool and Carrol (2008) have also pointed out that in many 
cases two to three tons of carbon must be captured to offset every tonne emitted.  Both group 
of authors have shown that the linear relationship and one-to-one relationship between pollution 
and abatement are debatable.  From an economic development perspective, global carbon 
markets tend to benefit industrialised countries, and not those countries in need for local 
development.  For example, Sutter and Parramo (2007) evaluated 16 CDM projects in Latin 
America7, Asia8 and Africa9 and concluded that 95% of them had little value for local 
development.  For gaming, carbon markets through CDM projects are intended to encourage 
firms to adopt cleaner sources of energy production.  Some regulations under CDM scheme 
have designed and approved projects supporting fossil fuel initiatives.  For instance, an offshore 
oil platform in Vietnam and two local coal mines in China were approved for 17 million carbon 
credits for capturing and using methane as part of their operations (Pearson, 2007).  By doing 
this, both projects generated revenue that will further funnelled back into coal and oil 
production.  With regards to information problems, carbon markets have worked projects with 
high transaction costs because of the lack of knowledge and experience about the entire process 
of designing, approving, verifying, auditing and evaluating whether the emission reduction 
have been done.  CDM projects has another risks that may make them increase their costs.  
Credit are not approved until project in completed, making the market price for credit 
unpredictable and more volatile (Lof, 2009). 
 
Many other authors have also assessed carbon markets with regards to market manipulation and 
the impact of transparency in the international negotiations (Newell, Pizer & Raimi, 2012, 
Abramson, Czaja, Ito, & Li, 2006), to whether the projects can demonstrate their carbon stock 
accurately (Gorte & Ramseur, 2008), and carbon prices drivers (Chevallier, 2011).  The 
confluence of these factors may explain why global carbon markets have so far failed to make 
a meaningful contribution to reduce GHG emissions.  However, positive signs have been 
reported by Hamrick and Goldstein (2015) showing that in 2014 Latin America transacted the 
most offsets of any region for the first time. Latin American countries that have transacted 
                                                 
7 Brazil, Honduras, Bolivia, Chile. 
8 India, South Korea, Bhutan. 
9 South Africa. 
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carbon credits the most are Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico.  Despite Guatemala 
is lacking of a national carbon market scheme, its transactions has been based in the 
international carbon markets.  For example, one out the four largest volumes of carbon 
transacted in Latin America has been in Central America led by Guatemala (1.1 MtCO2e out of 
2.2MtCO2e in Central America) (Hamrick and Goldstein, 2015).  
 
Despite large amounts of carbon offsets transacted globally under Kyoto Protocol (85% of 
traded emissions), prices have crashed to less than US$10/tCO2e from an average of US$ 
20//tCO2e in 2008 (Hamilton, K., et al., 2008).  For voluntary markets prices are now below 
US$5/tCO2e (Kossoy, et al., 2015).  According to Hamrick and Goldstein (2015) this situation 
can be attributed to policy uncertainty and the diminishing number of new corporate offsetting 
programmes.  This policy uncertainty and high transaction costs (Coggan et al. 2013) in carbon 
projects have discouraged new carbon projects and other market participants have continued to 
exit the market.  For example, SGS withdrew from the validation and verification business in 
June 2014, Standard Bank closed its carbon desk in April 2015, and Bunge has announced it 
would close Climate Change Capital (Kossoy, et al., 2015). 
 
Despite current carbon market conditions and, in some cases implementation problems, climate 
change continues to be an important global policy issue and forestry systems continue to be a 
priority for policy makers at international scale to contribute to reducing carbon emissions.  
Small landholders should also be seen as a potential source of carbon to help to reduce the 
impact of climate change. 
2.3 Permanent and temporary carbon sequestration under carbon trading 
 
The notion of permanent carbon sequestration is that once sequestered, the same carbon must 
continue to be held in the place and form it was first sequestered (Herzog, Caldeira & Reilly, 
2003; Kim, Lewandrowski, Sands, & Johansson, 2011).  According to IPCC (2007) 
permanence is defined as the longevity of a carbon pool and the stability of its stock.  This 
concept is analysed by Marland and Marland (2009) who point out that reducing CO2 emission 
represents a permanent benefit for the atmosphere, whilst capturing CO2 through forest 
coverage represents a significant challenge of storing the carbon and also the risk of releasing 
it into the atmosphere (reversibility).  Further, the concept has been widely discussed at 
international level, but it has fundamental issues linked to the time dynamics of sequestration 
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options.  For instance, carbon will be accumulated only until the ecosystem becomes effectively 
saturated in any given management system.   
 
Temporary carbon sequestration is associated with fixed term sequestration or where there are 
uncertainties about the permanence of carbon sequestration (Maréchal & Hecq, 2006).  Some 
argue that when temporarily stored carbon is eligible for trade, stored carbon cannot be 
attributed the same value if there is uncertainty about whether the carbon will be released to the 
atmosphere for any reason (Chomitz & Lecocq, 2003; Feng et al., 2002; Skutsch & Trines, 
2010).  For instance, forest carbon sequestration, by its nature, will always have potential to be 
temporary due to carbon projects being exposed to natural risks,10 ineffective project 
management, changes in farmers’ land use (Dutschke & Angelsen, 2008; Kim, McCarl & 
Murray, 2008), unsustainable land uses (Esuola & Weersink, 2006), insecure forest ownership 
(encroachments), failure of project partners, and political risks from changing government 
policies (Dutschke & Angelsen, 2008). 
 
To differentiate temporary and permanent carbon sequestration, the difference between the 
concepts of weak and strong sustainability proposed by Pezzey and Toman (2002) can be used 
as an analogy.  Strong sustainability focuses on sustainability of a specific resource whilst weak 
sustainability focuses on sustainable flows rather than the source of the flow.  Permanent carbon 
could be thought as ‘strong’ sequestration focusing on a continued sequestration process of the 
same carbon which is meant to be held in the same place.  Temporary carbon, with substitution 
of carbon pools, could be thought of as ‘weak’ sequestration.  To deal with temporary carbon 
sequestration three approaches to address the temporary nature of forest carbon sequestration 
have been analysed (Bigsby, 2009a; Ellis, 2001; Esuola & Weersink, 2006; IPCC, 2000; 
Marland et al., 2001; Sedjo & Marland, 2003; Van Kooten & Sohngen, 2007).  These are: 1) 
Ton-years, 2) Temporary Carbon Emissions Reduction Units (TCERs), and 3) Renting forest 
carbon. 
 
Attempts to value temporary storage have led analysts to propose a Ton-Years approach where 
carbon sequestration is value on the basis of both the number of tons sequestered and years over 
which it is sequestered.  This approach is described in The Special Report on Land Use, Land-
use Change, and Forestry, prepared by the IPCC (2000).  It refers to a Ton-year system by 
which credit would be awarded for the total amount of tons of carbon held out of the atmosphere 
for a certain number of years. Some equivalency factor would be set to equate a specific amount 
                                                 
10 Forest fires, pests, outbreaks, storms, wind throws, to name a few. 
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of Ton-years with permanence in sequestering forest carbon.  Basically, one would integrate 
over time the number of tons sequestered and convert this to tons of carbon emissions offset by 
dividing the equivalency factor, i.e.  ton-years/f = permanent tons, where f is the equivalency 
factor.  For instance, if an equivalency factor were chosen to be 50, then sequestering 1 ton of 
carbon for 50 years or sequestering 50 tons of carbon for 1 year would both entitle the forest 
owner to offset 1 ton of carbon emissions from fossil fuels during 1 year (IPCC, 2000; Marland 
et al., 2001). 
 
Temporary carbon credits can be considered as one possible solution to the potential 
‘reversibility’ of reduction obtained through the sequestration of carbon.  The Colombian Ministry of the Environment (2000) proposed the Temporary Carbon Emission approach 
whereby the mediums of exchange are expiring Temporary Carbon Emission Reduction 
(TCERs).  Expiring TCERs are credits issued after forest carbon projects have been verified 
and certified by a competent authority and are valid for a certain period of time.  Once TCERs 
have expired, the amount of carbon has to be subtracted from the entity holding carbon 
liabilities which has to replace or renew carbon credits, either by buying other expiring TCER 
or buying a permanent carbon credit elsewhere (Esuola & Weersink, 2006).  For example, the 
carbon credits certified for the last year of the project cycle are only valid for one year and will 
consequently suffer a high depreciation.  
 
Many authors have written about the carbon renting approach as another alternative for trading 
temporary forest carbon (Bigsby, 2009a; 2009b; Bosetti, Carraro & Massetti, 2008; Cho, Kim 
& Kim, 2010; Chomitz & Lecocq, 2003; Esuola & Weersink, 2006; Herzog et al., 2003; Kim 
et al., 2011; MacCarl & Murray, 2008; Maréchal & Hecq, 2006; Marland et al., 2001; Sedjo & 
Marland, 2003; van Kooten, 2009).  The rental approach is a traditional system for limited-term 
use of a capital asset or piece of real estate that involves a rental contract.  This contract transfers 
carbon liability if permanence is either not guaranteed or not desired.  A rental contract can 
allow the buyer-renter to enjoy limited term benefits of the asset while the seller-host retains 
long-term discretion over the asset (Sedjo & Marland, 2003).  In the rental approach, one would 
not expect indefinite sequestration or full payment before the service of sequestering carbon 
was rendered (See section 2.4.3 for further details on carbon rental approach).  A rental market 
can be facilitated by setting up a carbon bank.  This structure has been discussed by Esuola and 
Weersink (2006), who point out that a financial entity will play a role in aggregating carbon 
credits with the aim of renting them out.  Their work is more akin to a bond market where rental 
agreements are fixed by setting up a minimum period of five years (Esuola & Weersink, 2006), 
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whilst Bigsby (2009b) has analysed carbon banking in relation to making carbon markets work 
for small landowners by delivering payments on an annual basis.  Renting carbon credits 
through the aggregation of small and large forest owners and their carbon pools over time may 
boost the participation of the banking sector into the business of carbon rental (Bigsby 2009a; 
Marland et al., 2001; Sedjo et al., 2001b). 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that in all the approaches described above, if forest carbon remains 
sequestered at the field level, the emissions credit can be used only one time, but it could be 
transferred to another interested party at any later time if one of the parties incurred a current 
year debit (reducing emission) and the new renter received a current year credit (sequestering 
emissions) (Kim et al., 2008). 
 
The following section describes how the carbon banking model works by modelling temporary 
carbon sequestration initiatives in a carbon bank. 
 
2.4 The carbon banking model: Rental approach 
According to Cogan (2008) climate change is opening opportunities in the banking sector by 
joining capital, labour and natural resources in which the common denominator, nowadays, is 
GHG emission trading.  The upward trend in trading forest carbon credits through the banking 
sector is grounded in three main areas of opportunity: 1) the brokerage of GHG emissions 
allowances and credits, 2) the financing and development of forest carbon offsetting projects, 
and 3) speculative investing and derivative offerings in emissions credits (Deutsche Bank 
Group, 2011, 2012).  Based on these opportunities forest carbon trading, in either a formal or 
informal market, could be improved by using a carbon bank where the bank serves as an 
aggregator of forest carbon, broker, and an institution for depositing and renting out forest 
carbon (Bigsby, 2009a; Esuola & Weersink, 2006). 
2.4.1  Carbon bank basic structure 
According to Bigbsy (2009a) the carbon banking approach creates a carbon market through a 
financial institution (bank) in which sequestered forest carbon, not cash, is the medium of 
exchange.  The system can work with emission reductions schemes that are either permanent 
or temporary carbon sequestration projects.  Forest carbon may be processed by applying 
financial institution services such as deposits, renting, leasing and withdrawals. Other aspects 
of financial institutions can be applied in carbon banking.  Firstly, carbon assets (capital) are 
rented rather than bought, using market interest rates and carbon prices to determine rental rates.  
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Secondly, sequestered carbon is deposited in varying amounts and commitment terms to create 
a pool of carbon that may be loaned to carbon renters, which have different offset requirements 
and commitment terms (Bigsby, 2009a). 
 
The basic structure of a carbon bank is shown in Figure 2-2.  Its main components are: 1) small 
forest owners which are the forest carbon depositors, 2) the carbon bank, and 3) carbon renters 
who have carbon commitments (Bigbsy, 2009a). 
 
 
In this case small landholders are the source of carbon credits, by either growing forest biomass 
or keeping forest biomass.  They can be grouped to establish a carbon pool in the bank, so they 
can tap into carbon market opportunities (Peskett, Huberman, Bowen-Jones, Edwards, & 
Brown, 2008).  Small landholders in different regions around the world represent a significant 
part of regional and national territories.  For instance, in the United States 106.8 million ha of 
forest are owned by small forest owners with an area between 0.4 ha and 3.64 ha (Butler, 2008), 
and in the European Union 16 million private forest owners are holding an average size of 13 
ha each (Pelli et al., 2009).  
 
The carbon bank is similar to a financial entity supplying brokering services.  Its job is to match 
specific sequestration requirements of carbon renters with the small landholders’ forest carbon.  
These brokering services facilitate carbon trading by a) registering carbon stocks, b) searching 
for carbon renters in carbon markets, c) tracking withdrawals when emission reductions are 
transacted, d) registering annual payments from carbon renters, and e) making payments to 
small forest owners (depositors) (Bigsby, 2009a). 
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Figure 2-2. Carbon Banking structure (Bigsby, 2009a) 
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Finally, carbon renters are those entities which have carbon liabilities and need to offset their 
CO2 emissions levels to attain national or international targets.  These renters can be operating 
in either voluntary or non-voluntary markets (Bigsby, 2009a; Peters-Stanley et al., 2012; 
UNFCCC, 1998). 
2.4.2 Depositing, withdrawing forest carbon and contracts  
Deposits in the bank occur when landholders bring their assets (forest carbon), either permanent 
or temporary.  As mentioned earlier, carbon is sequestered in forests forming a reservoir of 
carbon which is known as the carbon pool, measured in tonnes of carbon (IPCC, 2003; USAID, 
2012).  The size and accumulation of carbon relies on silvicultural practices such as forest 
rotation age (Sohngen & Mendelsohn, 2003), or thinning regimes (Couture & Reynaud, 2011; 
Galik et al., 2009; Galik & Jackson, 2009; Jandl et al., 2007; Sedjo, 2001).  Avoiding 
deforestation may increase forest carbon storage over time (Sohngen & Mendelsohn, 2003).  
Carbon pools supplied by landholders have to be measured to establish how much forest carbon 
the bank pays for and has available to rent out.  The initial forest carbon deposited in the bank 
is determined by a baseline carbon measurement (Angelsen, 2008) and is measured on an 
annual basis.  Subsequent measurement is required to monitor changes of forest carbon stock 
and area through applying carbon accounting systems11 (Bigsby, 2009a).  The carbon bank may 
annually increase its forest carbon stocks (measured in tonnes of carbon dioxide -tCO2e-) from 
recruiting more landholders’ forest carbon into the bank (Bigsby, 2009a).  The deposits of a 
number of forest owners create a carbon pool at the bank; the amount of carbon which has been 
deposited must be greater than the number of carbon credits sold or loaned to emitters (Esuola 
& Weersink, 2006).  The bank must always have an excess of carbon credits in its carbon 
general accounts to face any contingency due to unforeseen withdrawals. 
 
Landholders (carbon depositors) may withdraw their carbon stocks from the bank for various 
reasons.  Firstly, depositors may find better and more profitable alternative uses of their carbon 
assets.  Current carbon markets may be affected by the uncertainties of international policies 
on GHG emissions surrounding the Post Kyoto-2012 agreement, which might either change 
carbon prices or reduce the demand for carbon credits, and hence renting or selling carbon 
credits will not be as economically attractive to small landholders (Esuola & Weersink, 2006; 
Linacre, Kossoy, & Ambrosi, 2011).  Secondly, they might use their own carbon credits to meet 
                                                 
11 The IPCC has set up a guide with five objectives to facilitate measuring carbon pools and emissions.  These are: 
1) transparency, 2) consistency, 3) comparability, 4) completeness, and 5) accuracy (IPCC, 2003) 
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their own emission reduction obligations.  In addition to these reasons, withdrawals may occur 
due to intentional intervention such as net harvest reductions (rotation  
 
length, stocking and harvesting intensity) (Galik & Jackson, 2009), landholders’ decisions 
about land use (Lambin et al., 2001), as well as unexpected environmental events such as forest 
fires, pests, storms, wind throws, landslides, hail, floods and droughts (Bigsby, 2009a; 2009b; 
MARN et al., 2009). 
 
Contracts play an important role when carbon is deposited and withdrawn.  Their main role in 
renting forest carbon is to help establish mutual expectations by addressing risks, setting 
commitments and responsibilities, and identifying liabilities for both depositors and renters 
(Kerr, 2003; Sedjo & Marland, 2003).  When depositing forest carbon, payments can be 
addressed by establishing the price paid for renting out forest carbon and the period to retain 
the forest carbon, for example.  These periods and prices can also be linked to risks the depositor 
and renter might be exposed to.  So, contracts can identify and explicity address risks that may 
promote withdrawals from the bank.  For instance, intentional carbon release by changing forest 
land use, and unintentional release due to natural hazards.  Contracts may include liability 
procedures to deal with landholders who convert forest land into other agricultural alternatives.  
If this happens and the land conversion is within the contract period, the bank pays to the 
depositor the amount of carbon sequestered until the time of the withdrawal.  When risks are 
not properly addressed in contracts, landholders may not see the credibility of sequestration as 
a viable mitigation option (Esuola & Weersink, 2006).  Many other aspects can be included in 
the contract; however, the contract’s clauses will rely on the conditions imposed by market, 
renters’ and depositors’ interest, international climate change policies, and national emission 
trading schemes (Kerr, 2003).  Therefore, the design of contracts to allow for the trade of 
sequestered carbon is complicated not only because of the temporary nature of the accumulated 
carbon, but also the risks involved for both the carbon depositor and carbon renter (Esuola & 
Weersink, 2006). 
2.4.3 The theory of carbon rental approach and payment system  
The main characteristic of a rental system is that it behaves like a direct credit-debit system for 
the renter of credits.  For instance, credit is assigned when forest carbon is sequestered and 
debits are accrued when carbon is emitted.  At the end of the rental period, the renter will have 
received some of the benefits and can decide either to renew the lease, or incur the emission 
debit and replace the credit with one from other activity (Marland et al., 2001; Sedjo & Marland, 
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2003).  The carbon rental approach, by using temporary crediting of forest carbon storage, may 
allow emitters to reduce emission obligations for certain periods (Marland et al., 2001; Sedjo 
& Marland, 2003). 
 
The payment system comprises a rental price paid for carbon which is linked to a period 
specified in the rental contract, either as a temporary emission reduction or as a depositor-renter 
mutual negotiation time agreement. For instance, annual payments (Bigsby, 2009b) or 
payments every five years can be delivered to depositors (Esuola & Weersink, 2006).  Both 
periodic payments can consider the provision of renewal.  The rental price may increase with 
the length of the sequestration period, in the same way that interest rates increase with the length 
of period when a saving certificate is held.  However, this tendency will depend upon 
expectations about the future rental income stream, just as the banking sector may be affected 
by national monetary policies on interest rates (Koch & MacDonald, 2010; Lasher, 2008).  
Figure 2-3 illustrates an example when there are longer commitments on the part of both renter 
and depositor; higher annual payments to compensate for the reduced flexibility or increased 
security will be required.  The differential between renter and depositor yield curves, similar to 
financial markets, provides the return to the bank (see Figure 2-3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bigsby (2009a) proposed a carbon rental concept which is based on applying capital concepts 
to payments for forest carbon on an annual basis.  The carbon rental price can be derived from 
a carbon purchase market in the same way that bond yields and prices are determined in 
financial markets, or property prices and rentals are determined in real estate markets (Marland 
et al., 2001; Sedjo & Marland, 2003).  Capital value (Pc) of an asset can be determined from its 
annual yield (Pr) and the interest rate (λ). 
  
Increasing value 
of annual payment 
Increasing length of term  
Renter 
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Figure 2-3. Carbon rental yield curve (Bigsby, 2009a) 
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Pc = Pr
𝛌𝛌
 
 
Since it is already known that the capital value for forest carbon (Pc) stems from carbon markets 
and interest rates (λ) from financial markets, Equation 2-1 can be arranged to solve for an 
annual carbon rental price paid by renters (Pr). 
 
Pr = Pc * λ 
 
Equation 2-2 has been used in models incorporating the economic value of forest carbon 
sequestration, but these models assumed the existence of some type of entity where rental 
agreements could be arranged (Ellis, 2001; Tavoni et al., 2007; van Kooten & Sohngen, 2007).  
 
Pr becomes the annual rental price paid by renters in the absence of transaction costs.  Pr will 
fluctuate according to international markets and interest rates12 in financial markets.  Chevallier 
(2011) provides some insights based on a literature review about carbon prices which identifies 
the drivers that promote fluctuation.  Prices are influenced by market structure and institutional 
policies.  On the supply side, developed countries will issue a certain number of allowances 
according to their National Allocation Plans (NAPs).  This may influence the availability of 
allowance (carbon credits) to be transacted in international markets.  On the demand side, the 
level of emissions relies on different factors such as unexpected fluctuations in energy demand, 
fuel prices (e.g. oil, coal), as well as weather conditions (temperature, rainfall, wind speed).  
Interest rate drivers are related to national inflation rates, the level of government spending, the 
preference for consumption of individuals,13 and national monetary policies (Lasher, 2008).  
Therefore, Pr is influenced by market-based changes at a national and international level which 
make the price of forest carbon sequestration change accordingly (Marland et al., 2001; Sedjo 
& Marland, 2003). 
 
The bank bears transaction costs to rent out forest carbon in markets.  Figure 2-4 shows the 
annual carbon rental price payable to depositors (PL) and carbon rental price paid by renters 
(Pr).  PL accounts for all those risks small landholders might face whilst keeping their forest.  
                                                 
12 Interest rates are a measure of opportunity cost of capital.  They balance the time preferences of individuals who 
supply capital with productivity of capital for those who are trying to borrow funds to invest (Klemperer, 2003).  
13 It refers to whether a person is inclined to spend a dollar of income on current consumption or invest it  to grow 
into something more (Lasher, 2008) 
(2-1) 
(2-2) 
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transaction costs due to the carbon bank serving as an aggregator and clearing house mechanism 
for commercialisation of forest carbon (Bigsby, 2009a).  For instance, small land owners may 
reduce transaction costs because the bank takes the costs of searching for emitting firms in need 
of carbon credits, negotiating costs with traders, setting up emission reductions purchase 
agreements (ERPAs), and monitoring and enforcing contracts after they are signed (Bigsby, 
2009a; Esuola & Weersink, 2006).  Therefore, the cost to the bank is less than the cost to 
landholders doing all these activities independently. 
 
The fluctuations of carbon prices and interest rates are an important factor when renting carbon 
credits.  According to Chevallier (2011), the price of forest carbon is classically driven by the 
balance of supply and demand as well as other factors linked to market structure, national and 
international institutional policies, energy prices and weather conditions.  Interest rates may 
also fluctuate because of national monetary policies, inflation rates, and the amount of money 
spent by governments (Lasher, 2008).  However, under the carbon banking approach small 
landholders become neutral to these price changes as the bank bears the price risk by setting up 
a fixed price it will pay for carbon credits (Esuola & Weersink, 2006). 
 
According to Bigsby (2009a), and Esuola and Weersink (2006), carbon banking may function 
as a positive economic incentive for maintaining small owners’ forestry or agro-forestry 
systems, as annual payments rely on the presence of the forest in the contracted state.  In the 
current system, the forest owner is paid by an upfront payment and receives no further income.  
This means that over time maintenance of the forest for carbon becomes tied to a past payment 
and may be less relevant to the interests of the current forest management.  Another advantage 
of annual payment is that neither party (depositor or renter) is tied into one value of forest 
carbon.  Currently, the carbon market forces parties to take a transaction position on the price 
in a dynamic and volatile market (Chenost et al., 2010; Linacre et al., 2011).  As such the 
potential for either party being financially affected is high.  Carbon banking removes this risk 
by allowing the rate which is paid to fluctuate according to the market and the term of forest 
carbon sequestration (Bigsby, 2009a). 
 
In addition, the carbon banking approach provides the opportunity for any landholder to deposit 
their carbon, enter the carbon rental market (Bigsby, 2009a) or withdraw their carbon credits at 
any time (Esuola & Weersink, 2006).  This opportunity allows the bank and landholders to 
manage financial risks in different ways.  Firstly, the bank will pay small landholders for the 
time the forest carbon was sequestered.  For instance, if landholders’ forest is burnt accidentally, 
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the bank will pay until the time the forest was burnt.  Also, if a farmer’s forest remains for the 
year, the bank will pay for that period, and provide the option to the farmer to renew the contract 
for another year.  Secondly, annual payments could be insured to cover potential carbon release 
due to natural disasters.  Without insurance coverage, the bank will assume the risk of an 
unintentional release of carbon by offering a forest carbon release risk-adjusted price.  This 
price will rely on the probability of the occurrence of an environmental disturbance, which will 
depend on the location of the carbon depositor (Esuola & Weersink, 2006).  Finally, the carbon 
banking approach also provides the advantage of being applied to other forest environmental 
services such as wildlife, water or any other services, either as co-benefits or independent ones 
with carbon (Van Kooten & Sohngen, 2007).  Incorporating a non-carbon forest service only 
requires developing a value for any of these environmental services and a link between the level 
of the service and forest management (Bigsby, 2009a).  Thus, the value of the service could 
provide an additional premium to forest carbon for preserving forests. 
 
Other carbon bank related initiatives provide some experiences of incorporating environmental 
projects in their portfolio.  Some banks in Latin America have made poor decisions when 
including environmental issues (e.g. forest carbon trading, tourism projects) into their 
operations (Pratt & Rojas, 2001).  For instance, the lack of risk management to deal with 
environmental hazards on forest carbon projects reduced the amount of carbon available to rent 
out and discouraged forest farmers from joining banks’ forest carbon initiatives.  In addition, 
large local forest owners’ organisations can be at a disadvantage when aggregating or pooling 
landholders into a carbon bank.  The bank may face the risk that a large group of landholders 
might decide to withdraw their forest carbon at any time.  Thereby, the bank might have a 
shortfall of carbon credits to rent to borrowers.  This could happen in regions where local 
community organisations make collective decisions.  Therefore, depositors with this 
characteristic may also be a risk to the bank (Rojas, 2003).  Due to the lack of experience in 
implementing carbon banking, there is an operational risk that the bank bears because of the 
possibility that operating expenses (e.g. monitoring carbon stocks) might vary significantly 
from what is expected (Koch & MacDonald, 2010).  For instance, there is trade-off between 
accuracy and costs of carbon measurement systems that may affect bank costs and amount of 
carbon deposited.  Measurement accuracy is essential to ensure that carbon stocks are not over- 
or underestimated.  In cases when remote sensing methods14 are used, high accuracy levels 
                                                 
14 Remote sensing technology is a process of acquiring field data from a distance without being in contact with 
the area which is being assessed (e.g. through satellite imagery).  It provides a synoptic view of the surface of the 
area of interest, thereby capturing the spatial variability in the attributes of interest (Vashum & Jayakumar, 
2012).  For example, LiDAR method. 
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require the use of fine-resolution imagery (e.g. to detect changes in forest land at small scale), 
imagery repeated over time (e.g. to overcome cloud cover limitations), or imagery that needs 
higher expertise to process (e.g. radar imagery analysis), all of which implies a greater cost.  
Likewise, ground measurement methods such as allometric method15 requires harvesting trees, 
weighing different components of the harvested tree (e.g. trunk, twigs, leaves, and branches) 
and weighting the same components after they are oven dried, diameter at breast height, height 
of the tree trunk, wood density, and crown diameter.  This is also time consuming and relatively 
expensive for large-scale applications such as national-level carbon stock inventory (Wertz-
Kanounnikoff, Verchot, Kanninen, & Murdiyaso, 2008).  Costs vary not only because of 
requiring high levels of accuracy but also because of size of the forest area being measured.  
Measurement costs (cost/ha) may decrease as the size of forest area increases (Böttcher et al., 
2009; Brofeldt et al., 2014).  Thereby, the cost of measuring carbon stocks will depend upon 
desired level of accuracy. 
 
2.5 Forest carbon permanence 
Forest resources are exposed to a wide range of environmental disturbances as well as 
landowners’ decisions about their land use that may affect the permanence of carbon storage in 
forests, and also some other environmental services such as water, wood supply, soil fertility, 
to name a few.  The following subsections describe some biophysical and landholders’ 
behaviour risks.  
 
2.5.1 Biophysical risks to forest carbon  
Forests are subject to biophysical risks from natural disturbances.  These disturbances pose a 
challenge to forest carbon projects because of the inherent unpredictability and potential scale 
that characterise them (Galik & Jackson, 2009).  Naturally occurring disaster events that can 
partially or completely reverse the carbon sequestration of a growing or mature forest include, 
fires, pests or fungal attack, floods, hurricanes, volcanoes, earthquakes and landslides (Bigsby, 
2009a; 2009b; Ellis, 2001; MARN et al., 2009; McNulty, 2002; Nabuurs et al., 2007; Steven, 
2002).  They also have different impacts.  For example, droughts may kill trees, which will be 
left standing, at least for a short-medium term.  Trees felled by hurricanes or wind throws could 
decompose or be used either as fire wood or wood products (Steven, 2002).  Forest disturbed 
                                                 
15  Allometric method by harvesting is the most direct method for estimation of above-ground biomass and the 
carbon stocks stored in forest (Qureshi, Pariva, Badola, & Hussain, 2012). 
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by floods would have higher methane (CH4) emissions as they will decompose by anaerobic 
decomposition (Ellis, 2001).  The intensity and frequency of environmental disturbances can 
be influenced by climate variability (e.g. long droughts may promote forest fires) (IPCC, 2007).  
Two biophysical risks - forest fires and forest pests -are analysed to explore interactions of 
factors and impacts.  
 
Fire can be human-induced by arson or negligence or can be natural, caused by lightning.  It 
can occur at any point during the development of a forest, although from a carbon sequestration 
perspective the severity of damage is likely to increase as the trees mature (Ellis, 2001).  At any 
time the forest might be affected and carbon released into the atmosphere due to fire (Ellis, 
2001).  For instance, during the 1990s, nearly 16 million hectares of the Brazilian Amazon 
forest was affected by forest fire (Lecocq & Chomitz, 2001).  In Guatemala forest fires affected 
13,086 km2 in 1998 and 11,564 km2 in 2003.  These two affected areas in Guatemala were 
influenced by El Niño-Southern Oscillation (CONAP, INAB, CONRED, & MARN, 2010).  
Annual carbon emissions from tropical wildfires are extremely variable, ranging from 7.5 to 70 
Mg ha-1 depending on previous fire and land-use history (Cochrane, 2003).  Studies have been 
undertaken to analyse the relationship between forest fires and climate variability (Flannigan, 
Stocks & Wotton, 2000), ecosystem resilience (Pausas, 1999), fire management when trading 
carbon credits (Couture & Reynaud, 2011), fire ignition danger in fire-prone sites (Conedera et 
al., 2011), and prediction of forest fire by modelling scenarios (Au, Wang & Lo, 2007; Carmel, 
Paz, Jahashan, & Shoshany, 2009) to name a few.  These relationships have helped to a certain 
extent to determine fire susceptibility in some regions with particular environmental conditions.  
For instance, fire susceptibility in tropical forests occurs largely because of moisture stress 
during periods of extreme drought, when normally moist fuels dry out and become potentially 
flammable.  This is even more predominant in dry regions (Cochrane 2003; Nabuurs et al., 
2007).  This example can be analysed from a more complex perspective by relating other factors 
that interact between fuel, topography, ignition (Flannigan, Stocks & Wotton, 2000), human 
induced activities (e.g. slash-and-burn agricultural practice) (Cochrane, 2003; MARN et al., 
2009; Monzón-Alvarado et al., 2012), ecosystem temperature (Cochrane et al., 1999), type of 
vegetation (Pereira Jr & Setzer, 1996), and rain fall pattern (Cochrane, 2003).  Because of the 
complexity of these interactions trends in disturbance derived from forest fires are still under 
investigation (Rosenzweig et al., 2007). 
 
Insects and diseases are a natural part of forest ecosystems.  However, damage from pest or 
fungal attack can have varying impacts on the carbon sequestration potential of the trees.  Pests 
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may kill trees leading to loss of their reproduction or regeneration potential, deform trees, 
reduce resistance to other natural disturbances such as droughts; hence, reducing the ability to 
sequester carbon dioxide (Ellis, 2001; Hicke et al., 2012; Peltzer et al., 2010).  There are well-
documented studies about these effects such as from Dutch elm disease and chestnut blight in 
to eastern US forest (Lovett, Canham, Arthur, Weathers, & Fitzhugh, 2006), and from 
Phytophora-induced forest dieback syndromes in Australia, the US and central Europe 
(Condeso & Meentemeyer, 2007).  Despite some models of carbon cycling including forest fire 
into risk analysis, few researchers incorporated pest disturbance and its effect on carbon 
sequestration (Peltzer, Allen, Lovett, Whitehead, & Wardle, 2010). For example, some studies 
have undertaken simulations of impacts from pests on forest carbon such as the role of 
defoliation on forest carbon dynamics (Clark, Kowronski, & Hom, 2010; Cook et al., 2008; 
Medvigy, Clark, Skowronski, & Schäfer, 2012), aspen decline (Hogg, 2001), and insect-caused 
tree mortality (Kurz, 2008).  However, the scale of defoliation events for carbon sequestration 
dynamics are still not well understood (Medvigy et al., 2012).  Overall simulation results from 
Medvigy et al. (2012) have found that insects (e.g. gypsy moth) have large defoliation effects 
on oak-pine forest biomass dynamics, functioning, and its capacity to act as a carbon sink. 
2.5.2 Landholders' decisions about land use and forest carbon  
Factors influencing land use change are formed and interrelated by a complex of social, 
political, economic, demographic, and biophysical factors (Hails, 2002; Lambin et al., 2001).  
These factors are linked to a broad range of sciences (e.g. social, environmental) that can help 
to analyse aspects of land use change in specific situations.  The synthesis of these sciences is 
essential, but paradigms and theories applied by the different scientific disciplines are often 
difficult to integrate and their specific results do not easily combine into an integrated 
understanding of land use change (Overmars & Verburg, 2005).  Researchers have not yet 
succeeded in integrating all disciplines and sciences associated with land use change.  
Conclusions drawn from land use change studies can vary substantially amongst disciplines, 
which means that the level of complexity of land use systems as a whole is not fully understood 
so far (Lambin et al., 2001; Lambin, Geist, & Lepers, 2003).  Because of this complexity of 
disciplines and the unpredictability of landholders’ decisions about land use (Dutcher, Finley, 
Luloff, & Johnson, 2004; Lambin et al., 2003; Lubowski, Plantinga & Stavins, 2007), this 
section attempts to provide information related to possible causes that may trigger the decision 
of landholders to change their land use.  
The risk of land use change is a direct anthropogenic action at the field level. This risk realtes 
to release of carbon or the reduction of the ability to sequester carbon if landholders decide to 
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change forest land into other agricultural alternatives.  The risk of changing forest land use 
makes carbon offset projects complex because of their exposure to reversal risk.  This may 
influence the attractiveness of forest offsets as an investment strategy for landholders and 
carbon buyers, and mitigation strategies for policymakers (Galik & Jackson, 2009; Wertz-
Kanounnikoff et al., 2008). 
 
According to the FAO (2013a), land use is characterised by the arrangements, activities and 
inputs people undertake in a certain land cover type to produce, change or maintain it.  Any 
given area is usually used to satisfy multiple objectives or purposes such as food security, 
recreation, urban living or wildlife conservation.  However, concerns about land use in different 
regions of the world emerged during the 1970s with the realisation that land surface processes 
influence the world climate (Charney, & Stone, 1975; Otterman, 1974; Sagan, Toon, & Pollack, 
1979).  Attention increased during the 2000s when scholars began to discuss land use, land use 
change and forestry in the context of global climate change (IPCC, 2000). 
 
Now, change in land use and its effects on carbon management is a prominent topic in 
discussions surrounding the mitigation of climate change (Boyd, 2010; Cantarello, Newton & 
Hill, 2011; Dilling & Failey, 2013; Gibbs, Brown, Niles, & Foley, 2007).  For instance, when 
shifting from cropland to pasture or from rangeland to forest, soil carbon and vegetation on land 
are significantly affected, resulting in either an increase or decrease in its carbon stock (Eve, 
Sperow, Paustian, & Follett, 2002; Guo & Gifford, 2002).  Some practices, such as halting 
deforestation, planting trees, sustainable forestry activities, or reducing biomass burning can be 
implemented to increase the amount of carbon sequestered (Alig, 2003; IPCC, 2000; Nasi et 
al., 2011).  Changes in agricultural practices such as ceasing tillage of soil, changing crop 
rotations and using cover crops can also avoid the loss of carbon (Jandl et al., 2007; Post & 
Kwon, 2000).   
 
Landholders’ decisions are also influenced by external drivers (Acosta-Michlik & Espaldon, 
2008; Miahle, Becu, & Gunnell, 2012).  This includes market prices for commodities, policy 
levers such as incentives and subsidies, and biophysical factors such as climate and water 
supply (Dilling & Failey, 2013; Lambin et al., 2001; Lambin et al., 2003).  Internal drivers are 
also implicated in landholders’ decisions on land use, such as cognitive capacities and social 
capital (Acosta-Michlik & Espaldon, 2008).  Polhill, Sutherland, and Gotts (2010) point out 
that land use decisions are the result of a combination of profits and satisfaction seeking which 
demonstrate that landholders are perfectly rational decision makers.  Lambin et al. (2003) also 
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highlight that landholders’ decisions are based on environmental, socio-economic (e.g. 
economic, technological, globalisation, demographic), and institutional factors. 
 
Variability in environmental or natural factors such as long droughts or high levels of rainfall 
may also affect land use (Lambin et al., 2003).  Variability of conditions in ecosystems caused 
by climate change amplifies the pressures stemming from demand on land resources, especially 
in dry or sub-humid climatic conditions.  For instance, in Australia and the African Sahel, when 
unusually wet conditions prevailed, the perceptions of drought risks were altered; hence, 
overstocking on rangeland occurred.  However, when drier conditions returned, the livestock 
management practices were ill adapted and land degradation resulted (Turner, 1999).  Cropland 
expansion in dry lands may also increase the vulnerability of land to climatic fluctuations and 
trigger land degradation (Lambin et al., 2003). 
Economic and technological factors.  From an economic stand point land use decisions are led 
by a range of variables that have direct impact on farms.  For example, on- and off-farm income, 
input and output prices, taxes, subsidies, production and transportation costs, capital flows and 
investments, access to credit and trade (Barbier, 1997).  Carbon markets are external economic 
factors that can also promote the change from crop lands to forestry if carbon prices are 
sufficiently high (Adams & Turner, 2012; Chevallier, 2011; Failey & Dilling, 2013), increasing 
returns when planting trees relative to returns from crop lands (Lubowski et al., 2007; Newell 
& Stavins, 2000).  This coincides with Alig, Latta, Adams, and MacCarl (2010) who concluded 
that carbon payments to landholders can have considerable impacts on future patterns of 
forestry and agricultural land use.  On the other hand, enhancing agricultural technology, and 
better access to credit and markets have the potential to encourage deforestation rather than 
reducing pressure on forests.  This depends on how profitable farming is at the forest frontier 
(Lubowski et al., 2007), whether crops are sold locally or globally, and on the labour and capital 
intensity of the new technologies (Lambin et al., 2003).  This is the case for cattle and pasture 
land which may have higher short term returns than forestry activities.  As a result, farmers tend 
to increase the proportion of pasture cropland16 to feed cattle at the expense of forest land (Geist 
& Lambin, 2002; Ramankutty & Foley, 1999).  Furthermore, on-farm income may also have 
an impact on land use change.  The higher the crop land productivity derived from agricultural 
activities, the higher the possibility to increase on-farm income, hence the farmer is less likely 
                                                 
16 Pasture crops is land used permanently for herbaceous forage crops, either cultivated or growing wild.  This 
crop is commonly used for livestock; however, livestock is not merely a source of food for farmers.  Farm animals 
also provide income when production exceeds family needs, and dung can be used for enhance soil fertility in 
other crops (e.g. cash crops and/or staple crops) (FAO, 2014d). 
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to reduce the forest land (Tilma et al., 2002).  Hamilton and Fischer (2005) identified a wide 
range of economic activities through which on-farm income is generated.  For instance, planted 
crops such as cash crops (e.g. coffee, pea, broccoli, potato, and tomato) are sold.  In some cases, 
when staple crops (e.g. beans and maize) exceed family basic food needs, landholders 
commercialise this surplus to increase their on-farm income.  When crop land is profitable 
enough some landholders tend to see their forest as a “saving account” for future generations 
(Eve et al., 2002; Thacher, Lee, & Schelhas, 1997).  This can also be seen as a strategy to allow 
them to respond to unexpected crises by maintaining a set of assets (e.g. forest and its sub-
products such as timber and fire wood) that they can rapidly liquidate in either local or national 
markets (Lipper & Cavatassi, 2004).  A similar relationship happens with off-farm income.  
Landholders might find better labour opportunities off-farm which represent higher income to 
the family.  Therefore, landholders satisfy family needs (food and economic), and they may be 
less likely to convert their forest land to other uses (Hamilton & Fisher, 2005). 
 
Globalisation is an economic related factor which is not a driver of land use change.  
Nevertheless, it amplifies the driving forces by removing regional barriers and increasing 
interdependency amongst people and nations (Lambin et al., 2003).  Economic liberalisation 
and globalisation, mostly trade liberalisation and reforms to open up the agro-industrial sector, 
have a direct impact on land use, and hence effects on the environment and natural resources.  
For example, in Mexico and Ghana high rates of agriculture productivity triggered forest land 
conversion and promoted land degradation due to unsustainable production methods.  
Indirectly, agro-industrial development also displaced rural poor and landless people who were 
then pushed to marginal agricultural lands or to the forest frontier (Barbier, 2000).  Grau and 
Aide (2008) point out socioeconomic drivers of land-use change associated with globalisation 
produce two contrasting land-use trends in Latin America.  Firstly, increasing global food 
demand (particularly in Southeast Asia) accelerates deforestation in areas suitable for modern 
agriculture (e.g. soybean), severely threatening ecosystems, such as Amazonian rain forests, 
dry forests, and subtropical grasslands.  Secondly, demand for biofuels may also become an 
emerging threat in land degradation and deforestation. 
 
Demographic factors are associated with the characteristics of human populations such as, 
labour availability at the household level with regards to family members living on the farms, 
years holding the farm, farmers’ age, level of education of farmers, amongst others.  For 
instance, in West African Sudan-Sahel the high availability of labour on the farms due to the 
high number of family members caused increased investments in crop intensive yields, and 
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increased the consumption of fuel wood.  Thereby, land degradation and forest degradation, 
especially in semi-urban environments, occurred over 25 years (Turner, 1999).  Because 
families’ priorities are based on satisfaction seeking, the high number of family members living 
on the farm may represent a threat to their forest land as they might convert forest land use into 
crop production systems (Adams & Turner, 2012; Barbier, 1997; Boyd, 2010).  According to 
Zander and Durr (2011) the difficulty of satisfying material and food needs in large families 
living on the farm puts pressure on forestry resources and crop lands.  To satisfy these 
necessities landholders tend to clear forest to acquire short-term revenues from selling timber 
and fire wood (Ramadhani, Otsyina, & Franzel, 2002); hence, they extend crop lands (e.g. food 
crop cultivation) to increase staples production (Geist & Lambin, 2002).  This land use change 
phenomenon has two related aspects; the availability of forest and the demand of staple crops.  
The former is supported by Geist and Lambin (2002) and Lambin et al. (2003) who found that 
the larger the proportion of forest land, the more likely landholders select the option of 
converting forest area into short-term benefits (e.g. cash and/or staple crops).  With regards to 
staple crops Geist and Lambin (2002) pointed out that landholders with larger proportions of 
staple crops tend to select the option of reducing their forest land in larger proportions.  Further, 
high numbers of family members on the farm and the reduction of forest land are also attributed 
to the period of holding the farm (Ebanyat et al., 2010; Lambin et al., 2003; Pichón, 1997).  The 
reason for reducing forest land after a long period of holding property is the number of family 
members on the farm, which encourages landholders to promote the subdivision of the 
landholding into the number of inheritors so they will be able to diversify production by 
converting forest land into other alternatives (Lambin et al., 2003).  The subdivision of land 
amongst family members for inheritance has been documented as a customary land use practice 
commonly used by ethnic groups (Maina, 2013). This is the case in Guatemala (e.g. Department 
of Chimaltenango) where the Kackchiquel ethnic Maya group prevails (von Braun, Hotchkiss, 
& Immink, 1989).  Therefore, the longer the period of holding the property, the more likely it 
is the landholder will reduce a large proportion of forest land. 
Farmers’ age is another demographic factor that influences land use change. Alassafl, 
Majdalwail, and Nawash (2011) found that older farmers are less likely to reduce forest land 
but are more likely to participate in forestry activities, because their opportunities to be 
employed or engaged in other livelihood activities is limited compared to younger people.  Also, 
Lwayo and Maritim (2003) pointed out that farmers’ age is a factor that influences the decision 
of not adopting any activity that reduces forest land, because older farmers tend to be more 
aware about the environment.  Millington, Perry, and Romero-Calcerrada, (2007) highlight that 
the relatively old age of farmers is an important constraint on the ability to convert forestry land 
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use into new areas of cultivated land.  Older farmers prefer to keep their farms with forest and 
keep cultivating the areas already planted with staples and cash crops.  Another study (Thoai & 
Rañola, 2010) showed that the older the farmer the more reluctant they were to adopt 
innovations in forestry activities and changes in forest land. On the other hand, the level of 
education of landholders may also have an effect on land use change. Studies support that the 
level of education, particularly formal education, lowers the probability of converting forest 
areas into other land uses (Browder, Pedlowski & Summers, 2004; Ebanyat et al., 2010; Godoy, 
Groff & O’Neil, 1998). This is because some farmers with formal education are more 
knowledgeable and aware about forest and its relationship with the environment (Walker, Perz, 
Caldas, & Silva, 2002). 
 
It is also worthwhile highlighting the importance of institutional factors in land use change.  To 
explain land use changes, it is important to understand legal, political, and economic institutions 
and their interrelationships with individual decision-making at a farm level (Agrawal & 
Yadama, 1997; Lambin et al., 2001; Lambin et al., 2003).  Access to capital, technology, labour 
and land are examples of how local and national policies and institutions are structured 
(Agrawal & Yadama, 1997).  For instance, planting trees because of government forestry 
subsidy programmes in Guatemala has changed land use over the last 15 years (BANGUAT, & 
URL-IARNA, 2009; MARN et al., 2009; URL/IARNA, 2009).  Also, land use changes in Costa 
Rica are due to reforestation incentive policies (Bryan, 2013; Le, Smith, Herbohn, & Harrison, 
2012; Thacher et al., 1997).  Furthermore, local institutions and organisations (e.g. forestry or 
agricultural) and their memberships may also play an important role in land use change.  
However, few academic efforts have been undertaken to analyse relationships between 
organisations’ memberships and the effect on land use change.  Related work from Agrawal 
and Yadama (1997) and Lambin et al. (2001) found that weak institutions or organisations and 
lack of information might influence decision making processes on farms land use, particularly 
when an organisation’s members decide to convert forest land into crop land without having 
any market opportunity to sell their products.  This is also supported by Lambin et al. (2003) 
and Jepson, Jarvie, MacKinnon, and Monk (2001) who pointed out that many unexpected land 
use changes are because of ill-defined17 local organisations and local government 
organisational policies.  Ill-defined policies and weak institutional enforcement have also 
affected forest management due to illegal logging and corruption in Indonesia (Jepson et al., 
2001).  Some other examples of policies that impinge on land use changes are resource 
                                                 
17 Mainly lack of information sharing mechanisms, poor decision-making processes (Jepson et al., 2001). 
 47 
commodification, nationalisation, international environmental agreements, taxation, and price 
controls on agricultural inputs and outputs (Lambin et al., 2003). 
 
Based on the land use factors analysed above, some expected relationship can be found to help 
this research to understand the effect of landholders’ decisions on changing forest land area. 
From an economic and demographic perspective, some of the factors that might drive changes 
on forest land are associated with cattle and pasture land, productivity of crop land, on- and off-
farm income, family members at the farm, years of holding the farm, farmer’s age, and farmer’s 
education. 
 
For instance, the larger the proportion of cattle and pasture land, the higher the probability the 
landholder will decide to reduce a large proportion of forest land.  If there are high crop yields 
and high prices of agricultural products in markets, landholders may increase their on-farm 
income.  The higher the productivity in crop land, the more likely it will increase on-farm 
income and lessen the landholders’ interest in reducing forest land.  Another way to increase 
income is derived from off-farm activities.  If landholders can complement on-farm income 
with off-farm jobs, income may also tend to increase.  Therefore, there will be less likelihood 
of changing forest land area into other agricultural alternatives.  
 
Families at the farms tend to look after their livelihoods by prioritising basic needs such as food, 
sources of short-term revenue, and the availability of crop land.  The literature notes that there 
is a relationship between the number of family members and forest land area.  That is, the higher 
the number of family members living at the farm, the higher the probability of converting forest 
land into crop land to generate short-term economic benefits.  Regardless of the number of 
members living at farm, a similar relationship is found between the availability of forest land, 
and food and short-term economic benefits (e.g. selling timber).  For instance, the higher the 
proportion of forest land area, the higher the likelihood to convert forest land into crop land 
(e.g. staple crops) to generate short term profits.  Furthermore, years of holding property also 
has an effect on forest land use.  Based on the literature review, the longer the period of holding 
the farm the more likely it is the farmer will reduce the proportion of forest land and convert it 
into other agricultural alternatives. 
 
With regards to farmer’s age and the level of education, a positive relationship to avoiding 
forest land use change has been documented in the literature.  For instance, the older the farmer, 
the less likely they will decide to reduce the proportion of forest land area.  For the level of 
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education, literature highlights that the higher the level of formal education, the less likely it is 
that the proportion of forest land is reduced.  Both farmers’ age and education factors are mainly 
associated with environmental and forestry awareness. 
 
On the other hand, institutional factors such as local organisations and their memberships also 
play an important role in forest land reduction, mainly related to decision making processes.  
There is a gap in the literature about the relationship between membership and the role of 
organisations in improving local land use management processes.  However, from an empirical 
perspective it could be stated that the relationship between organisational membership and 
forest land area is that the greater the membership in a forestry organisation, the less likely it is 
to reduce forest areas, assuming that members are obtaining appropriate forestry management 
information.  
 
2.5.3 Mitigating and incorporating risks in carbon projects 
Mitigating or managing risks need not be limited to silvicultural practices and other forest 
management measures (See Table 2-1) (Galik & Jackson, 2009).  Other tools are useful to tackle 
environmental risks in carbon projects.  For instance, third-party insurance is an option used for 
risk pooling.  A third-party insurer selects a portfolio of insured projects in a way that several 
growth regions and ecosystems are covered, thereby limiting the risk of occurrence of large 
simultaneous damages.  There is a risk premium paid in emission reduction units.  In the case 
where an environmental event strikes the carbon pool, the third-party replaces credits by the 
ones held in stock (Galik & Jackson, 2009; Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2008). 
 
Table 2-1. Risk management strategies to address risks in carbon projects (Galik & Jackson, 2009) 
Strategy Description 
Forest management Promotes resistance to or resilience from disturbances  
Insurance Allows for the replacement of lost carbon in the event of reversal 
Buffer 
Requires set-aside of some portion of storage in project-specific or 
programme-wide pool 
Portfolio 
diversification 
Minimises impact of disturbances by pooling diverse project types or 
projects in geographically diverse areas 
Programme re-
evaluation 
Periodic evaluation of expected sequestration versus realised, allowing for 
additional credits to be released or withheld 
 
Another mechanism for dealing with risk in carbon projects is the use of a buffer account or 
reserved pool.  Buffers can vary in scale depending on the size of the carbon pool available for 
trading.  For example, only certain shares (e.g. 25%) of the credits generated are sold, whilst 
the remainder is held in an escrow account for a predetermined time period (e.g. 10 years).  So, 
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a proportion of these credits are liberated as the guarantee that no losses have occurred by the 
end of the agreed period (Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2008).  A variation of this buffer entails 
several projects maintaining a joint credit buffer, thus spreading the risk of releasing carbon 
into the atmosphere simultaneously.  The individual project buffers can be smaller than non-
pooled project credit buffers (Marland et al., 2001; Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2008).  The role 
of diversification as an effective risk reduction strategy may be limited by risks that are 
systematic or that are of low probability but high impact (Galik & Jackson, 2009).  Pooling 
carbon projects in different geographic areas can minimise the impact of disturbances.  For 
example, in some ecosystems where carbon sequestration projects are located, there may be 
biophysical disturbances such as drought stress, fluctuation in rainfall and temperature that can 
significantly affect annual carbon sequestration rates (Hultman, 2006).  However, the risk can 
be minimised as the carbon projects portfolio is spread out in different ecosystems and climate 
conditions.  Programme re-evaluation could also be used to ensure that levels of expected 
carbon sequestration and actual realised carbon storage match.  If discrepancies arise as a 
consequence of reversal or other reasons, future buffer withholding rates can be adjusted or 
additional carbon credits can be obtained from elsewhere (Galik & Jackson, 2009; Murray & 
Olander, 2008). 
 
Despite the existence of mitigation strategies to cope with disturbances, the stability of carbon 
reservoirs when trading carbon credits may still be affected by environmental risks.  An 
expected value can be estimated by analysing the level of damage and the probability of 
occurrence of any risk.  To begin with, the basic terminology needs to be addressed.  Firstly, 
risk is something that is based on a known or measured set of past events.  In other words, it is 
an expected loss due to a particular hazard for a given area and reference period (Aven, 2008; 
Gadow, 2000; Klemperer, 2003).  It is typically expressed as a probability distribution that is 
derived from observed frequencies of events (Aven, 2008).  Secondly, uncertainty is the lack 
of knowledge about the frequency of occurrence of an event.  It arises when there is no past 
history on which to base models of how future events might occur (Aven, 2008).   
 
When incorporating risks into quantitative research analysis, it is essential that the probability 
of occurrence of any event is considered.  For instance, a potential hazard presents a risk if it 
occurs with a probability greater than zero and if its occurrence will cause damage to a valuable 
object (Gadow, 2000; Liley, 2000; Rose et al., 1989).  Gadow (2000) points out that a system 
may be tolerant to any damage arising from biophysical risks such as fire, wind throw, or 
flooding within a given range of wind speed, temperature or rainfall.  Outside this range, 
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damage can occur.  The amount of damage increases whilst the probability of occurrence 
decreases.  Risk can be defined as the expected value of loss due to a particular hazard for a 
given site or reference period and can normally be incorporated into calculations of an expected 
value (EV).  The EV may be calculated by estimating two variables, Si expressed in different 
units (monetary terms, burnt area, etc.) and different levels of probability of occurrence Pi, and 
is calculated as  
 
EV  = � Si Pi
i
 
 
For carbon offsets, the EV can be used to calculate an expected amount of forest carbon. The 
EV can then be used as the risk-adjusted amount of carbon (Gadow, 2000; Hurteau, Hungate, 
& Koch, 2009; Liley, 2000).  The risk of disturbances can be borne by the carbon project (e.g. 
carbon bank) by leasing out a risk-adjusted amount of carbon based on Si and Pi (Esuola & 
Weersink, 2006). 
 
2.6 Carbon bank and costs 
It is worthwhile to consider the role that costs may play in new and emerging markets.  For 
instance, with regard to carbon sequestration, the costs of securing transactions could have 
implications for whether the market or carbon project is successful (Pearson, Henman, & 
Brown, 2010).  
 
Before starting to analyse transaction costs, their classification and their implications, it is 
important to understand what a transaction cost is.  Transaction costs are defined as the cost of 
resources used to exchange goods and services through defining, establishing, maintaining and 
transferring property rights (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, & 
Kuperan, 2005).  It also includes the costs of discovering exchange opportunities, negotiating 
contracts, monitoring and enforcing implementation (van Kooten, Shaikh & Suchanek, 2002).  
An important point the literature highlights is that most transaction cost definitions refer to costs 
of exchanging goods and services, whilst in climate change projects such costs of carbon 
sequestration represents trade of an environmental externality, where policies and rules create 
a new commodity (carbon emission reductions).  Hence, in this case, there will be a cost 
associated with defining and establishing a non-existent good.   To address this deficiency and 
(2-3) 
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to adapt this into carbon offset terms, the concept can be phrased as: “the financial cost to 
define, establish, maintain and transfer carbon offsets” (McCann et al., 2005; Pearson, 
Henman, & Brown, 2010).  
2.6.1 Typology of transaction costs  
Exchanging goods and services between buyers and sellers generates a broad range of activities 
which are allocated in different categories of costs.  The following list of categories takes into 
account some elements suggested by McCann et al. (2005) and Antinori and Sathaye (2007).  
However, other scholars have also considered to adapt these categories for carbon banking 
(Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; Cacho, Hean & Wise, 2003; Cacho & Lipper, 2007; Cacho, Lipper 
& Moss, 2013; Cacho, Marshall, & Milne, 2005a; Coggan, Buitelaar, Whitten, & Bennett, 
2013; Milne, 1999; van Kooten, Shaikh, & Suchanek, 2002). 
 
Searching and negotiation includes the costs of identifying and selecting the project, project 
partners and hiring consultants (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007).  They include the price for 
information services, brokerage costs and delay experienced by stakeholders in finding an 
appropriate partner.  Search cost will rely on institutional constraints, firm experience and 
search procedures.  For the latter, the search process may consider including a single project or 
a set of projects.  Search costs may include contacting and establishing relationships with the 
local people, negotiating the terms of the project with the potential stakeholders and clients in 
terms of scheduling the payments arising from the carbon sequestration services, visiting sites, 
arranging finance, obtaining permits, and other mutually agreed obligations (Antinori & 
Sathaye, 2007; Cacho & Lipper, 2007; Coggan et al., 2013; Milne, 1999). 
 
Establishing base line comprises the preparation and design of a project document through 
which the carbon project proponent has to find a suitable area and collect social, economic and 
agricultural information about the area.  It also includes the estimation of carbon sequestration 
potential, selection of carbon monitoring method, the estimation of financial and carbon flows, 
the development of a risk-management strategy (e.g. how to deal with project failures due to 
environmental disturbance), and the determination of the project’s additionality (Antinori & 
Sathaye, 2007; Cacho & Lipper, 2007). 
 
Verification generally occurs by hiring a third party.18  The accrediting agency checks the 
validity of the claims of the carbon project, and verifies and proves to investors that the 
                                                 
18 Third parties are institutions with carbon experts who certify carbon projects. 
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estimated levels of carbon have been sequestered and can be traded (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; 
Cacho, Hean & Wise, 2003; Milne, 1999; Pearson, Henman, & Brown, 2010).  
 
Approval includes time delays incurred after submitting the carbon project designs in the carbon 
bank.  The final approval cost is associated with registering and transferring ownership of 
offsets from the depositor to the renter (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; Milne, 1999; Pearson, 
Henman, & Brown, 2010). In this study, approval procedure cost is not charged to an external 
agency as carbon projects are approved by the bank. 
 
The cost of keeping records of project participants and administering payments to sellers, 
salaries, and transportation costs are directly included in overhead project management costs.  
The main stage of overhead management cost is setting up an office with its hardware and 
software and hiring carbon experts to oversee, coordinate and implement all the services and 
activities that a carbon bank needs.  Overhead management costs are expenses incurred in 
buying, renting and selling carbon sequestration services (Cacho & Lipper, 2007; Milne, 1999). 
 
Monitoring costs are those related to ensuring that project participants are fulfilling their 
obligations with regards to the quantification of the actual greenhouse gas reduction.  They 
include the cost of technical expertise, training, collecting and analysing data and reporting.  
Monitoring procedures range from simple methods that use allometric equations, remote 
sensing, and field inventories.  These imply undertaking sampling, permanent plots and ground 
truthing, biomass surveys, etc.  These procedures will influence the level of transaction costs 
for project managers, and will essentially be dependent on availability of information, size of 
the project area, duration of the project, and frequency of monitoring.  Every time a new batch 
of carbon is sold or rented and registered, monitoring has to be undertaken. For this reason, 
monitoring costs are recurrent (Cacho, Hean, & Wise, 2003; Milne, 1999). 
 
Enforcement costs are the expenses of insisting on compliance with the terms and conditions of 
the contract.  These costs may be incurred in the form of litigation and dispute-resolution 
expenses.  Insurance costs are costs entailed by the partners in lowering or compensating for 
the risk of project failure through natural disturbances (e.g. forest fire, hurricanes, forest pests) 
or any failure of a partner to fulfil their responsibilities.  Some examples of insurance 
mechanisms are a) portfolio diversification, b) pooling projects, c) adding a buffer stock of 
carbon, and d) deduction of a risk premium from the prices of carbon. All these strategies which 
address mitigation of risks are part of the base line project document required to start a carbon 
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project (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; Cacho, Hean, & Wise, 2003; Cacho & Lipper, 2007; Coggan 
et al., 2013). 
 
For carbon offset projects, empirical estimates of transaction costs have been undertaken.  Some 
examples of transaction costs are presented in the following subsection.  
 
2.6.2 Examples of transaction costs: Empirical estimates 
 A review of documented carbon projects throughout the world indicates a wide range of 
transaction costs.  Examples from Uganda, Peru, and Tanzania cited by Pearson, Henman, and 
Brown (2010), and from Costa Rica and Ecuador (Milne, 1999) demonstrate different 
proportions of transaction costs.  The examples shown in Table 2-2 are afforestation and 
reforestation projects approved by the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention 
(UNFCCC). 
 
 Table 2-2. Examples of cost estimates in commercial carbon projects 
 
As can be seen in Table 2-2 the dominant proportions of transaction costs amongst Uganda, 
Peru and Tanzania are represented by approval, monitoring, and enforcement and insurance 
costs.  In the case of Uganda and Peru, approval costs reached 50% and 27% respectively, 
whilst in Tanzania they were only 8%.  Uganda and Peru have higher proportions of monitoring 
costs compared to Tanzania.  Other important costs are enforcement and insurance where Peru 
had 41% and Tanzania 87%, whereas Uganda did not incur any of these costs as the project 
was transacting temporary carbon credits so no risk buffer or insurance costs were anticipated 
(Pearson, Henman, & Brown, 2010). 
 
                                                 
19 Not available  
Host country  Uganda Peru Tanzania Costa Rica Ecuador 
Project area (ha) 2,130 920 10,814 6,000 75,000 
Type of transaction cost      
Searching and negotiation 
(%) 
2 2.2 0.5 N/A19 N/A 
Base line (%) 2 4 0.3 N/A N/A 
Approval (%) 50 27 8 N/A N/A 
Project management (%) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Monitoring (%) 42 22 5 N/A N/A 
Enforcement and insurance 
(%) 
0 41 87 N/A N/A 
Total transaction costs 
(USD/ha) 
269.87 1,425.74 1,190.49 1,777 117.46 
Total transaction costs  
(USD/tCO2e) 
0.09 7.71 3.64 5.42 0.92 
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When analysing the total transaction cost, the same variability is seen not only amongst the 
examples presented in Table 2-2, but also in other case studies which showed ranges between 
5 and 7 US$/tCO2e (Cacho & Lipper, 2007).  Similar data (1 to 8 US$/tCO2e) were found by 
Torres et al. (2010).  However, extreme cases have also shown that total transaction costs can 
attain 6,070 US$/tCO2e (Richards & Stokes, 2004).  Another extreme case is demonstrated by 
van Kooten, Eagle, Manley, and Smolak (2004) who undertook 981 cost observations from 55 
studies which provided estimates of the cost of carbon sequestration project through forestry 
activities.  Their study showed that transaction costs varied from 1.73 US$/tCO2e up to 1,675.36 
US$/tCO2e.  The regions considered in this study were the Tropics, North American Great 
Plains, US Cornbelt, US South, US New England states, and Europe.  
 
These studies of empirical estimates of transaction costs show that cost varies from case to case 
(Cacho & Lipper, 2007).  However, there are theories to explain why and how this variation 
happens.  The next subsection sets out factors that influence transaction costs on carbon 
projects. 
 
2.6.3 Influences on transaction costs  
Many scholars have analysed the factors that may affect transactions costs (Antinori & Sathaye, 
2007; Cacho, Lipper & Moss, 2013; McCann, 2013; McCann et al., 2005; Olsen & Bishop, 
2009; Torres et al., 2010).  Transaction costs tend to increase with the remoteness of the area, 
local social opposition, and the need for international expertise (Olsen & Bishop, 2009).  The 
cost of the remoteness of the area is associated with awareness raising by disseminating 
information on what the project is about, monitoring and contracting costs.  Local social 
resistance towards new development projects without local government consent may incur costs 
such as dispute resolution and wide consultation processes.  The “know how” of carbon 
initiatives in most developing countries is a gap that has to be addressed by hiring international 
carbon experts, as well as setting up a permanent capacity building programme to support 
national and local staff (Olsen & Bishop, 2009).  Undertaking carbon projects in weak 
governance contexts is likely to imply higher transaction costs than projects in settings where 
institutions and rights are well-defined and well-functioning (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; Vatn, 
2010; Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2008; Williamson, 2000).  
 
Coggan et al. (2013) analyses the ‘uncertainty’ which also affects transaction costs.  They 
describe three types of uncertainties:  Firstly, the uncertainty of the institutional arrangements, 
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policy design and legal framework at national and local level.  This is discussed by Vatn (2010) 
as a governance issue when establishing payments for environmental services projects.  
Secondly, the uncertainty about the future state of nature as the offset outcome may be affected 
by natural disturbances.  This is associated with biophysical uncertainty.  Thirdly, the behaviour 
of the contracted parties regarding their obligations.  The cost of monitoring and enforcement 
may be higher if parties are not accomplishing their duties properly.  
 
Also factors such as project size (Torres et al., 2010) and geographical dispersion of project 
parcels increase the costs of transportation and field staff required to monitor carbon stocks.  
Monitoring and carbon measurement costs are also pointed out by Milne (1999), who highlights 
that the choice of monitoring and carbon measurement techniques may influence the level of 
transaction costs.  There are some monitoring options: 1) Modelling, 2) Remote sensing, and 
3) Field inventories.  The first two options, such as Quickbird and LiDAR, imply costs related 
to gathering knowledge, analysis, managing information, satellite images, and software.  Field 
inventories require high investment in labour, training field crew on setting up plots, and 
sampling trees (weighing and cutting).  Field inventories with community involvement tend to 
have high transactions costs, mainly in the establishment phase as the monitoring training 
process might take longer than expected (Milne, 1999; Vine, Sathaye, & Makundi, 1999).  
However, overall monitoring costs will rely on availability of existing information, duration of 
the project, size of the project area, and frequency of monitoring (De Jong, Tipper, & Montoya-
Gómez, 2000; Galik et al., 2009; García-Oliva & Masera, 2004; Vine et al., 1999; Woerdman, 
2001). 
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2.7 Summary 
Carbon markets at global level were described and assessed in this chapter.  Also the 
permanence and temporary of carbon sequestration were reviewed in this chapter.  The review 
discusses that carbon permanence in forests remains an important issue for carbon project 
developers as carbon markets prefer stable carbon pools.  To deal with permanence and 
temporary carbon sequestration issues, this chapter included the description of different 
approaches.  These were Ton-years, Temporary Carbon Emission approach and rental 
approach.  For each of these approaches, structure, services (depositing, withdrawing, etc.), and 
the theory of the carbon banking model, assuming the existence of a carbon rental market, were 
analysed. 
 
This chapter gave special emphasis to two risks that might affect the permanence of the amount 
of forest carbon provided by landholders.  Firstly, biophysical risks caused by natural 
disturbances such as forest fires and pests.  Secondly, the risk of landholders’ decisions about 
land use.  Land use changes are influenced by multiple factors (e.g. economic, demographic, 
institutional, etc.) that interact together.  Considering these risks when implementing a carbon 
bank, this chapter also included the treatment of risks in the carbon banking model.  Finally, 
bank costs were also an important part of this chapter.  Cost typology, examples of empirical 
estimates of transaction costs in different carbon projects in Uganda, Peru, Tanzania, Costa 
Rica and Ecuador, as well as factors influencing transaction costs were discussed.  This 
information demonstrates that costs may vary from case to case.  Factors influencing costs such 
as governance context, remoteness of the area, monitoring, lack of information, and lack of 
expertise were listed.  The next chapter presents the carbon bank model which includes a 
mathematical model, and the methods and variables used for modelling.  
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    Chapter 3 
Carbon bank model  
3.1 Introduction  
To answer the research questions outlined in Chapter One, a conceptual model based on the 
literature review in Chapter Two is defined in this chapter.  The main problem of this research 
is how to structure payments to small landholders using a carbon rental model which accounts 
for risk of changes to the carbon pool arising from biophysical risk (forest fires and pest disease) 
and socio-economic risk (landholders changing land use).  As mentioned in Chapter Two, the 
carbon banking approach aggregates forest carbon deposited by landowners and creates a 
carbon rental market through an institution (a bank), which facilitates trading between 
landowners and companies with emission reduction commitments (Bigsby, 2009a; Esuola & 
Weersink, 2006).  To analyse this approach a conceptual model was developed to show the 
structure of the carbon banking approach used in this study.  Figure 3-1 shows that the carbon 
banking approach may facilitate the interaction between forest carbon owners and liable 
companies.  This interaction is expressed as a mathematical model which aims to measure the 
carbon price a bank can afford to pay to landholders in exchange for sequestering carbon 
dioxide through their forest.  To do this, the model needs to account for different carbon risks 
such as the effect of environmental disturbances (e.g. forest fires and forest pests), and the effect 
of landholders’ decisions about land use change on their carbon pool.  Two factors may 
influence the carbon bank model: 1) carbon price in international markets, and 2) bank costs 
(Figure 3-1). 
Each subsection of this chapter describes the methods and techniques used to implement the 
mathematical model of carbon banking.  Risks from environmental disturbances such as forest 
fire and forest pests were analysed by using @Risk20 software which is an Excel add-in for 
Monte Carlo analysis.  For risk arising from landholder changes in land use, the Double Hurdle 
Model was adopted to model landholders’ decisions about land use, using LIMDEP version 10 
software.    
                                                 
20 Software acquired from www.palisade.com 
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Figure 3-1. Research conceptual model 
 
Finally, the mathematical model was used to determine how environmental disturbances and 
socioeconomic risks might affect the stability of the carbon pool as well as the bank’s ability to 
make payments to small landholders.  The chapter ends with a summary.  
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3.2 Carbon Banking: Mathematical model  
Based on the theoretical carbon banking approach outlined by Bigsby (2009a), this study has 
developed a mathematical carbon banking model, and the first empirical application of the 
model.  Bigsby’s approach is composed of a bank, many depositors and many renters (Bigsby, 
2009a).  The depositors are individual small landholders (i) located in different geographical 
regions (r) holding an area of forest (Air measured in ha). The total area of forest in small 
holdings in region r is Ar.  
 
Ar  =  �Airl
i = 1  
 
An individual landholder is paid based on a contract term of one year for the amount of carbon 
sequestered in his forest.  The amount of carbon in i’s forest (tCO2e) is the area of forest 
multiplied by the carbon density of that forest (Dir measured in tCO2e/ha).  The total amount 
of carbon sequestered by small holdings in region r (Kr measured in tCO2e) is 
 
Kr =  �Air
l
i = 1
* Dir  
 
The proportion of sequestered carbon deposited21 in the bank by i is Wir.  The amount of carbon 
deposited in the bank by small holder i (KDir  measured in tCO2e) is 
 
KDir = Air* Dir * Wir 
 
The total amount of carbon deposited in the bank by all small holdings in region r (KDr 
measured in tCO2e) is 
 
KDr = �KDir
l
i = 1
 
  
                                                 
21 Deposits in carbon banking refer to those amounts of forest carbon derived from landholders’ forests which are 
registered in the bank as carbon accounts.  
(3-4) 
(3-1) 
(3-2) 
(3-3) 
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The total amount of carbon deposited in the bank by small landholders from all regions (KD 
measured in tCO2e) is 
 
 KD = �KDr
𝑝𝑝
r = 1
  
3.2.1 Risks of forest loss  
The bank may face changes in the amount of carbon deposited due to the occurrence of 
biophysical disturbances (Bigsby, 2009a; Bigsby, 2009b; Ellis, 2001; MARN et al., 2009; 
McNulty, 2002), and decisions about land use (Galik & Jackson, 2009; Lambin et al., 2003) in 
individual landholdings. 
 
To account for possible changes in the amount of forest carbon, the bank must estimate a risk-
adjusted amount of carbon available to rent out in region r (KRr measured in tCO2e) after 
accounting for the bank’s acceptable risk-adjusted annual proportion of forest area lost in any 
region by each type of risk22 (γrj).  For forest fire and pests this analysis assumed a strongly 
risk-adverse bank position, setting (γrj) to the 95th percentile of annual loss from individual risk 
factor j in region r.  It is assumed that the incidence of biophysical risks may be different 
amongst geographical regions.  So, the model should be able to incorporate different risk in 
each region.  It is also assumed that 100% of forest is lost when fires and pests affect forests.  
Joint probability23 was used to calculate the combined effects of multiple risks assuming no 
correlations between risks of each type in any area. 
 
KRr = KDr [ (1-γrF) (1-γrP) (1 - γrS)]   
 
In this study the risks are forest fires (F), forest pests (P), and risk from landholders’ decisions 
about land use (S).  γrF is the 95th percentile of annual proportion of forest area affected by 
forest fire risk and γrP is the 95th percentile of annual proportion of forest area affected by pest 
risk, and γrS is the likely annual proportion of forest area lost by socioeconomic risk. 
Socioeconomic risk is not evaluated at the 95th percentile because of lack of longitudinal data. 
                                                 
22 Environmental disturbances such as forest fire, forest pest, etc. 
23 Joint probability is widely used when two or more observable phenomena may occur at the same time 
(Kempthorne & Folks, 1971). 
(3-5) 
(3-6) 
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This is discussed in Section 3.2.2.  (1-γrF) (1-γrP), and (1 - γrS) are the independent proportions 
of forest not being subject to any type of risk.  
 
The total risk-adjusted amount of carbon available to rent out in region r (KRr) must be less 
than or equal to total carbon from that region deposited in the bank (KDr) 
 
KRr   ≤  KDr 
 
 
3.2.1.1 Method used to calculate biophysical risks  
Monte Carlo simulation was chosen to calculate the probabilities of occurrence for forest fires 
(Carmel et al., 2009; Conedera et al., 2011; Couture & Reynaud, 2011) and forest pests (Maeda, 
Pellika, & Clark, 2010; Makowski, 2013; Makowski & Mittinty, 2010). 
 
Monte Carlo analysis can address any mathematical problem or model that is too complex, time 
consuming, or resource intensive to solve analytically.  Instead of tackling the numerical 
problem directly, Monte Carlo analysis allows the researcher to obtain an approximation of the 
solution by setting up an experiment of statistical sampling (Ratick & Schwarz, 2009). Monte 
Carlo simulation is a method for numerically operating a complex system that has random 
components.  Thousands of repeated iterations using means and distributions of the input 
variables are combined to obtain an output distribution function (Ratick & Schwarz, 2009; Rose 
et al., 1989; Vose, 2000).  At the beginning of each simulation, parameter values are chosen 
from predetermined probability distributions.  The process is repeated for a number of iterations 
sufficient to converge on an estimate of the probability distribution of the output variable.  The 
output distribution indicates that the likelihood of occurrence is a function of the distributions 
of the input variables and the simulation function (Hayes, 2011; Robert & Casella, 1999). 
 
The Monte Carlo simulations in this study used historical data to estimate the 95th percentile of 
annual proportion of forest areas affected in any region by some type of change (γrj ).  
Probability distribution functions were tested to determine the quality of fit using a Chi-square 
test (Law & Kelton, 1982; Palisade Corporation, 2010; Vose, 2000).  All these calculations 
used @Risk software. 
 
(3-7) 
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3.2.2 Socio economic risk  
There is also a risk of changing land use because of landholders’ decisions.  Thus, the bank 
needs to estimate the risk that landholders might reduce their area of banked forest because of 
their decisions about land use.  To address this, two variables are modelled: 1) the probability 
an individual landholder in region r decides to change land use (𝛅𝛅ir), and 2) the proportion of 
forest reduced by the landholder in region r (FLir).  Further details about this model are 
described in the following subsection (3.2.2.1)  
 
The total expected amount of banked carbon reduced by all landholders in region r (Lr, tCO2e) 
due to socioeconomic risk is,  
Lr = �δir𝑙𝑙
i = 1
 FL𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 KDir 
 
The total expected amount of banked carbon reduced L (tCO2e) due to socioeconomic risk in 
all regions is, 
L = �Lr
𝑛𝑛
r = 1
 
 
The likely annual proportion of forest carbon lost by socioeconomic risk (S) in region r (γ𝒊𝒊𝒓𝒓) 
is,  
γ𝒊𝒊𝒓𝒓 =  LrKDr 
The risk-adjusted amount of carbon remaining to rent out in region r after accounting for 
socioeconomic and other risks can be derived using Equation 3-6. 
 
3.2.2.1 Method used to calculate landholders' decisions about land use 
Landholders’ decisions on land use change about whether to increase or reduce their forest area 
are considered as a two-step decision process modelled with a double hurdle model (Kimhi, 
1999; Moffat, 2005; Saz-Salazar & Rausell-Köster, 2008).  The double hurdle model proposed 
by Cragg (1971) is applicable to disaggregate the landholders’ decisions about land use 
(Dhakal, Bigsby, & Cullen, 2008, Greene, 2003; Maddala, 2001; Moffat, 2005; Verbeek, 2012).  
Disaggregating the decision about land use change encompasses hurdles associated with 
selection and outcome decision steps.  The two hurdles are:  1) landholders deciding to reduce 
forest land, which uses a selection model to estimate 𝛅𝛅ir with a probit model, and 2) the extent 
(3-8a) 
(3-9) 
(3-8b) 
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of reduced forest area, which uses an outcome model to estimate FLir, by using the truncated 
linear regression method.  The first hurdle uses a binary (0 or 1) dependent variable, whereas 
the second one consists of both continuous positive and zero value observations.  Zero values 
are the result of truncation at zero (cut off point).  
 
Mathematically, the decision by a landholder (i) in region (r) about land use can be formulated 
as follows:  
 
𝛅𝛅ir = βrXir + ei 
FLir = αrZir + ui   
Where,  
Xir is a vector of individual i’s explanatory variables in the probit model for reducing forest 
area in region r 
𝜷𝜷r is a vector of coefficients of the probit model for reducing forest area in region r 
Zir is a vector of individual i’s explanatory variables in the truncated linear model for the extent 
of reduced forest area in region r 
αr is a vector of coefficients of the truncated linear model for the extent of reducing forest area 
in region r 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  are independently distributed, normal random error terms with mean 0.  
For the probit model Equation 3-10,   
𝛅𝛅ir = 1  If  δ'ir = βr Xir + ei    >  τF 
𝛅𝛅ir = 0  Otherwise 
Where, 
𝛅𝛅′ir  is a latent variable 
τF  is the cut-off point for decrease or no change in forest area 
ei is an independent and normally distributed random error term with mean 0 
(3-10) 
(3-11) 
(3-12) 
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For the truncated linear model in Equation 3-11  
FLir = F'Lir = αr Zir + ui  if F'Lir > 0 
FLir  = 0    Otherwise  
Where,  
FLir  observed cases or outcome of decision (the proportion of forest area reduced) 
F'Lir  is a continuous latent variable  
ui independent and normally distributed random error term with mean 0 
The coefficients of both the probit and truncated regression models were based on the maximum 
likelihood estimation method. To analyse the double hurdle model described above LIMDEP 
version 10, software was used.  
 
3.2.3 Carbon rental, leasing payments and bank profit24  
The bank is willing to rent out only KRr.  Therefore, in the presence of risk the bank’s loan 
portfolio has to be smaller than its deposits (Esuola & Weersink, 2006).  The bank leases carbon 
to renters at an annual carbon rental price (Pr) and makes an annual payment to landholders 
(PL) for the carbon they have deposited. 
 
Pr is derived from existing carbon prices (Pc) in international carbon markets and an interest 
rate (λ) arising from financial markets (See Equation 2-2 as reference).  Pr ($/tCO2e) is,  
 
Pr =  Pc ∗ λ 
 
Total bank revenue R ($) is derived from the annual rental payment and the risk adjusted 
amount of carbon rented out (KRr).  
R = Pr ∗ KRr   
 
                                                 
24 When PL= 0 
(3-14) 
(3-15) 
(3-13) 
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A necessary condition for bank viability is that the annual carbon rental revenue (R) exceeds 
the annual payments to carbon depositors plus costs.  
 
Pr KRr  > PLKD + Cr    
 
The bank’s total cost in region r (Cr) comprises variable costs (Vc) and fixed costs (Fc) 
measured in $/yr is   
 
Cr =  (CS*Ar)+ (CB*Ar )+ (CM*Ar )+ (CVA* Ar) + (CV * Ar) + CO  
 
Where the components of Vc are: CS ($/ha/yr) are costs related to searching and negotiating 
forest carbon contracts with landowners, CB ($/ha/yr) are costs incurred to measure the actual 
amount of carbon stock, CM ($/ha/yr) are monitoring costs related to checking how much 
carbon has been sequestered over one year, CVA ($/ha/yr) are costs to validate, register and 
approve the amount of forest carbon that has been measured and monitored, CV ($/ha/yr) are 
costs to verify the amount of carbon measured. As Vc rely on the size of the forest carbon 
project, each variable cost is multiplied by Ar (ha).  Fc (CO, $/yr) is overhead management 
costs. Thus, Cr encompasses variable costs (VC) measured in $/yr, and fixed cost (FC) measured 
in $/yr (see Table 3-1 for costs descriptions). 
 
Table 3-1. Cost, categories and description of bank’s costs 
Transaction cost 
category 
Description 
Searching and 
negotiation 
(CS) 
• Selecting and identifying lenders 
• Finding consultants and renters 
• Negotiating carbon prices, if the market is voluntary  
• Organising information sessions and draft contracts 
• Providing preliminary carbon project information to lenders 
• Promoting the project through the year 
Base line (CB) 
• Setting up the methodology to measure carbon 
• Collecting information at field level  
• Estimating potential carbon stocks and flows of the project 
• Designing monitoring plan 
• Producing Project Design Document (PDD) 
Verification (CV) 
• Hiring an accredited third agency to verify and prove the base line 
• Preparing report for further verification and validation and approval 
Validation, 
registration and 
approval (CVA) 
• Searching an accredited third party for undertaking the verification process 
• Following proceedings to approve PDD by the Designated National 
Authority (DNA) of the host country 
• Validating the approval by either Designated Operational Entity (DOE), 
accredited CDM Executive Board (regulated carbon market), or a 
competent third party (voluntary carbon market) 
  
(3-17) 
(3-16) 
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Transaction cost 
category 
Description 
Monitoring (CM) 
• Visiting lenders 
• Checking carbon data in the bank’s database to calculate rental carbon 
annual payments 
• Measuring samples of plots to estimate the amount of carbon in forests  
• Consolidating a report for further verification and validation of carbon 
before making payments to lenders and renters 
Overhead 
management (CO) 
• Hiring carbon experts 
• Buying hardware and software for establishing an office in the bank 
• Establishing permanent sampling plots at each farm 
• Designing a risk management system to deal with externalities (e.g. 
environmental disturbances, carbon prices)  
• Maintaining  database and administering contracts, accounts, and carbon 
payments and withdrawals 
• Coordinating field crews and paying salaries 
• Coordinating transportation for field trips 
• Distributing rental carbon payments to lenders and renters  
• Settling disputes, if any 
• Purchasing liability insurance, if applicable 
 
The annual carbon rental price (PL�) ($/tCO2e) payable to depositors for deposited carbon at 
which the bank breaks even is 
PL�  = (Pr * KRr) - Cr KD   
 
The bank profit π ($) is 
π = Pc* λ * KRr - PLKD  - Cr 
When PL = 0 bank profit π ($) is  
 π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎= Pc* λ * KRr - Cr 
  
(3-18) 
(3-19) 
(3-20) 
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3.2.3.1 Method to estimate the effect of carbon price and administrative costs on bank 
profit (PL=0)  
 
Sensitivity analysis is the most common approach to dealing with risk and uncertainty of 
economic projects. Sensitivity is analysed to furnish information concerning the effect of a 
particular change in a specific output model.  In other words, this analysis helps researchers to 
assess the impact that changes in a certain parameter will have on the model (Klemperer, 2003).  
Sensitivity analyses have been undertaken in a wide range of carbon projects to assess the effect 
of some variables that show levels of uncertainty, such as administrative costs, carbon prices, 
project size, number of forest owners, to name a few (Cacho & Lipper, 2007; Cacho, Lipper, & 
Moss, 2013).  To assess the effect of risk variables on the bank profit when the price paid for 
deposited carbon PL� is zero, the variables analysed from Equation 3-20 are:  carbon prices in 
international markets25 (Pr), and bank cost26 (Cr).  The variables that remain constant are:  
interest rate derived from financial markets (λ), the total area of forest in the region (Ar), 
individual deposit rates (Wir), and carbon density (Dir). 
 
  
                                                 
25 For plot purposes carbon prices in international market from $1/tCO2e to $20/tCO2e were used.  However the 
analysed prices were $5/tCO2e and $20/tCO2e.  
26 Two bank cost estimates were used.  One cost estimate came from related work and the other from this study.  
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3.2.4 Summary of variables used  
Finally, all variables used in the carbon banking mathematical model are shown in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2. Variables used in the carbon banking conceptual model 
 
Variable Description Units 
Air Area of forest of landholder i in region r ha 
Ar Total area of forest formed by all small landholders in region r ha 
Kr Total amount of carbon sequestered by all small landholders in region r tCO2e 
Dir Density of carbon sequestered by landholder i in region r tCO2e/ha 
KDir Total amount of carbon deposited in the bank by landholder i in region r tCO2e 
Wir Proportion of carbon deposited in the bank by small landholder i  
KDr Total amount of carbon deposited in the bank by all landholders in region 
r 
tCO2e 
KD Total amount of carbon deposited in the bank from all regions tCO2e 
KRr 
Risk-adjusted amount of carbon available for lease in region r after 
accounting for risk in region r 
tCO2e 
γrF 95th percentile of annual proportion of forest area burnt in region r by 
forest fire risk 
 
γrP 95th percentile of annual proportion of forest area affected in region r by 
forest pest risk 
 
γrS Likely annual proportion of forest area lost in region r by socioeconomic 
risk 
 
𝛅𝛅ir The probability an individual small landholder decides to change land use 
in region r 
 
FLir The proportion of forest reduced by small landholder i in region r  
Lr 
Total expected amount of banked carbon reduced by all landholders in a 
region r due to socioeconomic risk 
tCO2e 
L 
Total expected amount of banked carbon reduced due to socioeconomic risk 
in all regions 
tCO2e 
Pr Annual carbon rental price paid by renters $/tCO2e 
Pc Carbon price in international markets $/tCO2e 
λ Interest rate derived from financial markets % 
R Total bank revenue $ 
Cr Total bank cost in region r $ 
π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 Bank profit before paying the annual carbon rental to depositors $/year 
π Bank profit  $/year 
Vc Bank variable costs $/year 
FC Bank fixed costs $/year 
CS Searching and negotiation cost $/ha/year 
CB Measuring carbon base line cost $/ha/year 
CM Carbon monitoring cost $/ha/year 
CVA Carbon validation, registration and approval cost $/ha/year 
CV Carbon verification cost $/ha/year 
CO Carbon project overhead management cost $/year 
PL�  Annual carbon rental price payable to depositors at which the bank breaks 
even 
$/tCO2e 
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3.3 Summary  
The aim of this mathematical model is to determine the annual carbon price the bank is able to 
afford to pay to landholders (PL�) after accounting for risks such as environmental risks (forest 
fires and forest pests) and landholders’ decisions on land use change, and to analyse the effect 
of administrative costs and carbon prices on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎.  A conceptual research model has been 
developed to facilitate the understanding of the process of the carbon banking approach.  The 
two main research questions related to risks from environmental disturbances and landholders’ 
preferences about land use are mathematically described.  Addressing these two research 
questions as main inputs of the carbon banking model, a third research question associated with 
the annual rental price (PL�) the bank can afford to pay to landholders was raised as an output of 
the conceptual model.  Two important factors linked to PL� were also described, these are carbon 
prices in markets and bank costs.  
 
In addition, a mathematical model describing the actual amount of carbon provided from 
landholders and its relationships with some type of changes that represent risks are 
mathematically described.  Methods to model biophysical and socioeconomic risks are defined. 
The risk of biophysical disturbances was modelled through Monte Carlo simulation by using 
@Risk software; the risk that landholders might change their land use was modelled through 
Double Hurdle model using LIMDEP software.  The combined effect of both risks on the 
effective carbon stock provided by small landholders was mathematically expressed.  Finally, 
the variables of carbon rental, leasing payments and bank profit were mathematically outlined.  
Sensitivity analysis considering two carbon prices and two administrative costs was described 
to estimate the effect on bank profit when π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 and on PL�.  The next chapter lays out the study 
area and data used to run the carbon bank mathematical model, and the process of surveying to 
collect data. 
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    Chapter 4 
Study area and Data 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter described the conceptual and mathematical models of the carbon banking 
approach.  This chapter outlines the study area and data needed to model a carbon bank.  An 
overall description of Guatemala’s forest, the trends of deforestation over the last decade and 
climate life zones are provided.  The selection of the Montane region as the research site to 
assess the combined effect of biophysical and socioeconomic risks is described.  Qualitative 
and quantitative research approaches are also described.  Due to the nature of this research, a 
quantitative approach was chosen.  Examples of other studies in similar fields using a 
quantitative approach are also provided.  Finally, the chapter provides a description of data 
needed and its collection process using secondary and primary sources.  Secondary information 
was used to define the research site, calculate carbon stocks in landholders’ forest in each 
region, collect and analyse environmental disturbances and estimate the bank’s costs.  Primary 
information was gathered by interviewing small landholders to explore their preferences about 
land use.  
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4.2 Study Area: Forest and Climate of Guatemala  
According to the last national forest report conducted by UVG, INAB, CONAP and URL 
(2012), the forest coverage map in Guatemala for 2010 reported 3.7 million ha of forest   Table 
4-1 shows forest coverage and annual deforestation rates from 1991 to 2010.  Although the 
decadal annual deforestation rate has decreased from 1.5% to 1%, deforestation is still a 
problem, with forest coverage reducing by about 38,000 ha per year. 
 
Table 4-1. Forest coverage 1991-2010 in Guatemala 
Year Forested surface  Annual deforestation rate 
1991 42%          [4.56 million ha] 
1.5%           [73,000 ha] 
2001 36.8%       [4.01 million ha] 
1.16%         [48,084 ha] 
2006 35.5%       [3.87 million ha] 
1.00 %        [38,597 ha] 
2010 34.1 %      [3.72 million ha] 
 Source:  UVG, INAB, CONAP & URL (2012) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4-1 forest coverage in Guatemala in mainly present in the central 
north, north part of the country as well as over the volcanic chain on the western highlands.  By 
2010 forest coverage represents 34.1% of the national land area (108,890 km2) and by 1999, 
forest coverage represented 4.5 million ha spanning 42% of the national land area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forest Coverage 2010 
Figure 4-1. Forest coverage map of Guatemala 
2010 
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The diversity of forests in Guatemala is based on a wide range of elevations which vary from 0 
to 4,211 meters above sea level (MARN, 2012; MARN et al., 2009; URL-IARNA, 2009a).  
Such elevations have made Guatemala a country with a great diversity of landscapes and unique 
climatic conditions, which in turn lead to great biological diversity (CONAP, 2008a; 
Mittermeier, Gil, Hoffman, Pilgrim, & Brooks, 1999).  According to De la Cruz, (1982) 
Guatemala is classified in fourteen Life Zones which were determined by climatological and 
geographical parameters such as elevations, temperature, rainfall, evapotranspiration and 
elevations (See Table 4-2). 
 
Table 4-2. National Regions and Holdridge Life Zones Classification (De La Cruz, 1982) 
 
To make this study more manageable, this research condensed the Life Zones in three 
ecological regions; 1) Wet and moist, 2) Montane, and 3) Dry.  Forest fires were modelled in 
all three regions and pest data was analysed only for the Montane region.  Based on the fire and 
pest data obtained from the National Forestry Institute, it was apparent that whilst fire occurred 
in most regions, pest outbreaks were concentrated in the Montane region.  This may be because 
of inconsistent data collection rather than actual outbreaks.  Since, this study aimed to estimate 
the combined effect of biophysical (forest fire and pests) and socioeconomic (landholders’ 
decision about land use) risks on the small landholders’ forest carbon only the Montane region 
(See Figure 4-2) was chosen to model socioeconomic and combined effects. 
  
Region Holdridge Life Zone Clasification
Minimum-
maximum 
elevation -masl-
Minimum-
maximum 
Temperature -
C-
Rainfall ranges 
and averages 
(mm/year)
Evapotranspiration 
[annual rate 
(mm/area/year )]
Subtropical thorn scrub 180-400 24-26 400-600 1.3
Tropical dry forest 440-600 24-27 1300 1.25
Subtropical dry forest 0-1200 19-24 500-1000 1.5
Subtropical wet forest (temperate) 650-1700 20-26 1100-1349 1
Tropical moist forest 0-1267 27-29 3600 0.4
Subtropical rain forest 460-1400 16-24 4410-6577 0.25
Subtropical moist forest (warm) 80-1600 21-25 1587-4327 0.45
Subtropical wet forest (warm) 0-275 22-27 1200-2000 0.95
Subtropical moist forest (Cold) 1100-1800 16-23 2045-2514 0.5
Subtropical lower montane wet forest 1500-2400 15-23 1057-1588 0.75
Subtropical lower montane rain forest 1500-2700 19-23 4100 0.25
Subtropical lower montane moist forest 1800-3000 12.5-18.6 2065-3900 0.35
Subtropical montane wet forest 2500-3000 11.8-15 1275 0.55
Subtropical montane moist forest 2800-3000 11.5-17 2500 0.3
Montane
Dry
Wet and 
moist
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Figure 4-2. Map of Guatemala indicating case study sites 
  
Proportion of the national territory 
Case study sites 
Guatemala:  Montane 
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4.3 Research approach: Analysing data  
Two approaches can be used in research (Creswell, 2009; Punch, 2014); qualitative and 
quantitative.  The qualitative approach entails the collection of information in the form of 
expressions of views or feelings.  This approach is mainly concerned with generating theories 
and hypotheses by analysing the topic of research from specific to general (Creswell, 2009; 
Punch, 2014).  Quantitative research refers to gathering and analysing numerical data and is 
more concerned with statistical testing of hypotheses and theories (Punch, 2014).  Each 
approach has its own advantages and disadvantages.  Qualitative research is more flexible, is 
applicable to a wider range of situations and purposes, and can be modified in the course of use 
if a new situation appears (Creswell, 2009; Punch, 2014).  It comprises an open ended type of 
survey through which a broad range of information can be collected and used for wider purposes 
(Opdenakker, 2006; Punch, 2014). The qualitative approach encourages the respondent to 
freely express their perspectives, rather than being attached to a specific area which has already 
been determined by the researcher.  However, this approach may be unreliable in certain 
contexts. For instance, when interviewing a small number of respondents, generating theory 
from a limited set of perspectives can be problematic due to the lack of information (Creswell, 
2009; Opdenakker, 2006; Punch, 2014). 
On the other hand, the quantitative approach refers to the process of gathering and analysing 
information in the form of numbers.  Thereby, it facilitates the description of any situation in a 
systematic and comparable way (Punch, 2014).  This approach is preferred especially when 
relationships amongst different variables describing the research problem are needed.  
Quantitative procedures are well developed and codified, and hence outcomes are more 
objective (Punch, 2014; van Zomeren et al., 2008).  Because of this objectivity, outcomes are 
not easily influenced by the researchers. 
Much has been written (Creswell, 2009; Opdenakker, 2006; Punch, 2014; van Zomeren et al., 
2008) about these approaches highlighting different stand points and hence may result in mixing 
theoretical world views that can be contradictory.  Neither approach is superior to the other.  
Moreover, researchers tend to choose a research approach in relation to the research problem 
and the objective of the study (Punch, 2014). 
This research is focused on the investigation of whether carbon pools from small landholders 
are stable, despite the exposure of risks derived from environmental disturbances and 
landholders’ preferences about land use.  After accounting for these risks, the carbon bank 
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model estimates the annual carbon rental payments the bank can afford to deliver to small 
landholders.  Thus, the nature of this research requires the adoption of a quantitative approach.  
Many other analyses of carbon banking (Bigsby, 2009a, 2009b; Esuola & Weersink, 2006), 
valuing risk in forest valuation (Liley, 2000), modelling the risk of forest fires  (Carmel et al., 
2009; Conedera et al., 2011; Couture & Reynaud, 2011) and forest pests (Maeda et al., 2010) 
have also employed quantitative analysis.  
 
The carbon bank model requires a set of data sources: data to define the research site, data 
associated with landholders and with environmental disturbances, as well as bank costs.  The 
following section lays out the type of data and its collection process.  
 
4.4 Data collection  
Due to the scale of the carbon bank model and type of data, primary and secondary data 
collection were used in this study.  Primary data involved a questionnaire survey conducted 
across different landowners; secondary data included climatological data, carbon stocks data 
and estimates of bank costs. 
 
4.4.1 Data sources  
A wide variety of secondary data sources were used.  The most reliable sources were used 
wherever possible, such as published data and official statistics.  Primary data were collected 
by the researcher directly from the field through semi-structured questionnaire. 
 
Criteria that were used to assure the quality of secondary data were: a) respectability of authors, 
b) data collection methods were well-designed, and c) document was well-referenced using 
official data (Government or scientific journals) (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2001).  In those cases 
where information did not fulfil these criteria or data were unavailable, expert knowledge was 
used.  This was obtained by direct personal contact via email or interview with relevant experts.   
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4.4.2 Data associated with carbon stocks  
As mentioned in Chapter Two forests have been identified as potentially being a relevant 
contributor to slowing the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  Thus, sequestration of 
atmospheric carbon in forest is a way to mitigate the effects of greenhouse gas emissions (Van 
Kooten & Sohngen, 2007).  As the carbon banking model uses carbon dioxide as a means of 
exchange between depositors (landholders) and renters (carbon emitters), this section sets out 
the estimations used to determine the amount of carbon dioxide sequestered by small 
landholders.  National carbon data was obtained from a study conducted by CONCYT, 
SENACY, FONACYT, UVG, and URL (2011) that measured the amount of carbon (tC/ha) in 
forests using allometric models. 
 
The size of the potential carbon pool27 provided by small landholders was estimated by using a 
Geographic Information System (GIS) through which three thematic maps were overlaid to 
form a new layer.  The thematic maps were: 1) the national carbon content28 map compiled by 
Del Valle University in 2011 (CONCYT et al., 2011), 2) the location map of small landowners 
from the National Institute of Forests (UVG et al., 2012), and 3) the map of Holdridge Life 
Zones Classification (De La Cruz, 1982).  A new geographical layer was constructed indicating 
the carbon storage rate per hectare (tC/ha) for each small landholder.  The conversion factor of 
3.66729 was used for converting carbon storage (tC/ha) into carbon dioxide sequestered 
(tCO2e/ha) (IPCC, 2005).  This is the density of carbon dioxide that a small landholder 
sequesters in his forest (Dir).   
 
Information used to calculate the size of the carbon pool is shown in Table 4-3. 
  
                                                 
27 According to the IPCC (2003) a carbon pool is a reservoir of carbon that accumulates or releases carbon, and its 
store of carbon is measured in terms of mass (e.g. metric tonnes of carbon) (USAID, 2012).   
28 This study conducted by CONCYT, SENACY, FONACYT, UVG and URL (2011) considered the carbon pool 
associated with forestry and agro-forestry systems as above-ground tree biomass and below-ground biomass (roots, 
trees). 
29 The atomic mass of carbon (C) and oxygen (O) are 12 and 14 respectively.  Therefore the molecular mass of 
CO2 is 44. So, the ratio of mass of atomic carbon to CO2 is 44/12, or approximately 3.667 (IPCC, 2005). 
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Table 4-3. Information used to calculate the size of the carbon pool 
 
4.4.3 Data associated with environmental disturbances 
Secondary data were needed to model the risk of environmental disturbances from forest fires 
(area burned/year) and forest pests (area affected/year).  Historical data from the last 10 and 5 
years were collected for fires and pests respectively.  This information was gathered from a 
government data base located at the National Forestry Institute (INAB).  Data showed the 
amount of land affected by each environmental disturbance.  These historical data fulfilled the 
minimum of 5 years of data required to run Monte Carlo Simulation (Palisade Corporation, 
2010).  
4.4.4 Data associated with landholders' decisions about land use 
Based on Chapter Three the estimation of landholders’ decisions about land use change was 
analysed by applying the double hurdle model.  This model helped to incorporate socio-
economic risk into the carbon bank model calculations.  To do this, primary data were gathered 
directly from individual landowners using a semi-structured questionnaire. This reduced the 
chances of collecting unnecessary information because pre-planned questions prevent the 
researcher and respondents from going off track (Bridgman & Holton, 2008; Punch, 2014; van 
Zomeren et al., 2008).  The semi-structured land use change survey is shown in Figure 4-2. 
 
Data were retrieved from a survey of landholders during a field trip in July and August 2013.  
The questionnaire was in three sections focusing on different areas of interest.  The first section 
spanned questions with regards to their property.  These included specific questions about time 
of holding the farm, the size of the property, and the type and area of land use in different years 
(2003, 2008, 2013, 2018, and 2023).  Landholders were also asked about their perceptions on 
Data Type of information Information provided Source of information 
Regions 
Map of Holdridge Life Zones 
System 
Life zones Classification 
in Guatemala at field 
level 
Faculty of Agronomy, 
San Carlos University  
(De La Cruz, 1982) 
Landholders and 
carbon storage 
Map of small forest owners 
List of landholders and 
area covered by small 
landholders at national 
level 
Data base from National 
Institute of Forests 
(INAB, 2011) 
Type of forest plantations 
Number of small farm 
owners with forestry and 
agro-forestry systems 
Data base from National 
Institute of Forests 
(INAB, 2011) 
Map of carbon content at 
national level  
Tonnes of carbon per 
hectare  
Data base from National 
Institute of Forests 
(INAB, 2011) 
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shifting land uses over time.  Finally, the willingness to receive a minimum payment to maintain 
their forest untouched was also inquired.  
 
Section two collected information on whether they were members of a forestry association, and 
where they obtained forestry information from. The final section included demographic 
information including the farmer’s age, their level of education, number of family members 
living at the farm, income per month, and the proportion of income derived from off-farm 
activities.  
 
The survey had Lincoln University Ethics Committee approval.  The case study survey sample 
was based on the list of landholders provided by the Municipality of Chimaltenango.  This 
Guatemalan department is located in the central highland plateau 56 km from Guatemala City 
(see Figure 4-1).  The list included information such as location, landholder's name, landholding 
size, address and phone number. 
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Crop Type Area (ha) Comments
 
    
  
 If yes,  
d. New cooperation aid on forestry projects
a. Markets and prices
b. Management techniques
c. New forestry species
 
 
 
 
If no, 2003
Crop Type Area (ha) Comments
If no, 2008
Crop Type Area (ha) Comments
If no, in 2018
Crop Type Area (ha) Comments
If no, in 2023
Crop Type Area (ha) Comments
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-structured survey:  Landowner’s preferences about land use 
The following questions are prepared to interview small landholders and it is expected to take between 
20 and 30 minutes. 
Interview Code:_________ 
Section 1: Property  
1. When did you acquire your land?        Year:________ 
2. What is the size of your land?             Hectares:________ 
3. Currently (2013) which kind of agricultural systems do you have in your land?  
 
 
 
  
4. Was the crop system the same  
a. In 2003                Yes         No  b. In 2008               Yes       No 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Do you think the crop system will be the same  
a. In 2018 years        Yes         No   b. In 2023  Yes   No 
 
 
 
6. What would be the minimum payment you would require to maintain your current area of 
forest for the next year?     Q/ha/year:_____________ 
 
Section 2: Sources of information  
7. Do you belong to any forestry organisation/association?  
a. Yes  No 
 
 
8. Where do you get forestry information about 
 
Section 3: Demographic information 
9. How old are you?  ______years. 
10. What level of school you have completed?  
a. Primary 
b. High School  
c. Tertiary –Diploma, Uni. degree   
d. Non-education 
11. How many family members are living at the farm? 
Number: ____________ 
12. What is your income per month before tax? 
a. Less than Q.500.00 
b. Q.500.00 to Q.1,999.99 
c. Q. 2,000.00 to Q. 3,999.99 
d. Q. 4,000.00 to Q. 5,999.99 
e. Q. 6,000.00 to Q. 7,999.99 
f. Q. 8,000.00 or more 
13. Which proportion from the income above comes from off-farm activities? _________% 
Figure 4-3. Semi-structured land use change survey 
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Landholders were selected by a sampling process. Sampling is the process through which a 
group of participants is selected, as representatives of the entire population (Salkind, 2012; 
Som, 1973; Thompson, 2012).  Punch (2014) points out that the choice of sampling methods 
relies on the research objective and research questions.  If research questions require 
representativeness, as was required in this research, some form of random sampling design 
should be used (Punch, 2014; Thompson, 2012).  In this research landowners were selected by 
simple random cluster sampling and interviews were undertaken in person at their farms.  The 
department of Chimaltenango located in the Montane region was selected as a case study due 
to its accessibility from Guatemala City, and accessibility to landowners’ farms.  Because 
landholders were spread throughout Chimaltenango, a simple random cluster technique was 
used to bunch landholders together in groups located in three different towns to minimise travel 
time and costs, but also to give landholders the same chance of being selected.  The three towns 
selected were: 1) Tecpan, 2) San Martin Jilotepeque, and 3) Acatenango (see highlighted red 
dots in Figure 4-2).  A total of 205 landowners were identified by the Municipality of 
Chimaltenango.  However, due to restricted field work time and limited budget, a random 
sample of 85 landowners was interviewed throughout the three towns.  The definition of small 
landholders was the size of their land, which according to the National Forest Institute and 
National Statistical Institute of Guatemala is up to 15 hectares (INAB, 2011). 
4.4.5 Data associated with carbon banking costs  
As part of the carbon rental and leasing payments, information about cost estimates was 
necessary to analyse the carbon banking model.  The main cost estimates collected are described 
and discussed in Chapter Seven.  The information was gathered by personal communication 
with staff from a local bank30 (Grupo Financiero de Occidente ) in Guatemala which has been 
working with large forestry and rubber plantation owners who are involved in carbon projects.  
Questions asked were related to costs associated with setting up, monitoring and managing 
carbon projects.  These costs are estimates of what the bank has been dealing with when 
developing carbon initiatives.  Empirical estimates of costs may vary from case to case as 
factors such as the size of the project (Galik et al., 2009; Torres et al., 2010), type of market 
(Antinori & Sathaye, 2007), the level of experience of the project proponent when negotiating 
and trading carbon (Coggan et al., 2013; McCann, 2013), and the effect of the host country (e.g. 
cheap or expensive labour costs) (Cacho, Lipper, & Moss, 2013) can influence the costs of the 
carbon project.   
                                                 
30 www.occidente.com.gt  
 81 
 
4.5 Summary  
This chapter has provided a description of the information required to apply the carbon banking 
model.  This information included data sources, case study research site, carbon stock estimates, 
environmental disturbances, landholders’ decisions about land use, and carbon banking costs.  
Since the carbon banking model analyses interactions amongst the risk of environmental 
disturbances and landholders’ preferences on land use, a quantitative approach of inquiry was 
adopted.  Secondary information was collected and selection information criteria were defined 
to assure the quality of such information.  Because of the availability of information only forest 
fire data was assessed in the three regions; however, the Montane region was selected to model 
the carbon banking approach.  Primary information was gathered using a semi-structured field 
survey of landholders’ preferences about land use.  Finally, data about environmental 
disturbances, landholders’ decisions about land use change, and the bank’s costs were 
described.  The following chapters will report the results of developing the carbon banking 
model.  These chapters are environmental disturbances and risk, landholders’ decisions about 
land use, and carbon banking model analysis. 
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    Chapter 5 
Environmental disturbances and risk 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified the study site and data needed to model the carbon banking 
approach.  This chapter presents the environmental disturbance risks.  Two environmental 
disturbances are assessed: 1) forest fires, and 2) forest pests.  The main purpose of this chapter 
is to identify combined the effect of forest fires and forest pest disturbances on the actual 
amount of carbon deposited in the bank in the Montane region.  Forest fire data was available 
for three regions.  Forest pest data was available only for the Montane region. 
The first section of this chapter presents forest fire data and Monte Carlo simulation outputs for 
three regions (Dry, Wet and Moist, Montane).  Ten years of forest fire data on the proportion 
of area burned annually was used to model the risk of fire on forest carbon.  Complementary 
information, such as area of forest land, 95th percentile of annual proportion of forest area 
affected by fires, and mean proportion of area burned per year, was also used.  To explore the 
incidence of forest fire, probability distribution functions of forest fires derived from Monte 
Carlo simulation are presented and analysed.  The second section models the risk of forest pests 
through a Monte Carlo simulation technique only in the Montane region.  Five years of forest 
pests data on the proportion of area affected by pest annually was used to model the risk of 
pests.  The effect of fire and pests on the effective carbon pool provided by small landholders 
in the Montane region is analysed, followed by a discussion section which analyses the main 
findings of this chapter.  The chapter ends with a summary of key results and findings.  
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5.2 The risk of forest fire on forest carbon 
As described in Chapter Three, to account for possible changes in the amount of forest carbon, 
the bank must estimate a risk-adjusted amount of carbon available to rent out (see Equation 3-
6).  Equation 3-6 is based on the assumption that biophysical risks may vary throughout 
geographical regions and that areas affected by fire and pest are 100% lost.  The key factors 
driving biophysical risks in different regions are associated with topography, temperature 
(Cochrane, 2003), type of vegetation (Pereira Jr & Setzer, 1996), and rain fall pattern 
(Cochrane, 2003). 
5.2.1 Modelling forest fire risk  
Forest fire data from annual official reports for 2002-2011 from the National Forest Institute 
database in Guatemala are reported in Table 5-1.  This Table also reports results from the Monte 
Carlo analysis in the two right hand columns.  Data in Table 5-1 show that the percentage of 
area burned in the Dry region range from 1.11% in 2010 to 3.06% in 2003.  The Wet and Moist 
region, with 2.86% in 2003, 2.82% in 2004 and 1.73% in 2007 presented the largest percentages 
of forest affected by fire, whereas in the Montane region 1.22% of forest loss was reported in 
2002 and 1.01% in 2005, the years most affected by forest fires.  Comparing the totals of 
percentage of area burned per year in the regions (Table 5-1), it can be seen that 2003 presented 
6.30% which is the largest percentage of forest loss by fire.  From this total, the Dry region lost 
3.06% of forest, whereas Wet and Moist lost 2.86% and Montane lost 0.38%.  2005 also showed 
a high incidence of forest fire with a total of 5.2% of forest lost in the three regions. In that year 
the most affected region was Wet and Moist with 2.82% and the less affected was Montane 
with 1.01%.  For the rest of the years the percentages of forest loss ranged between 3.63% and 
1.63%.  
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Table 5-1. Proportion of forest area affected annually by forest fire by region 
 
From the historical data in Table 5-1, Monte Carlo simulation was used to analyse the 
relationship between the proportion of forest area burnt and the corresponding probabilities of 
forest area lost.  The Monte Carlo simulation output in Figures 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3 illustrate 
probability distribution functions showing the exposure of small landholders’ forest to fire risk, 
the range at which this risk might affect the forest, and the probability associated with it.  They 
also show minimum and maximum proportions of forest affected by fire, mean, standard 
deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and four percentiles (10%, 25%, 75%, and 95%).  Monte Carlo 
simulation fitted distribution functions to forest fire historical data using a Chi-square test to 
compare the fits of alternative distributions.  The three regions had different probability 
distribution functions.  With skewness being positive (0.29) and with a low kurtosis value of 
2.8, the Weibull distribution function was the best fit for the Dry region (Figure 5-1).  The Wet 
and Moist region showed the highest skewness value (4.58) compared to the Dry region (0.29) 
and the Montane region (3.71) (Figure 5-2). The kurtosis value of 36.07 for the Wet and Moist 
region demonstrates that the distribution had a sharper peak and fatter tails, and the Montane 
region had a high kurtosis of 37.15.  The best fit to the Wet and Moist region was the Inverse 
Gaussian distribution function.  For the Montane region, the best fit was a Log logistic 
distribution (Figure 5-3) function which is regularly utilised to assess environmental 
phenomena such as rainfall and forest fire patterns that cannot take negative values.  
  
Region 
Percentage of area burned annually of the total area of forest 
per region in Guatemala (%) 
Total area of 
small 
landholders’ 
forest (ha) in 
region r 
95th 
percentile 
of annual 
proportion 
of forest 
area burnt  
Mean  
annual 
proportion 
of forest 
area burnt 
r 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
Ar γrF  
Dry 1.81 3.06 0.77 1.37 2.45 1.68 0.90 1.43 1.11 2.23 1,455 0.0287 0.0169 
Wet and 
Moist 
0.61 2.86 0.19 2.82 0.31 1.73 0.82 0.52 0.25 0.50 26,100 0.0365 0.0106 
Montane 1.22 0.38 0.28 1.01 0.71 0.52 0.54 0.45 0.27 0.44 7,594 0.0113 0.0057 
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Running 10,000 iterations with Monte Carlo simulation, there is a 90% probability that between 
0.000037 and 0.00044 of proportion of forest will be affected by forest pests in any year. 
Assuming the bank sets a risk-averse position to estimate the 95th percentile of annual 
proportion of forest area affected by pest γrP equals 0.00044.  Hence, the percentage of carbon 
available [(1 - γrP) * 100] for renting out is 99.95%.  Finally, the expected proportion of forest 
area affected by pests from 2008-2012 is 0.00020. 
5.4 The effect of fire and pest on forest carbon in the Montane region 
Forest fires and forest pests represent a great challenge to carbon banking because of the 
inherent unpredictability and potential scale of damage that characterises such environmental 
disturbances.  Therefore, the issue of carbon permanence for the carbon banking approach is of 
primary concern because fires and pests may release carbon dioxide back into the atmosphere 
at any time.  In the previous sections, Monte Carlo simulation results characterised the 
distribution of proportions of area affected in any one year in the Montane region.  To assess 
the combined risk of carbon loss due to fire and pests, a strong risk-averse position is assumed 
for the bank, requiring coverage of the 95th percentile, so this study estimated the 95th percentile 
of proportions of forest area annually affected by fire (γrF) and pests (γrP).  The combined effect 
of γrF and γrP on KRr was calculated using Equation 3-6 of Chapter Three.  Table 5-3 shows 
the total risk-adjusted volume of carbon that is available in the bank for renting out (KRr) 
derived from the combined 95th percentile risks from pest and fire. 
Table 5-3. Carbon deposited and risk-adjusted carbon available for renting out 
 
Considering the combined effect of fire and pests on KDr, the risk-adjusted amount of 1.476 
M tCO2e can be leased in carbon rental markets if there are no other reasons for loss of forest 
from the bank.  This is 98.8% of the amount of carbon deposited and assumes 100% loss of 
forest carbon in the event of either fire or pest invasion.  
  
Region 
Amount of 
carbon 
deposited (M 
tCO2e) 
Total risk-adjusted volume 
of carbon available for 
lease after accounting for 
combined 95th percentile 
risks from pest and fire (M 
tCO2e) 
95th percentile of 
annual proportion 
of forest area 
affected by fire 
95th percentile of 
annual proportion 
of forest area 
affected by pests 
r KDr KRr γrF γrP 
Montane 1.494  1.476 0.0113 0.00044 
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5.5 Discussion 
In this chapter the aim was to analyse the effect of biophysical risks from forest fire and forest 
pests on the carbon pool provided by small landholders.  Based on a bank’s risk-averse position 
at the 95th percentile for each risk, the percentage of forest area affected by fire is highest in the 
Wet and Moist region, even though some studies have shown that the Dry region tends to be 
more vulnerable to forest fires (Cochrane 2003; Nabuurs et al., 2007).  Forest fires in the Wet 
and Moist region are often human-induced (e.g. arson).  Farmers in this region practice slash-
and-burn as a land management technique.  Because they do not have full control of their fire, 
forestry and agro-forestry systems are accidently burnt (Monzón-Alvarado et al., 2012). In 
addition, the lack of sound governance in this region has facilitated money laundering from 
drug cartels from Mexico or Guatemala, promoting a forest land black market in which slash-
and-burn is used to establish large areas of cattle farms (MARN et al., 2009).   
The Montane region has the lowest fire risk with the 95th percentile affecting 1.13% of forest 
area annually, whereas in the Wet and Moist region it is 3.65% and in the Dry region it is 2.87%.  
The low incidence of forest fires in the Montane region may be associated with some 
environmental conditions such as low temperature, high rain fall, and high altitude when 
compared to the Wet and Moist, and Dry regions (see Table 4-2 Chapter Four)  (De La Cruz, 
1982).  However, the main cause of forest fire in this region is landholders implementing the 
slash-and-burn technique during the dry season without any fire control (MARN et al., 2009).  
Other scholars have shown that these conditions are also important factors that might trigger 
forest fires (Cochrane, 2003; Cochrane et al., 1999; Pereira Jr & Setzer, 1996). 
The incidence of pests in forest in the Montane region in Guatemala has very low impact on 
small landholders’ forest carbon because the annual 95th percentile probability of forest being 
affected by pests is 0.044%.  This low incidence of forest pests could be due to forests being 
exceptionally healthy (Garnas & Dvorak, n.d.).  Another important characteristic is that 
Guatemala possesses a considerable level of biological diversity (CONAP, 2008a; Mittermeier 
et al., 1999).  Forests tend to be less affected by pests and diseases (Jactel & Brockerhoff, 2007) 
because biological diversity provides an increased number and diversity of natural enemies due 
to a more complex and heterogeneous environment (Root, 1973).  Therefore, diverse forests 
indicate more pest and disease tolerance than forest plantation monoculture (Jactel & 
Brockerhoff, 2007). 
Despite fire and pests representing a risk to forest carbon in the Montane region, the bank is 
still able to rent out up to 98.8% (1.476 M tCO2e) of 1.494 M tCO2e it potentially has on deposit. 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter analysed the effect of forest fires on small landholders’ forest carbon in three 
regions (Wet and Moist, Montane and Dry).  However, this chapter aimed to examine the 
combined effect of forest fire and pest risks on the carbon provided by small landholders in the 
Montane region in Guatemala.  The analysis was done by Monte Carlo simulation of data on 
forest fires and pests.  The Montane region is the least affected by fire, reporting an average 
proportion of area burnt annually of 0.057 of the total area of small landholders’ forest in the 
region.  Simulation results indicate that 95th percentile annual proportion of area burnt is 0.0113.  
With this probability of forest area that might be burnt, the bank has up to 98.87% of forest 
carbon available to rent out in the carbon market if it adopts a 95th percentile risk position. 
Forest pest data were used to model the area annually affected by pests in the Montane region.  
After modelling these data, results show that the average proportion of forest area affected by 
pests annually is 0.00020, whereas the 95th percentile annual proportion of forest area affected 
by pests is 0.00044.  This low proportion of carbon loss indicates that the bank may have 
99.95% of carbon deposits available for lease after accounting for pest risk.  Finally, 95th 
percentile annual proportion of area affected by fire and pest were combined as independent 
probabilities to estimate their effect on landholders’ forest carbon.  By doing so, the risk-
adjusted amount of 1.476 M tCO2e out of 1.494 M tCO2e can be available to rent out in carbon 
markets assuming all forested area is deposited in the bank.  Risk of landholders’ decisions 
about land use is also evaluated by the bank.  The following chapter describes and assesses the 
results of the effect of landholders’ decisions about land use on the total effective carbon pool.  
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    Chapter 6 
Landholders' decisions about land use and risk 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that biophysical disturbances such as forest fires and forest pests 
represent a risk for carbon permanence.  However, landholders’ changes of land use may also 
represent a risk to carbon storage in forest.  This is because landholders might convert their land 
into more profitable alternatives to enhance their livelihoods.  The aim of this chapter is to 
identify the significance of and analyse the factors determining landholders’ choices about land 
use.  The first section describes the data collected during a field trip in the Montane region in 
Guatemala, followed by a section which lays out the process to model landholders’ decisions 
about land use.  Landholders’ decisions are modelled as a two step decision process with the 
double hurdle model.  The results of each step decision are separately analysed in this chapter.  
The first step describes and analyses variables that influence the selection of the option of 
converting forest land to other uses; the second step analyses the factors determining the 
proportion of forest that is converted.  The chapter also includes a general discussion explaining 
the factors influencing the landholders’ decisions on the reduction of forest land and their effect 
on forest carbon available to rent out.  The chapter ends with a summary of key results and 
findings. 
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6.2  Data collected 
Eighty five small landholders in Chimaltenango, Guatemala were surveyed during July and 
August 2013.  Data were collected using a face to face interview method and the survey outlined 
in Chapter Four.  The aim of this survey was to explore the effect on the effective carbon pool 
provided by small landholders when accounting for their preferences about land use.  The 
survey instrument was designed to collect data of three kinds: 1) property features, 2) sources 
of information, and 3) demographic information (Table 6-1).  Information about actual areas of 
staple crop, cash crop, pasture crop, and forest areas were gathered for 2003, 2008, 2013, 2018 
and 2023.  The remaining variables were only provided for 2013 (See Figure 4-3 Chapter Four). 
Section one of the survey contains data associated with type of land use.  Type of land use was 
classified in four categories: 1) staple crops, 2) cash crops, 3) pasture crops, and 4) forest.  Staple 
crops constitute a dominant portion of a standard farmer’s diet, and include corn, beans, 
potatoes, and tomatoes.  Cash crops are grown for sale to return a profit.  Cash crops were peas, 
coffee, papaya, peaches, and apples.  However, when production exceeded landholder’s 
expectations and needs, potatoes and tomatoes were traded.  Pasture crop is forage grown to be 
fed to the farmer’s animals.  In addition, forest is trees grown on the property.   Years holding 
the farm and farm area were also collected. Finally, a minimum payment required for small 
landholders to maintain forest was asked31.  
Section two encompassed sources of information, such as whether small landholders are 
members of a local forestry organisation, and whether they receive information about market 
opportunities and prices, forest management techniques, new forestry species and new forestry 
aid projects to improve their forestry initiatives. 
Finally, section three collected demographic information.  The farmer’s age, number of family 
members living on the farm, and the proportion of the small landholder’s off-farm income, total 
income and education were surveyed.  
  
                                                 
31 This information is analysed in Chapter 7.  
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 Table 6-1. Definition of variables for landholders’ decision models 
  
ID Variables Units 
Years 
2003 2008 2013 2018 2023 
𝛅𝛅ir Probability of reducing forest area 
(Dependent variable) 
Probability       
FLir Proportion of forest land reduced 
(Dependent variable) 
      
Property Features 
YEARSHF Years of holding the farm Years   *   
FARMA Farm area Hectare   *   
STAP Area cultivated with staple crops  Percentage * * * * * 
CASH Area cultivated  with cash crops  Percentage * * * * * 
PASTR Area cultivated with pasture crops  Percentage * * * * * 
FORES Forest area Percentage * * * * * 
Sources of Information 
OMEMBER If small landholder is affiliated to 
a forestry association/organisation 
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
INMARPRI 
If small landholder receives 
forestry information about market 
and prices  
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
INMGMTEC 
If small landholder receives 
information about forest 
management techniques  
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
INNEWFS 
If small landholder receives 
information about new forestry 
species  
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
INNEWFP 
If small landholder receives 
information about new forestry 
aid projects  
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
Demographic Information  
 
 
 
 
 
AGE Farmer’s age  Years   *   
PRIM 
If small landholder holds primary 
education title 
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
HIGHS 
If small landholder holds high 
school degree 
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
UNIDC 
If small landholder holds  
university degree (diploma, 
bachelor) 
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
NONEDU 
If small landholder does not have 
any formal education 
Yes 1, no 0 
  
* 
  
FAMILYM 
Family members living in the 
farm  
Number  
  
* 
  
INCOME Small landholder’s income level 
If lower 
than USD$ 
255/month 
1, else 0 
  
* 
  
OFFINCO 
Small landholder’s off-farm 
income level 
Percentage   * 
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6.2.1 Description of data  
As stated in Table 6-1, the dependent variable is the “proportion of forest land reduced” from 
2003 to 2013.  The drivers of forest area reduction from 2008 to 2013 could not be examined 
because only a few farmers had removed land from forestry in that period.  
Table 6-2 describes the continuous variables.  The sample shows that 1 year holding the farm 
(YEARSHF) is the minimum value found.  This indicates that this small landholder recently 
started farming, whereas 100 years is the longest period a small landholder family has been 
holding a farm.  The average of years holding the farm is 22 years.  Landholding size (FARMA) 
ranges from 0.17 ha to 15 ha, averaging 2.9 ha.  Regarding landholder’s age (AGE), the 
youngest small landholder is 25 years old and the oldest is 82 years old.  The average age of 
the 85 landholders is 49 years old.  The number of family members living on the farm 
(FAMILYM) varies in the sample from a minimum of one up to 15 members, with seven being 
the average number.  Finally, the proportion of income derived from off-farm jobs (OFFINCO) 
indicates that on average 68% of their income comes from off-farm jobs.  This demonstrates 
that there are still farmers who look for extra off-farm income to satisfy family needs. 
Table 6-2. Means of continuous variables on the small landholders sample 
 
The variables shown in Table 6-3 are dichotomous (e.g. yes or no, lower than or higher than). 
The proportion of small landholders in each category is displayed.  Firstly, 64% of small 
landholders belong to a local forestry organisation.  There is a considerable percentage of small 
landholders who do not receive any forestry-related information.  For instance, 94% of 
landholders do not receive forestry information about markets and prices (INMARPRI), 79% 
do not receive information about forest management techniques (INMGMTEC), 92% do not 
obtain anything related to new forestry species (INNEWFS), and 98% do not receive 
information with regards to new forestry aid projects (INNEWFP).   
 
ID Units 
Mean Maximum Minimum 
Continuous variables 
YEARSHF Years 21.94 100 1 
FARMA Hectare 2.91 15 0.17 
AGE Years 48.85 82 25 
FAMILYM Number 7.15 15 1 
OFFINCO Percentage 68 
 
100 0 
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Table 6-3. Percentage of small landholders sample (n=85) and discrete variables 
 
Regarding the level of education, 7% of the sample has no formal education (NONEDU).  The 
highest qualifications that landholders have attained are given as primary school, high school, 
and university degree.  Thus, 74 % completed primary school (PRIM).  Only 9 % completed 
high school (HIGHS), and 9 % have a university degree (UNIDC).  In terms of income 
(INCOME), 85 % of small landholders earned less than US$ 255 per month.  
Finally, Figure 6-1 illustrates the proportions of cultivated area of staple, cash, pasture and 
forest over time.  This data helps to understand the increases and decreases in the proportions 
of area cultivated over time.  The proportion of forest shows a decrease from 2003 to 2008 
which coincides with an increase in the proportion of cultivated area of staples, pasture and 
cash crops.  The proportion of forest on farms in 2013 indicates a slight increase compared to 
2008.  From 2013 up to 2023, small landholders anticipate an increase in the proportion of 
forest area by converting their land from other uses.  For instance, as shown in Figure 6-1 there 
is an anticipated reduction in the proportion of pasture, and staple crops, but there is an increase 
in cash crops. 
  
ID n (percentage) 
Dichotomous variables 
 
OMEMBER 54 (64%) 
INMARPRI 5 (6%) 
INMGMTEC  18 (21%) 
INNEWFS 7 (8%) 
INNEWFP 2 (2%) 
NONEDU  6 (7%) 
PRIM  63 (74%) 
HIGHS 8 (9%) 
UNIDC 8 (9%) 
INCOME (< US$255/month, else 0) 72 (85%) 
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Figure 6-1. Comparison of means of proportions of cultivated area in the sample 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6-1 on average more than half of each small landholding is still covered 
by forest.  The second biggest land use is for staples.  It is notable that staple crops are important 
to sustain the landholder’s diet.  The third biggest land use is cash crops.  The proportion of 
area allocated to pasture crops shows that this agricultural activity might not be a priority for 
small landholders. 
The variables described above were used to explain the main drivers of landholders’ decisions 
about land use. 
6.3 The process of modelling landholders' decisions about land use  
The process of modelling landholders’ decisions about land use entails an analysis of 
explanatory attributes that appear to influence landholders’ behaviour regarding the change in 
forest area, and the extent of reducing forest.  This section tests the assumption that landholders’ 
economic, institutional, physical and personal attributes are associated with changes in forest 
area at the farm level.  The following subsections describe the dependent variables, scenario 
assessed, and the variables used to calculate the effect of socioeconomic risk on the carbon pool 
derived from landholders’ forest.  
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6.3.1 Dependent variables  
As discussed in Chapter Three, landholders’ behaviour about land use change relies on the 
decision of whether to change land use, and then the extent to which the change is made.  This 
reflects that a two-step decision process or double hurdle is appropriate (Moffat, 2005).  The 
first step models the decision about whether to change land use from forestry (𝛅𝛅ir) (Equation 
3-10).  If the decision to change from forestry is adopted, the second step is to determine the 
proportion of forest land reduced (FLir) (Equation 3-11).  Literature suggests these types of data 
have a better fit in the limited dependent variable models such as probit and double hurdle 
model (Kimhi, 1999; Moffat, 2005; Verbeek, 2012).  As it was assumed that the two decisions 
(whether to reduce and how much to reduce) are independent to each other, the double hurdle 
model (often termed two-part model) is better than the Tobit model.  The parameters of the first 
decision were modelled with probit regression, and the parameters of the second decision were 
modelled with truncated regression using LIMDEP software. 
6.3.2 Choosing time periods to analyse land use change  
Data related to how many landholders increased forest land area, decreased forest area, and did 
not change forest area was gathered.  The first three time periods shown in Table 6-4 have land 
use information of what landholders actually did; the rest are related to what they might do 
about land use change in the future.  As there is a socioeconomic risk in the carbon bank model 
(section 3.2.2, Chapter Three), the dependent variable is related to decreased forest land area.  
Data in Table 6-4 is used to analyse the number of landholders who decreased their forest land 
area in different time periods.  Thus, from all time periods the largest number of landholders 
(27) who decreased forest area was in time period 3.  This time period encompasses 10 years 
of land use change. Because the bank pays annual rental payments, the likely proportion of 
forest carbon lost by socioeconomic risk needs to be converted to per year (see section 6.6 of 
this chapter for details).   
 
The reductions in forest land in different time periods (Table 6-4) were tested using probit and 
truncated model.  Because there were only 11 and 12 small landholders reducing forest land 
use in time periods 1 and 2, respectively, these observations were not enough to test 2 or 3 
explanatory factors explaining landholders’ decisions about forestry land use change.  The 
importance of the explanatory factors, in both probit and truncated models, for the bank is that 
it would help to set up decision-making criteria and identify who (landholders) might represent 
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a risk in reducing forest land.  The statistical information derived from these explanatory factors 
with a small sample of observations would have provided a low level of confidence to analyse 
landholders’ decisions about reducing forest land.  Therefore, this research excluded time 
periods 1 and 2 from the modelling process.  In time periods 4, 5 and 6, observations were also 
not enough to explain landholders’ decisions about land use; therefore, these time periods were 
also dropped from the modelling process.  
 
Table 6-4. Number of landholders tending to increase, decrease or not change forest cover 
 
All continuous variables without zero values in Table 6-2 were tested in logarithmic and 
quadratic functional forms in the regression model (Verbeek, 2012).  These transformations 
gave statistically higher log likelihood value of the estimated model which indicates a better fit 
in the model.  The fit of these variables in both the probit and truncated regression models was 
examined by running the model with the non-logged variables gathered through the 
questionnaire (raw field data).  Explanatory variables with continuous values were tested on log 
function forms and standard forms.  The most appropriate fit of these functional forms of data 
was determined by using Chi-Square test for the ratio of log likelihood values of the log 
transform and non-transform models.  In addition, based on the Chi-Square likelihood ratio test 
of the restricted (variable dropped) and unrestricted models, some explanatory variables listed 
in Table 6-1 were dropped from the probit and truncanted models because they were not 
significant.  Only significant variables were included in the final model (see Table 6-5 for 
descriptive statistics of significant variables). 
 
The Z statistics values of STAP, CASH, FORES, PASTR variables of the model estimate were 
unusually inflated (too large) and the signs of some variables contrasted with what was 
expected.  The results indicated endogeneity32 and misspecification33 problems in the models.  
                                                 
32 Correlation between an independent variable and the error term.  This implies that the regression coefficient in 
an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression may be biased (Verbeek, 2012).   
33 A deviation from the true population in the sample model means that the sample model is misspecified. This 
indicates that the inferences from the sample model about the population are suspect (Verbeek, 2012). 
Forest tendency 
Time period of change/Number of landholders 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2003-2008 2008-2013 2003-2013 2013-2018 2013-2023 2018-2023 
Increased 12 12 36 18 18 7 
No change 62 61 22 50 54 60 
Decreased 11 12 27 17 13 18 
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It was found that some of the explanatory variables were correlated with the error term in both 
models (probit and truncated).  These variables would have created a misleading output of the 
model.  Following Verbeek (2012), these problems were solved by estimating and using 
predicted values of the endogenous variables in both probit and truncated models.  After 
correcting the endogeneity problem by plotting the dependent variable against residuals in the 
model, no heteroscedasticity34 was found.  Table 6.5 provides descriptive statistics of the 
variables calculated from model data and fitted in the probit and truncated models. 
 
Table 6-5. Descriptive statistics of significant variables for probit and truncated model 
 
6.4 Analysis of landholders’ decisions on selecting the option of the 
reduction of forest land area (probit model) 
Based on the carbon banking mathematical model from Chapter Three, the estimation of 𝛅𝛅ir 
was modelled by using Equation 3-10 (probit model).  The output from the restricted model of 
the probit regression is shown in Table 6-6.  The Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-squared value35 is 
2.82 which indicates adequate fit of the model.  Pseudo R-squared is not equivalent to R-square 
of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to explain the predictive power of the model (Tjur, 2009).  It 
is a measure of the differences between log likelihood and restricted log likelihood value of the 
probit model which is used as a goodness-of-fit when the endogenous variable is discrete (Veall 
                                                 
34 The White test is a generalisation of the Breusch-Pagan test, which also involves an auxiliary regression of 
squared residual, but excludes any higher-order terms (Verbeek, 2012).  
35Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi-squared values greater than 10 indicate significance of the Chi-square value and poor fit 
of the model to the data.  
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Variables used in probit estimations (𝛅𝛅ir)  
FAMILYM 7.152941 2.692608 1.0 15.0 
AGE .411765 .495074 0.0 1.0 
FORES .556659 .254290 .009664 .969370 
PAST .020769 .070214 .143372D-04 .381702 
STAP .311991 .226302 .014919 1.057510 
Variables used in truncated estimations (FLir)  
OMEMBER .635294 .484204 0.0 1.0 
UNIDC .094118 .293725 0.0 1.0 
INCOME .847059 .362067 0.0 1.0 
FORES .519059 .209385 .070000 1.0 
STAP .315270 .195532 .001257 .779210 
PASTR .019955 .070851 .131060D-04 .422792 
YEARSHF 2.870343 .711978 0.0 4.605170 
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& Zimmermann, 1994).  The Pseudo R-squared statistic is 0.48 which indicates a very good fit 
(Domencich & McFadden, 1975). Signs of the coefficients are according to expectation.   
 
Table 6-6. Probit model of the decision to reduce forest land area 
 
The values of the Z statistics are consistent and not inflated.  This entails that the model 
provided statistical valid results.  Based on the level of significance at 5%, the probit model 
output provides the bank with evidence that demographic information associated with the 
number of family members living on the farm (FAMILYM) is a determinant of the decision to 
reduce landholders’ forest area.  However, the bank may also look at other landholder attributes 
such as farmers older than 50 years (AGE), and the proportion of forest area (FORES) with a 
significance level of 10%, as these may influence the choice of making a decision on reducing 
landholders’ forest land.  On the other hand, property features such as the proportion of area 
cultivated with staple crops (STAP) and pasture crops (PASTR) were found to be not significant 
(see Table 6-6). 
 
Field observations whilst interviewing landholders and literature with regards to demographic 
and socioeconomic factors were analysed to understand possible causes that influence 
landholders’ decisions about land use.  This allowed the researcher to explore some expected 
relationships between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. 
  
Dependent variable                𝛅𝛅ir  
Explanatory 
variables 
Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic P(z) 
Constant -1.79730 1.52863 -1.18 .2396 
STAP -3.34720 2.13622 -1.57 .1171 
PASTR 4.05820 2.58973 1.57 .1171 
FORES 2.61036* 1.57542 1.66 .0975 
AGE -.74379* 0.39056 -1.90 .0569 
FAMILYM .16950** 0.08079  2.10 .0359 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
Pseudo R-squared  =   0.48 
Restricted log likelihood value  =   -56.77 
Log likelihood value  =   -29.04 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-squared  =   2.82 
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It was expected that the higher the number of family members living on the farm (FAMILYM) 
the higher the probability that the landholders select the decision of reducing their forest land. 
The probit model provides evidence that forest land tends to be reduced on farms with more 
family members.  This is because large families need to satisfy food demand and increase 
revenue by extending their crop land (Lambin et al., 2003).  Clearing forest land represents 
short-term revenue from selling timber and fire wood (Zander & Durr, 2011). This phenomenon 
was also found in a similar study conducted by Turner (1999) in West African Sudan-Sahel. 
Another reason for reducing forest land is the subdivision of the landholding into the number 
of inheritors.  This fragments the farm by diversifying crops, resulting in a change in forest land 
area (Lambin et al., 2003).  This is commonly implemented as a customary land use practice 
(Maina, 2013) by indigenous groups in certain areas in Guatemala such as Chimaltenango (von 
Braun et al., 1989). 
It was expected that the relationship between landholder’s age (AGE) and the landholder’s 
decision on selecting the option of reducing forest land area would show that the older the 
landholder, the less interest in selecting the decision of reducing their forest land area.  The 
negative relationship shown in the probit model confirms from empirical evidence the expected 
relationship is accepted.  A similar study found the same relationship (Alassafl et al., 2011).  
Some reasons are related to environmental awareness and a reluctance towards considering new 
land use changes.  For instance, Lwayo and Maritim (2003) pointed out that older landholders 
tend to be more aware about the environment, so they prefer to keep their forest.  Older age of 
landholders is a factor that might represent a constraint on the ability to undertake new land 
uses on the farm.  This means that they would prefer to keep cultivating the crop land area they 
have been working on.  This theory is supported by Thoai and Rañola (2010) who highlight 
that older farmers are reluctant to adopt innovations in forest management techniques.  
 
The expected relationship with regards to the proportion of forest land (FORES) and 
landholders’ decisions about reducing the proportion of forest land was that the larger the 
proportion of forest land area on the farm, the more likely landholders select the option of 
reducing forest area.  The probit output supports this expectation but at a low level of 
significance.  To explain this result, it can be stated that the high availability of forest land area 
is basically seen by landholders as an opportunity to generate short-term net returns to satisfy 
family needs (Lubowski et al., 2007).  Short term returns can be obtained by clearing forest 
land and selling timber and firewood in local markets.  Another explanation for this relationship 
is associated with landholders’ farm management.  Landholders manage their farms for multiple 
agricultural objectives, to look for profits and improve livelihood arising from different crops 
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(Bryan, 2013). When there is a large proportion of forest area, landholders tend to convert forest 
land area into different crop lands (e.g. cash and/or staple crops). 
 
STAP36 and PASTR37 are close to significance at the 10% level.  The expected relationship 
between STAP and the selection of the option of reducing forest area is, the larger the proportion 
of STAP, the higher the probability of selecting the option of reducing forest land area.  This 
expected relationship is not supported by the probit model output, which indicates that there is 
a negative relationship between STAP and landholders’ decisions of reducing forest area.  That 
is, the larger the proportion of area with staple crops the less likely to make a decision on 
changing forest land.  This result indicates that STAP does not compete with forest land area 
and landholders might be improving their agricultural techniques to increase crop yields on the 
STAP they have already planted.  Over the last two decades the improvement of agricultural 
production, because of the level of inputs (e.g. fertiliser subsidies) and agricultural technical 
assistance provided by government and non-governmental organisations, has helped 
landholders to have more productive crops while looking after their forestry resource.  
Agricultural inputs and increased output of cultivated crops per unit area is well supported by 
Tilman, Cassman, Matson, Naylor, and Polasky (2002).  Also, the evidence that agricultural 
technical assistance enhances productivity has been documented by von Braun et al. (1989).  
 
The expected relationship with regards to the selection of the reduction of forest land area and 
PASTR is, the larger the proportion of pasture the more likely a landholder will decide to select 
the option of reducing forest land.  The positive sign shown on the probit model output supports 
the expected relationship.  There are a number of reasons why this might be the case, including 
the relatively high revenue derived from pasture land and cattle compared to other on-farm 
activities (e.g. cash crops), and the accessibility and high prices of beef and milk in local and 
national markets.  The tendency of clearing forests because of the expansion of pasture land has 
been studied in Latin America and Central America by Geist and Lambin (2002) and 
Ramankutty and Foley (1999), respectively. 
 
                                                 
36 STAP are considered basic edible food that constitutes the dominant part of the diet and supply a major 
proportion of energy and nutrient needs (FAO, 2014b). 
37 Pasture crops is land used permanently for herbaceous forage crops, either cultivated or growing wild.  This 
crop is commonly used for livestock; however, livestock is not merely a source of food for farmers.  Farm animals 
also provide income when production exceeds family needs, and dung can be used to enhance soil fertility in other 
crops (e.g. cash crops and/or staple crops) (FAO, 2014b). 
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6.5 Analysis of the extent of forest area reduction (truncated model) 
From Chapter Three, Equation 3-11 was used to model FLir.  Table 6-7 shows the truncated 
model results.  All variables fit in the truncated model at the 5% significance level.  The 
variables that influence the proportion of reducing forest land area are a) Property features, such 
as the amount of years holding the farm (YEARSHF), the proportion of area cultivated with 
staple crops (STAP), the proportion of area cultivated with pasture crops (PASTR), and the 
proportion of forest area (FORES); b) Forestry association membership (OMEMBER); and c) 
Demographic information such as the level of education (UNIDC) and on-farm income 
(INCOME). 
Table 6-7. Truncated model of the extent to reduce forest land 
 
Expected relationships between the explanatory variables shown in Table 6-7 and the extent of 
reducing forest land area were analysed and supported by literature in Chapter Two. 
The coefficient of YEARSHF is significant and positive, indicating that landholders with a 
longer period of holding property are more likely to reduce a large proportion of forest land.  
This finding is expected.  Years holding the farm is perceived as a factor that might promote 
land use change on forest land (Lambin et al., 2003).  A possible explanation of the relationship 
between YEARSHF and the reduction of forest land is that the need of family members in the 
farm for food crops land might be associated with the reduction of forest land.  Zander & Durr, 
(2011) pointed out that small landholders with large families on the farm will demand land 
areas over time by converting forest areas into other agricultural crops to satisfy family needs.  
This theory is also supported by Pichón (1997) and Ebanyat et al. (2010) who argued that the 
longer the landholding, the more changes in crop land for feeding purposes.  Hence, long 
Dependent variable              FLir 
Explanatory 
variables 
Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic P(z) 
Constant -1.00494*** .12542 -8.01 .0000 
YEARSHF .10042*** .03380 2.97 .0030 
STAP 1.00891*** .09930 10.16 .0000 
PASTR -2.11771*** .29861 -7.09 .0000 
FORES .92516*** .06913 13.38 .0000 
UNIDC -.10528** .05280 -1.99 .0462 
OMEMBER .09486*** .03235 2.93 .0034 
INCOME -.11230*** .03726 -3.01 . 0026 
Sigma .05800*** .00875 6.63 .0000 
Note: ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
Observations after truncation        27 
Log likelihood value = 42.19 
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landholding periods are associated with population density on the farm and the extension of 
staple crops.   
With respect to the proportion of area cultivated with staple crops (STAP) a positive 
relationship was found in the truncated model.  This agrees with the expected relationship: the 
larger the proportion of staple crops the larger the proportion of reducing forest area.  STAP is 
then a competing land use for forest.  A possible explanation is that the high concentration of 
family members on the farm may extend STAP for subsistence to satisfy family diet by reducing 
forest land areas.  This is supported by Lambin, Geist, and Lepers (2003) and Geist and Lambin, 
(2002). 
 
For FORES, the expected relationship was that the larger the proportion of forestry resources 
in the farm, the larger the proportion of reducing forest area.  The truncated model output shows 
that sign of FORES is positive, as expected.  Landholders may reduce their forest land area as 
they see FORES as a short-term profitable land use and source of timber and firewood for sale.  
This demonstrates that the high availability of forestry land and its permanence might also 
contribute to reduce forest land on the farm because of economic factors (Geist & Lambin, 
2002; Lambin et al., 2001). 
 
The coefficient of PASTR is negative and significant. This result was different from what was 
expected.  The expected relationship between PASTR and the extent of reducing forest area is 
the larger the proportion of area cultivated with pasture, the larger the proportion of forest area 
reduced.  This indicates that PASTR is not a competing land use for forest land area.  A reason 
that could potentially explain this relationship is that family food and economic needs are 
already satisfied by the current proportion of pasture and staple crops land.  When family needs 
are satisfied Hamilton and Fischer (2005) point out that landholders are less likely to change 
land use from forest to other uses. 
 
The coefficient on OMEMBER is positive and significant which contrasts with what was 
expected. The expected relationship is, memberships of a forestry organisation mean the 
landholder is less likely to reduce forest areas.  The truncated model output in this study 
indicates that the memberships of a forestry organisation means that landholders are more likely 
to reduce the forest land area.  Existing literature has not specifically found the direct effect of 
being a member of a forestry association on reducing forest land.  On this matter, future research 
may be required to determine a relationship between sharing forest-related information amongst 
members and the possible reduction of forest land area.  It would also be helpful to analyse the 
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level of organisation in terms of decision making processes and its effect in reducing forest 
land.  
 
There is a significant negative relationship between UNIDC and the extent of forest area.  The 
expected relationship is, the higher the level of education the smaller the proportion of forest 
land reduced. Explanations for these findings are that landholders with formal and higher 
education are more aware about forest and environment, and have more knowledge to manage 
their agriculture activities on the farm.  Some scholars have also found that formal and higher 
educational degrees have a positive impact on preserving forest land (Browder et al., 2004; 
Ebanyat et al., 2010; Godoy et al., 1998; Walker et al., 2002). 
 
Based on the literature review it was expected to find a relationship between INCOME and the 
probability of reducing forest land stating that the higher the level of income generated on the 
farm, the smaller the reduction in forest land.  Truncated model output shows a significant 
negative coefficient on INCOME which demonstrates that landholders generating on-farm 
income above US$250 per month are less likely to reduce the proportion of forest land area.  
Reasons to explain this relationship include the diversification of income sources such as, 
coffee, peas, broccoli, potatoes, and tomatoes, as well as the opportunity to export landholders’ 
products which has been documented by von Braun et al. (1989).  Related work shows that 
when the level of income is high, family satisfaction needs are attained; hence, landholders tend 
to look after and sometimes increase the proportion of forest land (Hamilton & Fischer, 2005; 
Rudel et al., 2005). 
 
6.6 The effect of landholders’ decision about land use on the effective 
carbon pool 
Based on the carbon banking mathematical model in Chapter Three, the total amount of carbon 
deposited in the bank (KDr) by all landholders in the Montane region (Equation 3-4), the likely 
annual risk-adjusted proportion of forest carbon lost due to socio economic risk (γ𝒊𝒊𝐒𝐒) (Equation 
3-9), and the risk-adjusted volume of carbon (KRr) available for renting out considering only 
socio economic risk (Equation 3-6), was calculated.  After modelling 𝛅𝛅ir using Equation 3-10 
(probit model) and FLir using Equation 3-11 (truncated model), the total expected amount of 
banked carbon reduced (Lr) due to socioeconomic risk was estimated with Equation 3-8a.  Thus, 
Equation 3-9 was used to estimate γ𝒊𝒊𝐒𝐒 and then divided by the number of years of time period 
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3 (10 years) to convert it to an annual percentage.  Table 6-8 shows quantitatively the effect of 
socio economic risk on the amount of carbon deposited in the bank in the Montane region.  
Table 6-8. The effect of land use risk on carbon deposited in the bank 
Region 
Amount of carbon 
deposited (M tCO2e) 
Risk-adjusted volume of 
carbon available for lease after 
accounting for socioeconomic 
risk (M tCO2e) 
Likely annual proportion 
of forest carbon lost by 
socioeconomic risk 
r KDr KRr γ𝒊𝒊𝐒𝐒 
Montane 1.494 1.466 0.0019 
 
The proportion of forest lost is attributed to different demographic and socioeconomic factors.  
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the double hurdle model disaggregates landholders’ decisions 
in a two step- decision process: the variables influencing landholders’ decisions on selecting 
the option of reducing forest land area (probit model), and the extent of forest area reduced 
(truncated model).  This helps the bank to understand which variables explain the risk of land 
use on landholders’ forest carbon.  Thus, the variables with strong significance that influence 
the landholders’ decisions of reducing forest area are, the number of family members living on 
the farm, the landholders’ age, and the proportion of forest land.  The variables determining the 
extent of reducing forest land area are associated with the number of years holding the farm, 
the proportion of area cultivated with staple crops, the proportion of forest area, and 
membership in a forestry organisation.  The latter, as discussed in the previous section, needs 
further research so as to understand its relationship with the reduction of forest area. 
 
Table 6-8 indicates that from a potential total amount of 1.494 M tCO2e deposited in the bank 
98.12 % (1.466 M tCO2e) is available to be rented out after accounting for 0.19% [(1- γrS) * 100] 
of carbon lost due to land use risk.  This result indicates that socioeconomic factors do not have 
a considerable effect on the stability of forest carbon derived from small landholders.  
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6.7 Summary  
This chapter assessed the effect of selected variables on the area of forest provided by small 
landholders. Land use risk is affected by variables categorised as demographic, property 
features, and sources of information.  The landholders’ decisions about land use change were 
addressed by disaggregating their decision into a two step-decision model known as the double 
hurdle model.  Land use changes were modelled to assess effects on the amount of carbon 
available in the bank for lease.  Time period 3 was finally selected as it showed more variation 
in terms of how many small landholders tend to reduce forest land area. 
The double hurdle model output produced two main results.  Firstly, the probit model identified 
which factors influence the landholder’s decision on reducing forest land area.  Secondly, the 
truncated model identified the factors explaining the extent of reducing forest area.  In the probit 
model, the number of family members living on the farm (FAMILYM) showed the strongest 
influence (significance level of 5%) on the probability of deciding to reduce area of forest land, 
followed by landholders’ age (AGE) which is significant at the 10% level.  Forest area (FORES) 
was also significant at the 10% level.  The rest of property features as proportion of staple crops 
(STAP) and pasture (PASTR) were not significant.  In the truncated model all variables are 
significant either at the 1% or at the 5% significance level. The variables inversely related to 
the reduction of forest area were: level of education at tertiary level (UNIDC), on farm income 
(INCOME), and proportion of pasture crops (PASTR).  Variables that showed a positive 
relationship with the proportion of forest land lost were: years holding the farm (YEARSHF), 
proportion of staple crops (STAP) and forest (FORES), as well as organisation membership 
(OMEMBER). 
After analysing the attributes that may affect landholders’ decisions about land use, the likely 
annual proportion of carbon loss due to land use risk was estimated.  This estimation indicates 
that only 0.19% [(1- γrF) * 100]  of carbon is lost due to land use risk which means that the bank 
will be able to have at least 98.12% of carbon deposited (1.466 M tCO2e) available for lease.  
This finding indicates that small landholders’ decisions on land use in the Montane region do 
not represent a large risk to the carbon pool. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to mention that all 
significant variables influencing positively and negatively deforestation in the Montane region 
could be used in classifying small landholders based on who of them might reforest and who 
might deforest.  The former might be useful for further carbon deposits as the bank may know 
that landholders tending to reforest could represent less risk to reduce their forest area.  
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    Chapter 7 
Carbon Banking Analysis  
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five analysed the risk of environmental disturbances such as forest fire and pests, and 
their effect on the stability of forest carbon deposited in the bank.  Chapter Six reported the 
drivers that influence landholders’ decisions about land use, as well as the effect on the 
reduction of forest land area.  In both Chapters modelling techiniques were adopted: Monte 
Carlo simulation to model forest fire and pests, and the double hurdle model to assess 
landholders’ decisions about land use.  The findings were related to estimate risk-adjusted 
amounts of carbon available for renting out in carbon rental markets.  This chapter analyses and 
discusses the significance of the findings in Chapters Five and Six on the carbon banking 
approach.  Firstly, the combined effect of forest fire, pests and landholders’ decisions about 
land use risks on the effective carbon pool provided by landholders is analysed.  Secondly, two 
different bank estimate costs, from related work and this study, are described.  Thirdly, these 
cost estimates are jointly analysed with two different international carbon prices to assess the 
impact on bank profit when payments to depositors are zero (π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎)  To do this, sensitivity 
analysis was utilised.  Finally, a payment analysis was carried out to determine the bank’s 
viability.  This chapter ends with a summary of findings and results. 
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7.2 Carbon banking analysis 
This chapter aims to explore the potential of a carbon bank through the estimation of the impact 
on payments to depositors and π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎, after accounting for biophysical and socioeconomic 
risks, carbon prices and administrative costs.  
7.2.1 Carbon bank and risks 
Based on the carbon bank mathematical model in Chapter Three, from 2,048 small landholders, 
the total amount of carbon deposited (KDr) by all landholdings in the bank was estimated with 
Equation 3-4.  To estimate the amount of forest carbon available, the bank needs to know the 
independent probability of carbon release by three different risks (forest fire, pests and 
socioeconomic).  As described in Chapter Five, the 95th percentile of annual proportions of 
carbon lost due to biophysical risks such as forest fire (γrF) and pests (γrP) was estimated using 
Monte Carlo simulation.  As stated in Chapter Six, section 6.6, the likely of annual proportion 
of forest area lost socioeconomic risk (γrS) was estimated using Equation 3-9.  Based on these 
independent probabilities, joint probability theory was used to estimate the combined effect of 
these risks on the KRr.  Thus, the total risk-adjusted amount of carbon available for lease (KRr) 
after accounting for such risks was calculated using Equation 3-6.  Results are reported in Table 
7-1. 
 
Table 7-1. The effect of biophysical and socioeconomic risks on deposited carbon in the Montane region 
   
Region 
Amount of 
carbon 
deposited (M 
tCO2e)  
 95th percentile 
of annual 
proportion of 
forest carbon 
lost by fire risk 
 95th percentile 
of annual 
proportion of 
forest carbon 
lost by pest 
risk 
 Likely annual 
proportion of 
forest carbon 
lost by 
socioeconomic 
risk 
Total risk-adjusted 
amount of carbon 
available for lease 
after accounting 
for fire, pest and 
socioeconomic 
risks (M tCO2e) 
r KDr γrF γrP γrS KRr 
Montane 1.494 0.0113 0.00044 0.0019 1.449 
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Sources of carbon loss are reported in Table 7-1.  The highest annual proportion of forest carbon 
lost is by fire risk is 0.0113, followed by socioeconomic risk is 0.0019 and pest risk is 0.00044.  
If the total amount of carbon deposited in the bank is 1.494 M tCO2e, a risk-adjusted amount of 
1.449 M tCO2e (97%) is available for lease after accounting for the combined effects of fire, 
pests and socioeconomic risks.  
7.2.2 Administrative costs for the bank  
To analyse the effect of cost estimates on the bank’s profit and the maximum annual carbon 
rental price payable to depositors, two cost estimates38 were used; costs from related work and 
costs collected by this study.  Firstly, five related studies with regards to small landholders were 
selected (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; Cacho, Lipper, & Moss, 2013; Chenost et al., 2010; Kumar 
et al., 2011; Pearson, Brown, & Sohngen, 2010).  Ranges (lower and upper bands) of cost 
estimates for each cost category were used.  The measurement units of costs vary for fixed and 
variable costs.  From the five studies variable costs relied on the size of the project ($/ha/yr) 
and fixed costs were annual ($/year).  Secondly, estimates of bank costs were collected during 
this study from a private bank in Guatemala City.  These costs were collected by personal 
communication39 with a staff member at the bank.  The same measurement units were used. 
 
The cost categories used in this study were adapted from McCann et al. (2005) and Antinori 
and Sathaye (2007).  The variable costs (Vc) are: search and negotiation (CS), measuring carbon 
base line (CB), monitoring (CM), validation, registration and approval (CVA), verification (CV). 
The fixed cost is overhead management (CO) (See costs description details in Table 3-1 in 
Chapter Three).  
 
The ranges of costs drawn from related work are: 
Searching and negotiation costs for small scale carbon projects ranged from $5/ha/yr to 
$35/ha/yr (Antinori & Sathaye, 2007; Cacho, Lipper, & Moss, 2013; Pearson, Brown, & 
Sohngen, 2010).  These costs include a wide range of activities such as identification of 
landholders, transportation, organisation of workshops, negotiation of contracts and prices, to 
name a few.  
                                                 
38 Cost units in this Chapter are expressed in USD $. 
39 Glenda Lee, Eco-business manager at Grupo de Occidente. www.grupoagroindustrial.net  
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For carbon offset projects from small landholders in Indonesia and Australia the monitoring 
costs ranged from $0.4/ha/yr to $8/ha/yr (Cacho, Lipper, & Moss, 2013; Chenost et al., 2010).  
The main activities for monitoring carbon sinks are establishing and measuring samples of plots 
to estimate the amount of forest carbon, visiting farms, reporting, and data analysis.  
Measuring carbon base line costs for small owners are estimated to be from $8/ha/yr to 
$25/ha/yr (Cacho, Lipper & Moss, 2013; Pearson, Brown, & Sohngen, 2010).  This entails the 
preparation and design of a project document, which includes the potential amount of carbon 
sequestration, the selection of monitoring methods, the estimation of carbon and financial 
flows, amongst others. 
Validation, registration and approval costs for small landholders’ carbon projects ranged from 
$10/ha/yr to $60/ha/yr (Pearson, Brown, & Sohngen, 2010).  These costs include searching for 
and hiring an accredited third party to undertake the validation process, and registering offsets 
in an international registered agency (e.g. Verified Carbon Standard).   
Verification costs for small landholders’ carbon projects ranged from $5/ha/yr to $12/ha/yr 
(Cacho & Lipper, 2007; Kumar et al., 2011; Pearson, Brown, & Sohngen, 2010).  Activities 
such as hiring an accredited third party to verify the carbon base line as well as to prepare the 
verification report are part of the verification process. 
Finally, overhead management costs varied from $50,000/year to $100,000/year (Cacho, 
Lipper, & Moss, 2013).  Some of the activities related to overhead cost are: maintaining a data 
base, administrating contracts, carbon bank accounts, permanent staff, making payments, 
coordinating field trips, hiring experts if needed, amongst others. 
From these ranges, the lower band of the cost estimates was used, assuming that these costs 
could be the minimum costs the bank may incur to deal with small landholders.  Table 7-2 
shows the type of costs (fixed and variable), the categories of costs, and estimated costs from 
related work and this study. The bank’s total cost (C), variable costs (Vc) and fixed costs (Fc) 
were estimated using Equation 3-17 from the carbon banking model in Chapter Three.  This 
Equation uses 7,594 ha of forest land as Ar to calculate Vc and Fc.  As can be seen, costs vary 
within and amongst categories.  The literature points out that costs may have a wide range of 
values.  This is because cost categories are quite sensitive to type, size of the farm, number of 
farms, monitoring methods, accessibility to forest land, frequency of monitoring, country’s 
economic situation, amongst others (de Gouvello & Coto, 2003; Ecosecurities, 2003; 
Michelowa et al., 2003). 
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Table 7-2. Cost estimates from related work and this study 
Type of 
cost 
ID Categories of costs 
Related work (US$) This study (US$) 
Lower 
band 
Lower band 
(Annual) 
Cost 
estimates 
Annual 
Fixed 
costs 
Co Overhead 50,000/yr 50,000 75,000/yr 75,000 
Subtotal 50,000/yr 50,000 75,000/yr 75,000 
Variable 
costs 
CS 
Searching and 
negotiation  
5/ha 37,970 20/ha 151,880 
CM Monitoring 0.40/ha 3,038 29/ha 220,226 
CB Base line 8/ha 60,752 24/ha 182,256 
CVA 
Validation, 
registration and 
approval 
10/ha 75,940 12/ha 91,128 
CV Verification 5/ha 37,970 3/ha 22,782 
Subtotal 28.40/ha 215,670 88/ha 668,272 
Total  265,670  743,272 
 
Considering the lower band of cost estimates from related work, total cost is $265,670 from 
which $28.40/ha are variable cost and $50,000/year is fixed costs.  The total cost estimate 
collected by this study is $743,272, which encompasses $88/ha as variable cost and 
$75,000/year as fixed costs.  These total cost estimates are used in the following subsection to 
determine their effect on bank profit and the breakeven annual carbon rental price payable to 
depositors.  
7.2.3 The effect of administrative costs and carbon prices on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 
In order to analyse the effect of administrative costs and carbon prices on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎, a sensitivity 
analysis was undertaken.  The variables and assumptions used in this analysis are shown in 
Table 7-3.  Bank profit (π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎) was estimated using Equation 3-20.  From this equation, the 
variables that are expected to show a certain level of sensitivity with regard to π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 are: bank 
cost, and international carbon prices.  Two international carbon prices were considered.  A 
carbon price of $5/tCO2e was the average carbon price in 2013 in the voluntary market (Kossoy, 
2013), and $20/tCO2e was the highest carbon price during 2008 (Kossoy, 2013).  The variables 
which remain fixed in the sensitivity analysis are: interest rate, total risk-adjusted amount of 
carbon available for lease after accounting for fire, pest and socioeconomic risks, total area of 
forest deposited by small landholders in the Montane region, and the number of small 
landholders in the same region (see values in Table 7-3). 
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Table 7-3. Variables and assumptions used for carbon banking analysis 
 
Based on the variables and assumptions listed in Table 7-3, Figure 7-1 shows graphically the 
effect of two cost estimates, and different carbon prices on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎.  This study aims to estimate 
the bank’s viability on the assumption that all forest carbon in the region is deposited.  Dark 
dots are breakeven points where carbon prices make π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 ($ M), while non-solid dots indicate 
π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 amounts at carbon prices of $5/tCO2e and $20/tCO2e.  Carbon prices from $1/tCO2e up 
to $20/tCO2e were used to plot and explore the tendency of π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 using both cost estimates.  
The dotted and solid lines are positively sloped straight lines for each bank cost. The former is 
based on the lower band costs from related work and the latter is using the cost estimates from 
this study.  When π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 is positive the bank is able to afford payments to small landholders 
after renting out their forest carbon.  To estimate the carbon price at which the bank breaks 
even, Equation 3-20 was arranged as follows 
 Pc = 
 Cr λ  *   KRr 
The breakeven point increases from $3.7/tCO2e considering the lower band cost estimates from 
related work to $10.5/tCO2e when using cost estimates from this study.  Cost estimates have 
important effects on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎.  The lower the carbon prices and higher the cost estimates, the 
lower π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎.  For instance, π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 with higher cost estimates (cost estimates from this study) 
at a price of $1/tCO2e is -$0.67 M, and at $5/tCO2e is -$0.39 M.  If cost estimates are less (cost 
estimates from related work) π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 increases, but is negative until Pc = $3/tCO2e.  At $1/tCO2e 
π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 is -$0.19 M and at $2/tCO2e is -$0.12 M.  
  
Variable Description Value 
KRr 
Risk-adjusted amount of carbon available for lease after 
accounting for risks 
1.449 M tCO2e 
Pc Carbon prices derived from international markets $5/tCO2e and $20/tCO2e 
Cr 
Total bank costs from related work lower band and from 
this study  
$265,670 and $743,272 
λ Assumed interest rate derived from financial markets 4.9% 
(7-1) 
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   Figure 7-1. The effect of total costs and carbon prices on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎. 
 
The bank increases its profit if costs are reduced and carbon prices increase.  This relationship 
in carbon projects has also been documented by Cacho and Lipper (2007), and Sohngen and 
Acres (2011).  They found in their model that if costs tend to be reduced and international 
carbon markets raise carbon prices, a positive effect on the profitability of carbon projects is 
attained.  For instance, the influence of carbon prices and cost estimates can be seen in Figure 
7-1.  When carbon price is $5/tCO2e, and PL= 0 the bank is able make profit of $0.09 M using 
cost estimates from related work, whereas with $20/ tCO2e, a profit of $1.15 M is generated by 
the bank when renting out landholders’ forest carbon.  On the other hand, using high cost 
estimates from this study, π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 > 𝟎𝟎 when carbon prices exceed $10.5/tCO2e.  With a price of 
$20/tCO2e π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 is $0.68 M. 
7.2.4 Carbon bank payments analysis  
The breakeven annual carbon rental price payable to depositors (PL�) is defined in Equation 3-
18 in Chapter Three.  Carbon bank payment analysis aims to assess two aspects:  1) the ability 
of the bank to make payments to small landholders for sequestering carbon and 2) to determine 
the international carbon price required to meet landholders’ forest carbon payment 
     π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 is zero ($ M)        π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 when Pc is 5 and 20 ($/tCO2e) 
π PL=
0  
 115 
requirements.  For the first analysis, four different maximum annual carbon rental prices 
payable to depositors (PL�) were estimated after taking into consideration two cost estimates and 
two carbon prices (see costs and carbon prices in Table 7-3).  To undertake the second analysis, 
data from the survey (Figure 4-2 in Chapter Four in the first section of the survey) with regards 
to landholders’ forest carbon payment expectations were analysed.  However, results showed 
that the question asked to small landholders was misunderstood; therefore, this analysis was not 
included in the carbon banking analysis (See details in section 7.2.5). 
 
Table 7-4 shows different options of PL� based on two cost estimates (Cr) and two carbon prices 
(Pc).  The price paid by renters (Pr) is derived from Equation 3-14 assuming Pc and λ from 
Table 7-3.  The bank cannot pay anything to depositors (PL� = -$0.26/tCO2e/yr) with current 
international carbon prices (Pc = $5/tCO2e, Pr $0.25/tCO2e), and with cost estimates from this 
study.  However, if costs are reduced (cost estimates from related work), using the same Pc and 
Pr, the bank is able to make a profit with payments up to $0.06/tCO2e/yr.  Another option is 
assuming that Pc is $20/tCO2e, (Pr is $0.98/tCO2e) and using cost estimates from this study, the 
bank is able to pay small landholders a maximum price of $0.45/tCO2e/yr in exchange for 
sequestering carbon.  If cost estimates from related work are used, PL� increases to 
$0.77/tCO2e/yr.  
 
Table 7-4. Annual carbon rental price payable to depositors (PL�) using two cost estimates and two carbon 
prices at which the bank breakeven.  
Pc 
($/tCO2e) 
Pr 
($/tCO2e) 
Cost estimates (Cr) from this 
study 
Cost estimates (Cr) from related 
work lower band 
5 0.25 PL� = -0.26 ($/tCO2e/yr) PL� = 0.06 ($/tCO2e/yr) 
20 0.98 PL� = 0.45 ($/tCO2e/yr) PL� = 0.77 ($/tCO2e/yr) 
 
Similar to π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎, PL� is also affected by carbon prices in international markets and cost 
estimates.  As can be seen in Table 7-4 the lower the cost estimates and the higher the carbon 
prices, the higher the maximum annual rental price the bank can pay to depositors.  
7.2.5 Small Landholder minimum payment 
Small landholders’ willingness to maintain their forest for one year was analysed by this 
question:  What would be the minimum payment you would require to maintain your current 
area of forest for the next year? (Quetzales/ha/year) (See survey in Figure 4-2 Chapter Four).  
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To standardise the currency variables in this study, the Guatemalan currency (Q) was converted 
into US dollars ($) using an exchange rate of Q 7.50 = $ 1.0040. 
 
When the survey was undertaken, 73 out of 85 small landholders answered the question about 
the willingness to receive a payment to protect their forest.  Some of the comments from the 12 
small landholders who declined to answer this question were;  a) We have been looking after 
our forest land for more than 50 years, so we do not need to sell this responsibility to someone 
else just for one more year, b) It is hard for us to accept a payment when we do not know if it 
will be fair and enough to cover all the benefits from our forest (e.g. wildlife, timber, fire wood, 
water reservoir, etc.), c) Our forest has been with us for more than 60 years and nobody has 
acknowledged the time we have invested in maintaining our forest land.  So, we do not see any 
price on our environmental commitment to look after our forest, d) If the payment involves 
being attached to a contract through which our traditional knowledge on forest management 
will be restricted, we do not accept any payment. 
 
The wide variations on the minimum payment landholders would require to keep their forest 
may have been distorted or misunderstood by landholders.  Notes from the survey when 
gathering information on the field indicated that these variations may have been influenced by 
individual criteria such as wages41, timber and fire wood prices42, different amount of working 
hours spent for pruning forest and weeding, and in other cases landholders could have used 
personal criteria of what they believe their land as a whole may worth to be maintained.  These 
reasons make the information collected an unrealistic set of data that should not be used for 
comparisons in the calculations of the carbon banking model.  
  
                                                 
40 At May 2013. http://www.banguat.gob.gt/cambio/  
41 Despite there is a minimum wages per day (Q.78.40) in Guatemala (Governmental accord 470-2014) they 
could have used what they think they may be worth per day. 
42 Forest in the department of Chimaltenango is broadleaf forest predominantly with a wide range of pines and 
oaks UVG, et al., (2012).  Landholders may have calculated different prices whether they have more oak or more 
pines.  Oak species have higher fire wood prices than pine as it lasts longer when using in stoves.  On the other 
hand Pine timber may have better prices than oak as oak timber is not well tradable for house constructions.  
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7.3 Discussion 
The carbon bank analysis was undertaken in the Montane region in Guatemala.  Recognising 
that small landholders’ forests are subject to biophysical disturbances such as fire and pest, and 
socioeconomic disturbances such as conversion to another land use, this research compared and 
combined these risks to explore their effect on the stability of forest carbon provided by small 
landholders.  This comparison between biophysical and socioeconomic risks and the effect on 
the effective carbon pool derived from small landholders reveals that forest carbon permanence 
is not subject to a high risk of being burnt, affected by pests or changed into other agricultural 
alternatives.  After accounting for forest fire, forest pests and socioeconomic risk, findings 
indicate that the bank might reduce the volume of carbon by 3%.  This means that 97 % of the 
potential maximum of 1.494 M tCO2e deposited will remain in the bank’s account to be rented 
out.  The highest to lowest proportions of forest carbon lost is by forest fire, pests and 
socioeconomic risks (See details in Table 7-1).  Marland and Marland, (2009) point out that 
capturing carbon from the atmosphere is still a significant challenge as it represents a benefit 
not only for the atmosphere but also to forest owners.  A low risk of being affected by any 
disturbance may allow small landholders to tap into a carbon rental market as it shows a great 
stability in their carbon sinks.  Despite the market opportunity derived from low biophysical 
and socioeconomic risks, the bank needs to take into account other risks such as administrative 
costs and carbon prices in international markets and explore whether these will influence π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 
and annual rental payments to small landholders.  
 
With regards to carbon bank cost, two cost estimates (variable Vc and fixed Fc) were used to 
analyse the effect on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 and on maximum possible rental payments to small landholders.  
Cost estimates from this study, and the lower band cost estimates from related work were used.  
It is noteworthy that costs in carbon initiatives vary from case to case (Cacho & Lipper, 2007; 
Torres et al., 2010).  The wide range of values in all categories of costs shown in the 5 cases 
studies illustrate the fact that cost estimates are highly sensitive to the type and size of project, 
monitoring methods, transportation, amongst others.  Since there is no evidence of carbon rental 
contracts operating in the market (Cacho, Lipper, & Moss, 2013), there might be a considerable 
variation and discussion on some of the categories of costs.  For instance, as the carbon rental 
approach is on an annual payment basis, annual monitoring costs per ha might tend to be high, 
not only because of the cost of hiring a certified third party every year but also because 
monitoring methods might vary for different types of forests.  An associated topic with 
monitoring is the cost related to training landholders to monitor their forest themselves. 
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This study provides an example of the effect of costs and carbon prices on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎.  Assumptions 
were considered in the sensitivity analysis (See Table 7-3).  Two variables were chosen in order 
to analyse the effect on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎.  These are cost estimates and carbon prices.  Figure 7-1 
illustrates two linear functions showing that low costs displaced the linear function to the left.  
This means that π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 increases as carbon prices increase and costs are reduced.  The highest 
breakeven point ($10.5/tCO2) arises if cost estimates are high and carbon prices are low.  The 
carbon bank will not generate any profit to pay to landholders to sequester carbon using the 
current international carbon prices.  At higher carbon prices, both total cost estimates have the 
same effect since they are parallel straight lines.  For instance, bank profit when π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 with an 
international carbon price of $20/tCO2e is $0.68 M using cost estimates from this study and 
$1.15 M considering cost estimates from related work.  
 
To analyse the maximum annual carbon rental price (PL�) the bank can afford to pay for 
deposited carbon, the same two cost estimates and two carbon prices were assessed.  Different 
payment options were estimated to explore which payment alternative the bank is able to afford.  
Taking into account the cost estimates from this study, a Pr of $0.25/tCO2e, with a current Pc 
of $5/tCO2e, an area of forest of 7,594 ha owned by 2,048 carbon depositors, the bank cannot 
afford to pay depositors (PL� is -$0.26/tCO2e/yr) for their forest carbon.  This finding is supported 
by Zaballa et al. (2013) who have argued that for the economics of forest and forest carbon 
initiatives, especially current carbon prices, carbon projects will not deliver the revenues that 
cover all expenses of mitigating carbon dioxide.  With this finding, the carbon bank is not viable 
to be set up to finance small landholders’ carbon forest in the Montane region in Guatemala.  
However, accounting for the same cost estimates but with a carbon price of $20/tCO2e, PL� is 
$0.45/tCO2e/yr.  Reducing costs (cost estimates from related work) at the current carbon price, 
PL� is $0.06/tCO2e/yr, and at $20/tCO2e it is $0.77/tCO2e/yr.  These results indicate that by 
lowering costs and with an increase in international carbon prices, the bank could afford to pay 
small landholders banking forest carbon in the Montane region.  This is supported by a similar 
study conducted by Cacho, Lipper, and Moss (2013) who found that the feasibility frontier for 
carbon projects involving small landholders is positively affected when carbon prices increased. 
Regarding cost estimates, Cacho and Lipper (2007), and Sohngen and Acres (2011) found that 
costs have also positive effect on carbon project profits when are reduced. 
 
Finally, this study also analysed the payment small landholders would require per year ($/ha/yr) 
to retain their forest.  Wide variations of what landholders would require to maintain their forest 
for one year were found.  Observations on the field showed that landholders took into account 
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different criteria to set their minimum payment they would require to avoid to reduce their 
forest land area.  For instance, landholders used different wages required for pruning trees and 
weeding as well as different forest product sale prices (timber and fuel wood). These variations 
revealed that data collected could have been misinterpreted by landholders when answering the 
question.  Therefore, data should not be used for further analysis in the carbon banking model 
as it might bias the results of the carbon bank viability. 
 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter examined the effects of risk from fire, pests and landholders’ decisions about land 
use, administrative costs and carbon prices on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 and on the maximum annual rental price 
the bank is able to pay to small landholders for deposited carbon.  The results of the 95th 
percentile of annual proportion of area affected by fire, pests and the likely proportion of forest 
lost by socioeconomic risk, indicated that the highest likely proportion was from forest fire risk, 
followed by socioeconomic and pest risks.  The combined effect on the deposited carbon 
showed that there is 97% of carbon available to rent out in carbon markets.  That is, from 1.494 
M tCO2e only 1.449 M tCO2e are available for lease. 
 
Assumptions were defined to undertake a sensitivity analysis in order to determine the effect of 
international carbon prices and administrative costs on π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎. The maximum annual rental 
prices paid to small landholders were structured to explore the options the bank has when 
considering two different cost estimates and carbon prices.  For both analyses, the following 
variables and assumptions were set:  cost estimates used were obtained from related work (Vc 
of $28.4/ha and Fc of $50,000/yr) and from this study (Vc of $88/ha and Fc of $75,000/yr).  
Carbon prices in international markets were:  $5/tCO2e, showing the current average carbon 
price, and $20/tCO2e which is an average when prices reached the highest peaks in 2008.  An 
interest rate of 4.9% and area of forest of 7,594 ha owned by 2,048 landholders were constant.  
Carbon deposited is 1.494 M tCO2e if the whole forested area is banked, the risk-adjusted carbon 
available for renting out is 1.449 M tCO2e.  From these variables the analysis reported that with 
the current carbon prices in international carbon markets and cost estimates from this study, the 
bank cannot make a profit; hence, it cannot afford to pay small landholders to capture carbon.  
Similar results arose when estimating international carbon price at which π𝐏𝐏𝐋𝐋=𝟎𝟎 becomes zero.  
It increased from $3.7/tCO2e to $10.5/tCO2e.  The annual carbon payment analysis indicated that 
using cost estimates from this study and with the current carbon price ($5/tCO2e) the bank 
cannot afford to pay to small landholders to protect their forest as PL� is -$0.26/tCO2e/yr.  Other 
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PL� options were estimated assuming the carbon price from previous years ($20/tCO2e).  So, 
highest PL� were $0.45/tCO2e/yr and $0.77/tCO2e/yr using cost estimates from this study and 
from related work, respectively.  Finally, the annual forest carbon payment what would be 
required from landholders to protect their forest was also assessed.  The question was 
misunderstood; therefore, data were not included in the carbon banking model. 
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    Chapter 8 
Conclusions, recommedations, and summary  
8.1 Conclusions 
This research aimed to investigate the viability of a carbon bank based on small forest owners.  
The key issues for a carbon bank, which is based on annual payments for sequestered carbon, 
are the stability of carbon pool formed from small landholders’ forest carbon after accounting 
for biophysical (forest fire and pests), and socioeconomic (land use change) risks, and the 
administrative costs of a carbon pool based on small landholders and how this relates to carbon 
prices.  The carbon banking model developed in this thesis incorporates such risks to estimate 
the effect on the effective carbon pool provided by small landholders, and how this affects 
payments to landholders for their sequestered carbon. 
 
To carry out this research, the following research questions were developed:  
 
a) What is the effect of biophysical risks from forest fires and forest pests on the 
effective carbon pool provided by small landholders?  
b) What is the effect of changes in land use on the effective carbon pool provided by 
small landowners?, and 
c) How should the bank structure payments to small landholders considering risks of 
fire, pests and landholder’s decisions about land use, carbon prices and 
administrative costs?  
By using different methods, each research question was addressed and findings were analysed 
in order to contribute to the understanding for the carbon banking approach.  
 
Biophysical risk such as forest fires and pests were modelled using historical data on fire and 
pest occurrence in a Monte Carlo simulation.  This allowed the estimation of risk to the carbon 
pool from biophysical factors. A bank was assumed to require 95% confidence for biophysical 
risk. At this confidence level, the annual proportion of forest burnt annually is 0.0113 and the 
annual proportion of forest affected by pests annually is 0.00044.  This means that the stable 
carbon pool that would be available for leasing and adjusted for the combined biophysical risk 
would be 98.8% of the total area deposited in the carbon bank. 
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Socioeconomic risks to the forest carbon pool provided by small landholders were modelled 
using demographic and property data obtained in a survey of small landholders in the Montane 
region of Guatemala. Landholders’ decisions about land use change were modelled using a 
double hurdle model.  The double hurdle model disaggregated the land use change decision into 
a two-step decision process.  The first step evaluated the probability that landholders would 
decide to change land use out of forestry.  This was analysed using a probit model. The second 
step evaluated the proportion of forest area reduced when a decision to reduce forest was made.  
This was assessed using a truncated model.  The results showed that a decision to deforest was 
more likely if the landholder was younger, had a larger number of family members living on 
the farm, and had a larger proportion of the farm in forest. Once the decision was made to 
deforest, the extent of deforestation was higher when the landowner had owned the farm for a 
long time, had a higher proportion of area in staple crops and forest area, had a smaller 
proportion in pasture, had a low level of education, generated less than US$250 per month from 
the farm, not being member of any forestry association. Using these results, the likely 
proportion of forest area lost annually by socioeconomic risk in the Montane region is 0.0019.   
 
The analysis of the combined effect of biophysical and socioeconomic risks on the small 
landholders’ carbon pool was carried out using joint probability theory.  Three independent 
probabilities (fires, pest and socioeconomic) of carbon release were used.  When comparing 
these probabilities, it showed that the highest risk to forest carbon loss was by fire, followed by 
socioeconomic and then pest risk (see Table 7-1 in Chapter 7).  The combined impact of all 
three risks at the 95% confidence level revealed that the carbon bank could have 97% available 
of carbon deposited from the Montane region to rent it out in carbon markets.  This shows that 
all risks combined do not significantly reduce the forest carbon pool from the bank’s accounts. 
 
A key focus of the research was to determine what the risk-adjusted payment should be to 
landowners, taking into account administrative costs and carbon prices. A sensitivity analysis 
was undertaken using the case study area for the Montane region.  This analysis used two 
different administrative costs estimates, one collected from this study and the other one from 
related work derived from reviewing literature. The cost estimates from this study indicated 
that variable costs could be $88/ha and fixed costs $75,000/yr.  The estimates costs from related 
work showed that variable bank costs are about $28.4/ha and fixed costs are about $50,000/yr. 
The two carbon prices used were the current price ($5/tCO2e) and a previous price ($20/tCO2e). 
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Using the higher cost estimates from this study and the current international carbon price 
($5/tCO2e), an area of forest of 7,594 ha spread across 2,048 landholders in the Montane region, 
the bank generates a loss (-$0.39 M) and would not be able to pay landowners.  However, using 
the lower cost estimates from related work and the current carbon price, the bank will make a 
profit absent payments to depositors ($0.09 M).  For the average landholder, this equates to an 
annual payment of $0.06/tCO2e.  If carbon prices returned to earlier levels of $20/tCO2e, and 
using the low cost estimates, the bank can be profitable when paying landholders annually up 
to $0.77/tCO2e. 
 
Finally, the small landholders’ willingness to maintain their forest for one year was assessed to 
explore which percentage of landholders might be interested to participate in the carbon 
banking approach.  Through a survey, small landholders provided a payment they would require 
to protect their forest and sequester carbon.  The question was not properly understood by 
landholders.  Possible reasons of these variations collected on the field were associated with 
personal valuations on wage, timber and fuel wood sale prices in local markets, and 
approximation of what they believe their land may imply to be maintained.  Because of these 
variations the bank should not use these data in its calculations as it may bias the carbon bank 
analysis. 
 
To complement this, contributions, limitations, recommendations and further research are 
described in the following subsections. 
 
8.2 Contributions of the research 
This research has made an important contribution to the literature in two main aspects, academic 
and policy.  The academic contributions are the modelling of biophysical and socioeconomic 
risks for carbon pools, and developing an empirical model of an alternative carbon aggregation 
system, carbon banking.  From the policy perspective the contributions are that carbon banking 
provides a market-based alternative mechanism to direct government interventions with 
landholders and that a carbon bank can also provide a means of offsetting the cost of 
governmental forest management programmes by tapping revenues from carbon markets. 
 
This study investigated the combined effect of the risk of forest fires, pests and land use change 
on the forest carbon pools.  Previous carbon sequestration literature has addressed forest fires 
(Carmel et al., 2009; Conedera et al., 2011; Couture & Reynaud, 2011), pests (Clark, 
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Kowronski, & Hom, 2010; Cook et al., 2008; Medvigy et al., 2012) and land use change (Eve 
et al., 2002; Guo & Gifford, 2002); however, this was for individual effects on the effective 
carbon pool.  By considering fires, pests and land use change, this study has identified that their 
combined effect is not significant to the total carbon pool showing that the small landholders 
do not represent risk at all to forest cover.  Finally, despite that these results are from Guatemala, 
this study could be considered in other regions taking into account the participation of small 
landholders. 
 
This is the first empirical application of the carbon banking approach outlined by Bigsby 
(2009a).  This research has developed a mathematical model to study the viability of a carbon 
bank based on a carbon pool comprised of small landholders who receive annual rental 
payments for their sequestered carbon.  Results indicated that a carbon bank for the Montane 
region in Guatemala can be profitable at carbon prices above $10.5/tCO2e, if the bank does not 
have to pay for carbon deposits.  The model approach could be also be used to incorporate 
additional biophysical risks, additional costs, and other environmental services associated with 
forest cover such as water, hunting and tourist activities in forests. 
 
From a policy perspective, this research contributes to Guatemalan forestry policy in two ways.  
Firstly, the market-based carbon bank approach is an alternative to direct government forestry-
related interventions.  Currently, the Guatemalan government is planning to provide direct 
economic incentives (Decree 2-2015) to support forest owners to undertake different 
sustainable forest management regimes43 through the National Forest Institute.  The carbon 
bank would provide small landholders with similar economic incentives to promote sustainable 
forest management.  Secondly, a carbon bank could provide a means of offsetting government 
subsidies or costs of other programmes to reduce deforestation by tapping revenues from carbon 
markets.  For example, the cost of the economic incentive programme discussed above could 
be reduced if the government was able to utilise a carbon banking scheme as the vehicle to 
provide financial support for sustainable forestry.  If necessary, financial support could be in 
the form of underwriting the cost of running bank or supporting carbon prices. 
 
  
                                                 
43 Such as forest management, forest protection, forest restauration, agroforestry, amongst others.  
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8.3 Limitations 
There are several limitations in this research.  Because of the short period for gathering data at 
field level, limited budget, lack of transportation, and the sparse distribution of landholders 
throughout the Department of Chimaltenango in Guatemala, this study only sampled 85 small 
landholders which was relatively small for the carbon banking analysis to analyse land use risk.  
A larger sample may have showed a strong and meaningful effect of explanatory variables on 
the landholders’ decisions about land use. 
Another limitation was imposed by the poor time series data regarding environmental 
disturbances, geographical specification, and specificity of units (such as affected area).  
Therefore, environmental disturbances such as landslides, wind throws and frosts were not 
included in this study.  Inclusion of historical data for these disturbances would have permitted 
an integrated risk analysis to determine the significance of these disturbances in the carbon 
banking model.  In addition, the carbon baseline for each landholder must be considered as an 
indicative estimate because the information of carbon content at the national level is not 
considered an accurate estimation of carbon stocks in all forests.  It only represents an 
approximation of what forests in Guatemala can potentially store in carbon content. 
Despite the researcher having access to information about the total landholding size of each 
landholder, this did not provide accurate information of how large the area of forest land and 
crops land are.  Areas of the different types of land use are an approximation of what 
landholders think they have.  However, the results provide a general idea about the effects of 
environmental disturbances and land use preferences on the landowners’ carbon pool. 
Information about the expected forest carbon payment from small landholders to protect their 
forest was collected, and an expected carbon price in international carbon markets to meet their 
requirements was estimated.  However, this research did not include small landholders’ 
opportunity cost of other economic alternatives they may have undertaken at their farms.  This 
information would have been worthwhile to obtain more accurately and provided a sound result 
about their carbon payment expectations.  Thus, results from this analysis could be considered 
as indicative for further related carbon rental studies.  
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Given the above limitations, especially those related to lack of information and limited time, 
the results of this research thesis should be treated as an indicative analysis of the carbon 
banking model. 
 
8.4 Recommendations and further research  
Due to the structure of the carbon bank investigation, the effects of the incorporation of medium 
and large landholders may be beneficial to explore the implications of expanding the carbon 
portfolio, diversifying the risk, and analysing the effect of economies of scale (increasing forest 
carbon depositors) in carbon rental payments from renters and to depositors.  This will allow 
the estimation of whether the carbon rental approach may be economically feasible for farmers.  
To do so, case studies could evaluate different scenarios with medium landholders, large 
landholders, and a combination of small, medium and large landholders.  
In order to expand and diversify carbon bank portfolios, the bank may potentially be extended 
to other forest services such as water and wildlife. These could be linked as co-benefits of forest 
carbon or independently.  Further research could be developed so as to determine a value for 
any of these services and explore the link between the level of the service and the forest 
management.  The research can be addressed by undertaking a case study on water, for example.  
This should generate information about water economic valuation, water market (supply and 
demand analysis), and potential co-benefit with forest carbon, amongst others.  
With regards to the land use risk, this research focused on those landholders who tend to make 
a decision on reducing their forest land area, and if the decision is made, the extent to which 
the forest land area is reduced.  This information is useful for the bank as it provides the factors 
influencing the reduction of forest area.  However, the landholders’ decisions can also be 
modelled to determine the factors that influence reforestation at the farms.  It means that the 
bank would be able to search and negotiate additional contracts with potential forest carbon 
depositors so as to increase carbon bank accounts for subsequent years.  
A supply curve analysis based on small landholders’ carbon payment expectations considering 
their opportunity costs could be helpful in order to explore whether carbon rental markets reach 
small landholders’ economic, social and environmental expectations.  This would provide a 
more realistic economic perspective on what small landholders are willing to receive to protect 
their forest and remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.  Conversely, it would allow banks 
to predict the amount of carbon deposited at various payments rates.  
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8.5 Summary  
In this research I have shown that the individual and combined effect of biophysical and 
socioeconomic risks is not significant on the stability of carbon pools provided by small 
landholders over one year.  The 95th percentile of annual proportion of forest burnt due to forest 
fire risk was 0.0113, the likely proportion of forest carbon lost by  socioeconomic (landholders’ 
decisions about land use change) is 0.0019 and the 95th percentile of annual proportion of forest 
area affected by pests was 0.00044.  This allows the bank to supply 97% from 1.494 M tCO2e 
deposited in the bank as the percentage of risk-adjusted forest carbon available to lease out from 
depositors to companies with carbon liabilities in carbon rental markets.  Nevertheless, these 
risks may still represent a threat to small landholders’ forest carbon due to their unpredictability 
for the future.  On the other hand, the third research question provides findings showing that 
the most influencing variables with respect to the carbon banking approach are the carbon price 
in international markets, administrative costs and landholders’ willingness to participate.  For 
example, if cost estimates from this study (higher costs estimates), current carbon price, with 
an area of forest of 7,594 ha owned by 2,048 small landholders in the Montane region, the bank 
cannot generate any profit; therefore, it cannot afford to pay landholders.  However, assuming 
that carbon prices would be as in 2008 and using the costs estimates of related work (lower cost 
estimates) the bank can pay a maximum annual carbon rental price of $0.77/tCO2e.  The 
landholders’ willingness to participate in the carbon bank was also assessed by analysing the 
minimum average payment they would require to avoid reducing their forest area.  As 
landholders based their answers on different criteria, the question “What would be the minimum 
payment you would require to maintain your current area of forest for the next year?” showed 
variations amongst landholders. The variation amongst landholders’ payments was possibly 
biased by the use of different wages, and forest product sales prices.  This drives the conclusion 
that the question asked was not properly interpreted by landholders.  So, the bank should not 
utilise it for economic calculations or further comparisons.  Finally, I believe that the individual 
and combined effects of biophysical and socioeconomic risks on landholders’ carbon pool, the 
aggregation of small landholders’ carbon in the bank from the Montane region after accounting 
for biophysical and socioeconomics risks, the design of a mathematical model to investigate 
the viability of the carbon bank by assessing the effect of reducing costs, modelling biophysical 
and socioeconomic risks and structuring payments to small landholders should be considered 
as the main contributions to the understanding of the carbon bank approach in Guatemala. 
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